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This outlook provides a focused assessment of the state of public capital in the 
major European countries and iden� fi es areas where public investment could 
contribute more to stable and sustainable growth. A European Public Investment 
Outlook brings together contribu� ons from a range of interna� onal authors from 
diverse intellectual and professional backgrounds, providing a valuable resource 
for the policy-making community in Europe to feed their discussion on public 
investment. The volume both off ers sector-specifi c advice and highlights larger 
areas which should be priori� zed in the policy debate (from transport to social 
capital, R&D and the environment).
The Outlook is structured into two parts: the chapters of Part I respec� vely 
explore public investment trends in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Europe 
as a whole, and illuminate how the legacy of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is 
one of insuffi  cient public investment. Part II inves� gates some areas into which 
resources could be channelled to reverse the recent trend and provide European 
economies with an adequate public capital stock.
The essays in this outlook collec� vely foster a broad approach to and defi ni� on of 
public investment, that is today more relevant than ever. Off ering up a � mely and 
clear case for the elimina� on of bias against investment in European fi scal rules, 
this outlook is a welcome contribu� on to the European debate, aimed both at 
policy makers and general readers. 
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on 
the publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary 
digital material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com
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Preface
Franco Bassanini, Alberto Quadrio Curzio,  
and Xavier Ragot
The major part of this outlook was written before or during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which has spread all over the world, but has erupted with special virulence in Europe, 
although with different speed and strength. This dramatic event is producing an 
economic slump and a social crisis of dimensions not yet assessable but certainly 
unprecedented, at least for our century. It does not nullify nor decrease the importance 
of the topic which is the subject of this research. On the contrary, it emphasizes the 
role of public investment in shaping not only the economy, but also society as a whole. 
In the short and medium term, a strong boost to public investment will be needed 
to cope with one of the worst legacies of the pandemic, the widespread public 
debt increase, caused by public policies aimed to mitigate the economic and social 
consequences of the shutdown of almost all production activities. The huge increase 
in public debt and even more in the debt-to-GDP ratio can in fact be addressed, as 
Mario Draghi recalled at the beginning of the pandemic outbreak in Europe, only by 
public policies capable of supporting the growth of the denominator or to reduce its 
fall; public investment and effective incentives for private investment are notoriously 
the most effective tools of these policies.
But this is only the quantitative side of the issue: as Floriana Cerniglia and Francesco 
Saraceno appropriately underline in their Introduction, the COVID crisis is moreover 
triggering “a healthy soul-searching process on our long-term development trajectory, 
questioning our way of life, our utilization of natural resources, the very social and 
environmental sustainability of our economies”. Public investment is in fact one of the 
key tools, with regulation and structural policies, to embed in the economy long-term 
horizons goals — such as sustainable growth, social and environmental objectives. 
Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis reveals, if necessary, that public investment must 
be analysed and coordinated at the supranational level, to attain some prominent 
European objectives, such as the fight against climate change or promoting an efficient 
mobility, but also to reach independent national objectives. 
The Outlook goes to the heart of the subject of public investment, using two 
complementary angles. The first is to identify public investment trends and needs in 
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Europe and in selected countries. The second is the analysis of key domains where 
European public investments are needed to build a more sustainable Europe, such as 
transportation, climate change, social investment, etc. These two approaches show the 
value of public capital both within European countries and as a European public good.
Public investment is a tool which is used to reach different goals: innovation, 
education, social cohesion across European regions and countries, the fight against 
climate change, growth and high-quality employment. There are in fact little trade-offs 
between these objectives, and they should be seen as complementary. 
This is all the more true after the eruption of the COVID-19 crisis. In this respect 
too, we are entering a world in which nothing will be as before. We have to be more 
ambitious in the goals we assign to public investment. As we have already mentioned, 
public policy toward a massive programme of investments will be needed to boost 
growth and consequently to make the higher public debt inherited from the crisis 
manageable. However, the quality of growth will be even more crucial. The “old” 
accounting approach of public investment, mostly measuring physical capital, is 
inadequate to fully grasp the nature of public investment. This increases the stock of 
human and social capital, which is part of the foundation of our complex European 
societies. The European Union should have a leading role in the new thinking about 
the role of public investment as a tool to reach the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
One might notice with some bitterness that we needed a pandemic that ground 
the world economy to a halt, to raise the awareness of policy makers around the world 
about the need of public investment. We believe that this timely Report will contribute 
to the debate that will, hopefully, continue past the emergency phase. 
The outlook was brilliantly and efficiently coordinated by Floriana Cerniglia 
(Cranec) and Francesco Saraceno (OFCE) in a complex environment. The editors of 
the Outlook started their effort in December 2017 at the Centre “Cranec” of Università 
Cattolica, where a first workshop on the relaunch of public and private investments took 
place. A second workshop was hosted by Astrid Foundation in Rome, a few months 
later. The authors of the different chapters of the Outlook, from various institutional 
backgrounds, collaborated in an admirable way, enriching their perspective from 
different countries. These “diversities” valuably contributed to the quality of the 
Outlook and made the message emerging from this volume even more significant.
Franco Bassanini, President of Astrid
Alberto Quadrio Curzio, President of Cranec
Xavier Ragot, President of OFCE
***
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In a recent Financial Times article Mario Draghi (2020) highlighted, in the midst of 
the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, the challenges ahead for advanced economies, 
and for the European Union in particular. As we write (April 2020), the extent of the 
economic damage from the pandemic is yet unknown. Even in the best-case scenario 
of a fast recovery, the world economy will experience an economic slump that will be 
far worse than the one that followed the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
Draghi’s Financial Times piece brilliantly states something on what most, if not 
all, policy makers and economists today agree on, namely that, facing a crisis of this 
extent, all macroeconomic policy tools need to be mobilized. In particular, the titanic 
effort of central banks to keep firms and governments afloat through massive liquidity 
injections is only one leg of the effort to support the economy. The other leg needs to be 
fiscal support, that in most countries is, for the time being, taking the shape of short-
term support to the productive system (temporary work schemes, loan guarantees) 
and to households’ incomes on the consumption side. In Europe this happens against 
the background of the suspension by the Commission of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), and of a somewhat softer interpretation of State Aid regulations. Governments’ 
efforts are unhampered by EU rules. The wager is that the joint operation of fiscal 
and monetary policy will succeed in preserving the vast majority of the productive 
structure and of incomes during the freeze associated to the lockdown, so as to 
facilitate a quick rebound as things go back to “normal”.
Now, the problem is that the new “normal” will not be as before. The legacy of the 
crisis will be a widespread increase of public debt, and a drop of both private and public 
investment, with most of the expenditure in the next few quarters focused on short-
term support to the economy. Furthermore, the COVID crisis is triggering a healthy 
soul-searching process about our long-term development trajectory, questioning our 
way of life, our utilization of natural resources, and the very social and environmental 
sustainability of our economies.
1  CRANEC — Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università Cattolica, Milano.
2  Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques — OFCE SciencesPo Paris; School of European 
Political Economy — Università Luiss Guido Carli Roma.
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This Report goes to the heart of this question by attempting to give a state of the art 
of public capital and investment needs in European countries and focusing on several 
of what we believe to be key sectors. Because of high debt, resources will be scarce; 
and because of the need to rethink our economic model, investment needs will be 
massive. Therefore, a careful assessment of these needs becomes paramount. Most of 
the chapters that compose this Report were submitted in their final form in the days 
preceding the outbreak of the virus in Europe. But they all deal with the existential 
questions posed by the current situation; more importantly, they collectively foster a 
broad approach to public investment that goes beyond the purely accounting definition 
that dominated the debate on public investment in the recent past.
Dealing with the environmental transition; needing to redefine the scope and extent 
of public services such as health care; making sure that we have in place the resources 
(human and physical) to face global crises that in the future are likely to increase in 
frequency — in all these cases we will need to invest not only in material assets, but 
also in intangible ones such as Research and Development (R&D), territorial cohesion 
or social capital. 
When the group of researchers gathered in this Report first met, one year ago, 
nobody would even remotely have imagined what the world economy is going 
through right now. But none of us doubted that the “old” accounting approach to 
physical capital was inadequate to fully grasp the role of the state in building the 
multifaceted capital that our complex economic system needs, to strive and to ensure 
social cohesion. One might notice with some bitterness that we needed a pandemic 
that ground to a halt the world economy, to make these very same issues a priority 
for policy makers around the world. We believe that this Report will contribute to the 
debate that will, hopefully, continue past the emergency phase.
In assessing the government role in building the stock of capital of the economy, 
we do not start from scratch. In fact, the renewed emphasis on the importance of fiscal 
policy as one of the tools for economic stabilization is the most visible outcome of 
the process of “rethinking macroeconomics” triggered by the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis. The New Keynesian theoretical consensus that emerged in the mid-1980s 
from the turbulence of the 1970s had abandoned the “Old Keynesian” focus on the 
stabilizing role of the State. Instead, emphasis was placed on the importance of market 
adjustment in absorbing shocks, and therefore on the fact that predictability and 
credibility of economic policy were its most important contributions to growth: by 
following monetary and fiscal rules, governments would anchor the expectations of 
efficient markets, and enhance their capacity to stabilize shocks. For the same reason, 
monetary policy was the preferred tool of the consensus. Lags and biases seemed 
inevitably linked to fiscal policy and that made it a source of uncertainty for markets. 
The Global Financial Crisis has come to shake this consensus. In 2008, faced with 
the severity of the crisis, monetary policy was not able to sustain aggregate demand. 
Liquidity injections were pivotal in stabilizing the financial sector and in cleaning up 
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the balance sheets of private (financial and nonfinancial) corporations of bad loans. 
But the infinite appetite for liquidity and the excess savings of the private sector, 
typical of balance sheet recessions, made it clear that monetary policy was pushing on 
a string, and fiscal stimulus packages in the Old Keynesian tradition had to follow to 
restart the engine of the economy. 
The hasty reversal of the fiscal stance, beginning in 2010, left the recovery without 
momentum in the United States; more significantly, it caused a second recession in the 
euro area. Monetary policy was left alone to struggle with the tendency of the economy 
towards secular stagnation. The flattening of the Phillips curve and the “missing 
inflation” following the gigantic liquidity injections on both sides of the Atlantic (not to 
mention the permanent quasi-deflation of Japan), led policy makers and academics to 
reassess the merits of fiscal policy as the primary tool to push the economy away from 
the liquidity trap and (more importantly) from the tendency towards secular stagnation.
The debate on the size of fiscal multipliers started by the mea culpa of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the impact of austerity (Blanchard and 
Leigh 2013), initially focused on short run countercyclical impact of fiscal policy at 
large. Jordà and Taylor (2016) recently confirmed in a more systematic framework 
Blanchard and Leigh’s conclusions, pointing at estimation errors in previous works. 
Once corrected these errors multipliers estimates tend to be much larger than was 
previously found, particularly in the event of a crisis. The meta-analyses of Sebastian 
Gechert and Henner Will (2012) and Gechert (2015) manage to extract from the 
abundant literature a number of broad conclusions: First, taking the average of the 
many studies they analyse, public expenditure multipliers are close to 1; this value is 
significantly larger than the 0.5 value that was taken as a basis of fiscal consolidation 
programs in crisis euro area countries; it had therefore to be expected that austerity 
triggered a second recession in Europe in 2012–2013. Second, consistently with the 
standard Keynesian argument, the spending multipliers are larger than tax and transfer 
multipliers. Nevertheless, these average values hide a very strong variability; this is 
not really surprising, as the value of the multiplier crucially depends on a number of 
factors such as the degree of openness of the economy and the distance of the economy 
from the natural equilibrium, known as the “output gap” (Berg 2015; Creel et al. 2011; 
Glocker et al. 2017).
Within the broader reassessment of fiscal policy, attention — especially that of 
policy makers — quickly switched to public investment. The Juncker Plan, while 
criticized in many respects, and probably closer to a Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
program than to a standard public infrastructure push, was an important symbolic 
act in that it officially brought back fiscal policy, and most notably investment, to the 
centre of the policy arena.
Since the seminal work of David Aschauer (1989) the role of public investment has 
been assessed both as a short-term aggregate demand support, and as a production 
factor that contributes to long-run productivity and potential growth. And yet, it is 
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in fact in a downwards trend since the early 1980s across advanced countries (IMF 
2014, and chapter 1 below). This trend, which can be thought of as a Kuznets cycle, 
accelerated with the financial crisis, as most countries tried to curb deficits and debt 
mainly through cuts in public investment, politically less sensitive than other items of 
public expenditure such as, for example, wages or entitlements. Figure 1 shows that 
the bias against public investment dates from the 1980s at least, and accelerated in the 
last decade (for further details see European Fiscal Board 2019, p. 74).
Fig. 1 Government Fixed Capital Formation as % of Primary Current Expenditure. 
Source of data: OECD Economic Outlook. Figure created by the authors.
At times of persistently weak and fragile growth, and with interest rates at record low 
levels, the advantages of stimulus through public investment are even more evident: 
on one side, borrowing costs are low; on the other side, the depletion of public and 
private capital stocks during the crisis make investment particularly productive, 
and the multiplier large. This is why, based on a large sample of developing and 
advanced countries, the IMF recently made the headlines beyond the academic and 
policy-making community by speaking of “free lunch”: public investment today is 
cheap and, boosting growth and fiscal revenues, it could pay for itself and ultimately 
reduce public debt (IMF 2014). Recent studies (e.g. Izquierdo et al. 2019) further show 
that this multiplier is higher when income per capita is low; in the European context 
this implies that investment would be particularly productive in the relatively poorer 
countries of the periphery. 
The estimation of public investment multipliers crucially depends on two variables: 
the first is the productivity of public capital. This is a particularly difficult variable to 
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assess, as measuring the public capital itself is rather complicated (see, e.g. Kamps 
2006, and chapter 2 below). The second relevant variable is the time it takes for 
capital to evolve into productive capacity. Once the productive capacity is operational, 
public investment will influence productivity and supply. How this affects short-term 
multipliers, however, is more ambiguous, because the reaction of monetary policy and 
of private expenditure to an increase of public expenditure may be different depending 
on whether the latter is current or capital expenditure. For example, the central bank, 
can be less aggressive against current inflation, anticipating future deflationary impact 
of new productive capacity. The short-term investment multiplier therefore could also 
be larger than the multiplier of current expenditure.
The meta-analysis of Pedro Bom and Jenny Ligthart (2014) reports elasticities 
of private production to public capital. This elasticity is used in standard models 
to determine the multiplier of public investment; they exhibit the same degree of 
variability as the broader multiplier estimates. Consistent with this intuition, the 
multiplier (even the short-term one) increases in size when public capital is more 
productive, and when time to build is shorter (so that future increases in productivity 
are nearer in time). In these cases, the positive purely Keynesian short-term demand 
shock, is quickly associated with the positive supply-side impact on productivity. 
The main takeaway of Bom and Ligthart’s meta-analysis (confirmed by Gechert 
2015) is that the multiplier associated with public investment is larger than the overall 
expenditure multiplier. This is particularly true in times of crisis (or when there is a 
tendency towards secular stagnation), when the economy is at the Zero Lower Bound.
The research on the impact of public investment triggered by the global financial 
crisis resonates with its recent surge in the public discourse. The centrality of public 
investment in addressing the issue of climate change, the debate on how to amend 
European fiscal rules so that governments have more incentives to adopt long-term 
strategies, the definition of public investment itself (is expenditure on human capital, 
for example in education or health care, less important than physical investment in 
ensuring long-term growth?): these are all questions of paramount importance, 
made yet more urgent by the events of recent weeks. Who would deny today that 
preparedness against pandemics is a crucial asset to protect not only lives but also the 
economy? An asset for which the current level of underinvestment is blatantly clear 
to the public! These are issues that will shape European policies (and politics) in the 
years to come. These are the reasons why we believe that our European Public Investment 
Outlook could constitute an important value added to the European debate. With this 
outlook — the first in a series of outlooks — we want to provide both an assessment 
of the state of public capital in (and of the needs of) the major European countries, 
and to identify areas where public investment could contribute more to a stable and 
sustainable growth. The scope of the outlook is not to advance the academic debate 
(although all the chapters present original material and data), but to provide a tool for 
the policy-making community in Europe to structure its discussion on the very notion 
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of public investment. The Outlook does not want to be exhaustive either, as we selected 
some items (from transport to social capital, R&D and the environment) that we 
believe should constitute a priority in the policy debate. Other items are emerging in 
this very moment (such as specific investment in health care and biomedical research) 
that will certainly be treated in the next edition of the Report. It is worth stressing once 
more that our choice to broaden the definition of public investment beyond traditional 
measures is vindicated by the events of these weeks, and this makes the Report more 
relevant than ever in the current situation.
The Outlook is organized in two main parts. The first part sets the stage, providing 
trends on public investment in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. It is preceded by 
an initial chapter by Rocco Luigi Bubbico, Philipp-Bastian Brutscher and Debora 
Revoltella from the European Investment Bank (EIB) outlining the experience of 
Europe as a whole. The picture is as follows: between 2008 and 2016 public investment 
in the EU declined from 3.4% of GDP to 2.7%. Despite a slight rebound in 2017 and 
2018, public investment still stands at only 2.9% of GDP, 15% below its pre-crisis levels. 
Fiscal consolidation pressure was at the core of such decline in public investment 
especially in countries that experienced a strong pressure to tighten their budgets. The 
negative effect of fiscal consolidation was in many cases amplified by a re-prioritization 
of public outlays away from investment towards current expenditures. Infrastructure 
investment was disproportionately affected by the decline in public investment. EIB 
estimates show that overall infrastructure investment declined by about 25% between 
2008 and 2016, with the government sector accounting for the lion’s share of this fall. 
From a sectorial perspective, investment in transport and education infrastructure 
experienced the strongest decline. The chapter clearly documents that the fall in 
government infrastructure investment does not reflect a saturation effect, the annual 
infrastructure investment gap is estimated to be about €155 bn and that construction 
of new infrastructure seems to continue to produce large positive economic spillover 
effects. This chapter advises, as a policy lesson, sound project selection: preparation and 
implementation are the keys to reversing the negative trend in investment activities in 
the EU, besides overcoming funding constraints. Obviously, to ensure the efficient use 
of available funds, sound infrastructure governance is also a key factor. 
In chapter 2, Mathieu Plane and Francesco Saraceno take up the case of France, 
where public investment has seen contrasting trends in recent decades. Although it was 
rather dynamic until the 2000s, a real inflection took place at the turn of 2010 when the 
government turned to austerity, and a large part of fiscal adjustment was achieved by 
reducing capital expenditure. Their chapter starts by looking at the evolution of general 
government net wealth from the late 1970s. While still positive, the consolidated net 
wealth is today at an all-time low. Indeed, after reaching a record level in 2007 (58.1% 
of GDP) it has lost 45 points of GDP in the space of eleven years. Plane and Saraceno 
then focus on the evolution of the stock of non-financial assets held by the general 
government. Most of this is non-produced (land), and it has fluctuated greatly because 
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of changes in prices. The stock of fixed assets, which represents the accumulation of 
public productive capital, has been much more stable, and it is owned mostly by local 
governments. The authors then focus on flows (investment), to conclude that, with 
the exception of intellectual property rights, all components of public investment are 
today at historic lows and it is “civil engineering works” that have experienced the 
greatest decline. For the last three years, public net investment was negative, meaning 
that France does not accumulate public capital anymore. In fact, since 2009 the increase 
of debt has not been used to finance new investment but mostly current expenditure. 
Finally, the chapter analyses, by means of a multi-sector macroeconomic model, 
the impact on growth in different macro sectors, of a permanent increase of public 
investment. Based on this analysis, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
public investment needs of the French economy, and, like other chapters of the Report, 
pleads for the introduction of a Golden Rule of public finances aimed at preserving 
capital expenditure.
Chapter 3, by Sebastian Dullien, Ekaterina Jürgens and Sebastian Watzka, reports 
on German debates about public investment. As with France, underinvestment by the 
public sector over the past two decades has led to a severe deterioration of the public 
capital stock. Moreover, demographic change, decarbonization and digitalization 
pose significant challenges for the German economy which imply additional public 
investment needs. A detailed sector-by-sector overview of investment requirements 
concludes that investment requirements add up to at least €450 bn over the next decade. 
Through a macroeconomic simulation, it is shown that a debt-financed increase of 
public expenditure of this magnitude would be compatible with keeping the debt-to-
GDP-ratio below 60% and would have a positive impact on potential growth.
Chapter 4, by Floriana Cerniglia and Federica Rossi, addresses the case of Italy. 
They start from the premise that this country, over the last decade, has experienced 
the worst economic crisis, which has had a huge impact on the already weak public 
finance conditions. Italy had to implement extraordinary actions to contain and 
reduce its public debt. Public investments have been curtailed the most, with respect 
to other functional areas of expenditure. The chapter provides an overview of major 
trends in public capital expenditure, including local and national public companies, 
which in Italy are significant contributors to public investment. The chapter considers 
also the breakdown of public investment by levels of government. Since the reform 
of the Italian Constitution in 2001, the interactions between levels of government 
in Italy have become increasingly challenging. Coordination issues between the 
central government and sub-national governments in running current and capital 
expenditures as well as the financing of local expenditures (both current and 
capital) remain unsolved problems, which most obviously impact the time required 
to make an investment. Moreover, Italy’s regional divide remains large, and sadly, it 
continues to grow. The issue of having shares of public investments in North-Central 
Italy and the Mezzogiorno, that proportionally reflect the population in those areas, 
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has been a serious political concern these last years. Finally, the chapter discusses 
some legislative and bureaucratic factors that keep investments in Italy from taking 
off and hinder the transformation of resources into actual construction sites. The 
authors conclude by an assessment of some policy prescriptions for the relaunch of 
Italian public investment.
In chapter 5, José Villaverde and Adolfo Maza discuss the case of Spain, which, 
like Italy, has experienced the most acute economic crisis since the end of the Second 
World War. Because of that, the country had to face some important constraints in its 
public finances and public investment experienced a severe blow after the outbreak of 
the crisis. Before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis — namely during the period 2000–
2007 — Spain was the country that registered the second highest increase in public gross 
fixed capital formation among the five biggest European countries (France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and the UK), a rate (6.8% per year) that was also much higher than that of 
the EU (2.3%) and the euro area (2.6%). However, over the next period, 2008–2013, the 
situation changed completely: public investment dropped on an annual basis at a rate 
close to 11%; thus, Spain suffered the most acute decline in public investment by far 
among the among the big five. It also emerges that public investment in Spain has been 
very volatile and pro-cyclical over time (with large increase periods during boom times 
and huge falls during recessions); investment in infrastructures always represents the 
main component of public investment. This implies a policy agenda towards a more 
anti-cyclical stance and a rebalancing of types of investments, for instance the necessity 
to increase the share devoted to information and communications technology (ICT).
A common theme that emerges from the first part is that in Europe, and specifically 
in its largest economies, the legacy of the Global Financial Crisis is one of insufficient 
public investment. The chapters were written before the COVID outbreak, and the 
reader can easily imagine how current events will make the need for public capital, 
broadly defined, even more stringent. The second part of the Report investigates some 
possible areas into which resources could be channelled to reverse the recent trend 
and provide the European economies with an adequate public capital stock. Recently, 
economic literature has not only focused its attentions on the growth of physical 
infrastructures, as such. Economic analysis has sought to analyse more carefully types 
of investments which are very favourable to economic growth (OECD 2015). For 
instance: public R&D research investments, social investments, public infrastructure 
targeted to support private spending and business investments that may take 
advantage of location, and investments that may be necessary to respond to global 
climate emergencies. Understanding the challenges and opportunities of these types 
of investment could lead to improved infrastructural policy in Europe. In this respect, 
it is strongly recommended to have an assessment also on types of investments in the 
EU Cohesion Policy, to date the main investment policy in EU. The second part of the 
Outlook offers some ideas for the policy debate on these themes. 
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Chapter 6, by Daniela Palma, Alberto Silvani and Alessandra Maria Stilo, analyses 
the role of research and innovation as key drivers of economic growth, and as an object 
of renewed concern in the European policy agenda. In this regard, however, special 
attention has been paid to the role played by public funding with respect to the now 
more than ever complex evolution of technological innovation and the need for the 
productive structure to be supported to continuously capture the potential of new 
technologies. Starting from a well-established ground of most recent analyses carried 
out on main R&D indicators by major institutional organizations, the authors present a 
work aimed at bringing out the nature of “system infrastructure” of European research 
activity, calling for the need to assess to what extent the resources dedicated to R&D 
and the relative spending modes are able to turn into an effective development lever, 
starting from the structural characteristics of the entire research and innovation system. 
They claim that, in order to overcome the existing differential between EU countries 
in research and innovation performances, rebalancing public funding, while orienting 
intervention towards common initiatives, is not enough. The implementation of a 
new course of public investment research policies should instead envisage a renewed 
orientation of the strategies consistent with the new course of missions/objectives 
formulated at the European level and, at the same time, point to a coordination with 
policies aimed at increasing the innovative potential of the economic system, in relation 
to the characteristics of the productive specialization of each country.
Anton Hemerijck, Mariana Mazzucato and Edoardo Reviglio, in chapter 7, offer 
an original perspective: the most competitive economies in the EU spend more on 
social policy and public services than the less successful ones. However, the twenty-
first century knowledge economies are ageing societies and require European welfare 
states to focus as much — if not more — on ex-ante social investment capacitation 
than on ex-post social security compensation. The growing needs for social services 
will require new and updated social infrastructure. According to a report on social 
infrastructure in Europe coordinated by former President of the European Commission 
Romano Prodi in 2018, the minimal gap is estimated at €100–150 bn per annum and 
represents a total gap of over 1.5 tn in 2018–2030. Long-term, flexible and efficient 
investment in education, health and affordable housing is considered essential for 
the economic growth of the EU, the well-being of its people and a successful move 
towards upward convergence in the EU. But how do we finance the great new needs 
with such a pressure on public finances? The chapter suggests innovative financial 
solutions using institutional and community resources to lower to cost of funding of 
social infrastructure. One such solution is the creation of a large European Fund for 
Social Infrastructure, owned by State Investment Banks (SIBs) and institutional long-
term investors, which would fund its operations by issuing a European Social Bond. 
In this endeavour, a central role must be played by the EIB and by State Investment 
Banks. The authors discuss the potential role of these “mission-oriented” SIBs in social 
innovation by changing their mission. They should not simply “compensate market 
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failures” but also become institutions that “shape the market” and become major 
providers of sustainable long-term and patient finance to deliver public value. 
Paolo Costa, Hercules Haralambides and Roberto Roson, in chapter 8, look back 
at the genesis — in Europe — of the transnational transport infrastructure which has 
long coincided with the Ten-T network, developed — sometimes as a weak Keynesian 
stimulus — as a tool for strengthening the cohesiveness and economic efficiency of 
the internal market. Following the enlargement of the EU, Ten-T has been evolving 
from 1996 to 2013, and has been encouraging modal shifts from road and air to rail, 
inland navigation and short-sea shipping, in order to achieve higher environmental 
sustainability and combat climate change. However, during these notable efforts, 
little attention has been paid to the external dimension of European connectivity. 
Along with addressing a number of technical disruptions affecting transport and 
its infrastructure, the new wave of Ten-T revision — due by December 2023 — must 
depart from what has thus far been an introverted view of Europe as a single market 
(something that has often penalized European competitiveness) to an extroverted 
orientation of the Union as a key player in a global market. The growing economic 
centrality of Asia since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); 
China’s strong interest in the Mediterranean Basin as the “super-hub” that connects 
four continents; and the eastward shift of the European economic barycentre: all of 
these developments indicate possible solutions for addressing the “geographical 
obsolescence” of the current Ten-T. In parallel, innovation-driven disruption of the 
worldwide maritime freight transport network and its infrastructure necessitates 
the streamlining of port nodes and rail networks around the world, in a way that at 
the same time addresses efficiently the current “technological obsolescence” of big 
parts of European infrastructure, predominantly of ports. The authors argue that 
new Ten-T network evolving into a Twn-T (Trans-Global) one ought to no longer be 
the product solely of European decisions: dovetailing Ten-T with China’s “Belt and 
Road Initiative — BRI” will not only be unavoidable but also, rather, a most welcome 
development. 
The global climate emergency is the main concern of chapter 9, by D’Maris Coffman, 
Roberto Cardinale, Jing Meng and Zhifu Mi. Anthropogenic climate change is widely 
understood to be the greatest existential threat to human societies in the coming 
centuries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established 
in 1988 to coordinate a global response to the coming crisis. The IPCC’s publication 
of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR15) in October 2018 has helped to 
galvanize public opinion and has given rise to unprecedented climate activism. State 
actors now recognise a need for immediate action. Broadly speaking, possible responses 
to climate change fall into three categories: mitigation, adaptation and remediation. 
Mitigation means measures to reduce carbon and methane emissions or to enhance 
carbon sinks; adaptation means measures that ameliorate the effects of climate change 
on human populations; and remediation means intentional measures to counteract 
Introduction  11
the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including global warming and ocean 
acidification. There are inevitable trade-offs between the costs of mitigation and those 
of adaptation over decadal time horizons. Nevertheless, with all three responses, 
large-scale infrastructure investment is required, with varying degrees of involvement 
by state actors, multilateral organizations, other non-governmental organizations 
(including religious groups) and, most significantly, private capital markets. In 
the current climate, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have taken a leading 
role. The EIB particularly is in the process of rebranding itself as a Climate Bank for 
Europe following Emmanuel Macron’s call. The authors then explore the investment 
opportunities that arise as a result of the growing urgency of the low carbon transition.
As mentioned, the Cohesion Policy is the EU’s main investment policy and — in the 
wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis — the European Regional Development Fund 
and the Cohesion Fund became the major sources of finance for investment in many 
countries. Francesco Prota, Gianfranco Viesti and Mauro Bux, in chapter 10, review how 
this policy has evolved over time in terms of financial size and geographical coverage. 
Firstly, in the programming period 2000–2006, the centre of gravity in Structural Funds 
allocation shifted from the Southern regions too the Eastern regions of Europe. What 
is interesting is that, looking at the expenditure composition by types, ‘transport 
infrastructure’ and ‘environmental infrastructure’ are the main expenditure items. The 
investments in transport infrastructure financed by the Cohesion Policy have changed 
the accessibility of EU regions. In particular, many regions in Eastern Europe have 
significantly benefitted from the Cohesion Policy financed transport infrastructure 
investments in terms of improved accessibility. Also, as result of the 2008 crisis, the 
Cohesion Policy has been the major source of finance for public investment for many 
Member States of the European Union. In 2015–2017 it represents around 14% of 
the total; this figure is larger than 50% in some small Central and Eastern European 
countries, in Portugal and Croatia; larger than 40% in Poland; larger than 30% in most 
of the other Central and Eastern European countries. In the EU-15, the figure is lower 
in most Member States (7% for Spain, 4.4% for Italy and 2.5 % for Germany). However, 
it has reached 20% of total capital expenditures in Convergence regions in Spain, 15% 
in Italy and 10% in Germany.
The authors of the different chapters of this Outlook come from different countries, 
and from different intellectual and professional backgrounds. The diversity of the 
topics they tackle and of their approaches, nevertheless, does not prevent a strong 
message from emerging throughout the volume; a message that in the current health 
and economic crisis is more relevant than ever: Without an increased role for public 
investment, without a less myopic approach to costs and benefits of fiscal policy, without 
embedding a long-term horizon into the trade-offs that inevitably characterize public 
policy, none of the challenges facing European economies will be properly dealt with. 
While the policy prescriptions of the Report are varied and sector-specific, 
many of the chapters share the idea that European fiscal rules should be revised to 
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eliminate the bias against investment. This is an idea that is now consensual even 
among European policy makers. We already cited the assessment by the European 
Fiscal Board (2019), highlighting the existence of the bias especially during the 
2010–2015 fiscal consolidation phase. The same diagnosis motivates the consultation 
process recently (February 2020) launched by the Commission on the reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. While that consultation has been put on hold during the 
COVID emergency, it is likely that it will resume sometime in the future, and that the 
emergency itself will have pushed towards a rewriting of the rules with the aim of 
preserving public investment. 
The old idea of a Golden Rule is now making headway again in policy circles; such 
a rule would allow debt financing of investment expenditure, requiring countries to 
balance current expenditure and revenues. In light of the discussions of the Report, the 
challenge would be to abandon a mere accounting approach, and to define investment 
in a functional way, so as to encompass all the sectors discussed here (Dervis and 
Saraceno 2014). But this is only part of the solution. The discussions on the 2021–2027 
European Union budget stalled until very recently: held hostage by countries’ defence 
of their positions around decimals of a point of GDP. The COVID-19 crisis is reshuffling 
the cards: a substantial increase of the EU budget, together with a more pervasive role 
to be played by the EIB, is one of the options on the table to end the stalemate on debt 
mutualization.
It is a vaste programme3 indeed, that we face. The management of the emergency 
cannot be disentangled from a long-term rethinking of our growth model, of the role 
of the welfare state, of the best policies to preserve the social capital of the economy. 
As if this were not enough, in Europe this also forces us to ask the question of the 
appropriate institutions for macroeconomic governance. This Report provides a state 
of the art of these issues and starts by investigating some of the answers.
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Public investment went through a prolonged contractionary phase over the past 
decade. Between 2008 and 2016 public investment in the European Union declined 
from 3.4% of GDP to 2.7%. Despite a slight rebound in 2017 and 2018, public investment 
still stands at only 2.9% of GDP, 15% below its pre-crisis levels.
Fiscal consolidation pressure was at the core of the decline in public investment. 
This is witnessed by particularly strong falls in public investment in countries that 
experienced a strong pressure to tighten their budgets. The negative effect of fiscal 
consolidation was in many cases amplified by a re-prioritization of public outlays 
away from investment towards current expenditures. 
Infrastructure investment was disproportionately affected by the decline 
in public investment. The European Investment Bank (EIB) estimates show that 
overall infrastructure investment declined by about 25% between 2008 and 2016; with 
the government sector accounting for the lion’s share of this fall. From a sectorial 
perspective, investment in transport and education infrastructure experienced the 
strongest decline.
The fall in government infrastructure investment does not reflect a saturation 
effect. About one in three municipalities in the EU report that infrastructure 
investment activities in the last five years were below needs. In addition, the fall in 
infrastructure investment activities was particularly pronounced in regions with a 
poor infrastructure quality to start with. Moreover, construction of new infrastructure 
seems to continue producing large positive economic spillover effects (EIB 2018). 
Overall, using a bottom-up approach, the annual infrastructure investment gap is 
estimated to be about €155 bn.
Sound project selection, preparation and implementation are key to reversing the 
negative trend in investment activities in the EU, in addition to overcoming funding 
constraints. To ensure the efficient use of available funds, sound infrastructure 
1  Policy Advisor, European Investment Bank’s Permanent Representative Office — Brussels.
2  Economics Department — European Investment Bank.
3  Director of the Economics Department — European Investment Bank.
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governance is key. This requires a comprehensive analysis of all economic and social 
costs and benefits. However, often such technical capacity is particularly weak in 
areas that invest little and face a range of other socio-economic challenges (EIB 2018). 
Addressing investment gaps, thus, calls for a series of complementary policies to 
increased spending, including lending, blending and technical advisory activities. 
1.1. Recent Public Investment Trends in Europe 
After a strong decline in public investment activities following the global financial 
crisis and subsequent sovereign debt crisis, public investment has started to gradually 
recover in recent years (Figure 1). After hitting its lowest level in two decades in 2016 
(at 2.7% of GDP), government investment increased slightly in 2017 (to 2.8%) and 
2018 (2.9%). Despite the reversal of the negative trend, public investment remains well 
below its long-term average of 3.1% of GDP between 1995 and 2017.
Fig. 1 Public Investment by country group (1995–2020)
Note: this chart reports Gross Fixed Capital Formation of the General Government as % of GDP. 
Forecast for 2019 and 2020. Data are missing for Croatia in 1995–2000. Source of data: Eurostat, 
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The recent increase in public investment was driven by investment activities in the 
Cohesion countries. In this group, gross fixed capital formation of the public sector 
increased from 3.6% of GDP to 4.3%. While positive, at least part of the increase reflects 
a mere rebound effect after a strong decline in investment activities in 2016 due to the 
start of a new programming period of European Structural and Investment Funds. 
Public investment in other parts of Europe remained broadly unchanged from their 
2016 levels and well below their long-term averages. 
From a cross-country perspective, investment increased markedly in Cyprus, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Croatia and Bulgaria. The increase in Cyprus was, however, 
largely due to one-off accounting measures.4 In Greece public investment continued to 
decline. Italy and the Netherlands also recorded declines in public investment, albeit 
more modest ones than in Greece, putting their investment levels at their lowest in 
twenty-five years, relative to GDP. 
Fig. 2 Public Investment in 2018 by Member States (1995–2018)
Note: this chart reports Gross Fixed Capital Formation of the General Government as % of GDP. 
Vertical black lines report the range of values observed in 1995–2018. Thresholds for ‘in line’ 
with long-term average: +/- 0.25% from average. Data are missing for Croatia in 1995–2000.  
Source of data: AMECO. Figure created by authors.
4  Cyprus registered the strongest increase in public investment in Europe. However, the strong increase 
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Tight fiscal budgets and a change in spending priorities are at the core of the decline 
in public investment in recent years. Public investment has fallen most in countries 
that experienced strong pressure to tighten their budgets. The negative effect of fiscal 
consolidation was in many cases amplified by a re-prioritization of public outlays 
away from investment towards current expenditures. The budget share of current 
expenditures increased, for example, from 84.4% on average between 1995 and 2017 to 
87.7% in 2018 (Figure 3). Instead, the budget share of capital spending dropped from 
9.3% to 8.4%.
Fig. 3 Change in public expenditure composition (2018 versus 1995–2017 average)
Note: this chart reports the changes in public expenditure composition from a long-term average 
(1995–2017) to 2018 by expenditure category. The sum of the components equals zero. Capital 
expenditure includes Gross Fixed Capital Formation, capital transfers paid and other capital 
expenditures. Source of data: AMECO. Figure created by the authors.
After the considerable fiscal contraction of 2011–2013, the fiscal stance of the EU 
has started to improve (Figure 4). There are no signals, however, that this will 
translate into a strong pick-up in public investment any time soon. The fiscal forecasts 
of the European Commission suggest that, despite the positive fiscal outlook, public 
investment will increase only slightly in 2019 and 2020, to 3.0% of GDP.
What is more, there is no sign of a reversal of the deprioritization of public 
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to remain stable in 2019 and even decline slightly as a percentage of current expenditure; 
suggesting no change in expenditure prioritization between current outlays and gross 
fixed capital formation (Figure 5).
Fig. 4 Fiscal stance in the European Union
Note: output gap as difference between actual and potential gross domestic product. 2019 and 2020: 
forecast. Source of data: AMECO. Figure created by the authors.
Taking a medium-term perspective, public investment is projected to remain below 
its long-term average. The Stability and Convergence Programmes submitted during 
the 2019 European Semester show a steady outlook for public investment in the 
medium term. Budgetary plans report an aggregate public investment equal to around 
2.9%–3.0% of GDP in Europe in 2019–2022 budget plans, which is below its long-term 
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The 2019 European Semester shows awareness of the issue. Compared to previous 
exercises, it has a stronger focus on investment. One of the general recommendations 
is to continue steps towards a ‘growth-enhancing’ composition of public spending. 
Member States with adequate scope, notably Germany and the Netherlands, are 
recommended to use fiscal and structural policies to increase public investment. 
The Commission also singles out, in each Member State, investment priorities. The 
Commission recommends most Member States to focus spending more on R&D and 
innovation, sustainable transport and energy (network infrastructure, low-carbon 
transition and/or energy efficiency).
A European Public Investment Outlook22 
Fig. 5 Fiscal stance and capital expenditure in the European Union
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1.2. Infrastructure Has Declined Substantially 
An area that suffered disproportionately from the fall in public investment is 
infrastructure investment. Applying the EIB methodology to proxy infrastructure 
investment,5 we find that infrastructure investment continuously declined since 2009. 
At 1.7% of GDP, overall infrastructure investment now stands at about 75% of its pre-
crisis level (Figure 6). 
5  We define proxy infrastructure investment as gross fixed capital formation in other buildings and 
structures in the infrastructure sectors (Revoltella et al. 2015). 
The government sector is the main driving force behind the decline. Government 
infrastructure investment declined between 2009 and 2017 by 0.5% of GDP. Over the 
same time horizon corporate infrastructure investment increased by 0.1% of GDP 
while infrastructure investment activities by Special Purpose Vehicles declined by 
0.1% of GDP. The decline in government infrastructure investment (as a share of 
GDP) corresponds to a fall of 37%; which is more than the fall in public investment 
reported earlier, suggesting that the latter affected infrastructure investment activities 
disproportionately. 
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Fig. 6 Infrastructure investment by sector and promoter
Note: based on EIB Infrastructure Database. Data are missing for Belgium, Croatia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and the UK. PPP: public-private partnership. Source of data: Eurostat, Projectware, 
EPEC. Figure created by the authors. 
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Government infrastructure investment includes fewer sectors and asset types 
than overall public investment. While public investment spans all sectors of economic 
activities including, for example, defence, security and recreational activities, 
infrastructure investment is limited to a narrower set of activities. Notably, for this paper 
it includes transport, energy, water, ICT, health and education. In addition, whereas 
public investment does not differentiate between investments in different asset classes, 
infrastructure investment activities are limited to gross fixed capital formation in ‘other 
buildings and structures’; therefore excluding investments in machinery, equipment, 
vehicles and intellectual property. To the extent that infrastructure investment 
activities are often much more bulky than non-infrastructure public investment, they 
lend themselves more easily to delays and/or cuts (EIB 2017).
The decline in government infrastructure investment has affected primarily 
the transport sector and educational sector. Government infrastructure investment 
accounts for the biggest share of total infrastructure investment in the transport and 
education sector (with 80% and 90% of total infrastructure investment, respectively). 
The share of government investment is lower in other sectors (55% in health; 30% in 
the utilities sector; and 10% in ICT). If we compare the evolution of infrastructure 
investment across the various economic sectors, it is, therefore, not surprising to 
find that — on the back of the strong contraction of government investment in these 
sectors — it is in particular transport and education that saw the strongest declines in 
overall investment activities.
Sub-national governments reduced their infrastructure investment activities 
disproportionately. Subnational investment accounts for more than half of overall 
government infrastructure investment (Figure 7). If we compare the fall in overall 
government infrastructure investment and the change in sub-national infrastructure 
investment, we find that changes in overall government infrastructure investment often 
came with disproportionate changes at the subnational level in the same direction. 
This is true in particular in regions with little fiscal autonomy (EIB 2017). 
The fall in government infrastructure investment does not reflect a saturation 
effect. The fall in infrastructure investment activities was particularly pronounced in 
regions which had a poor infrastructure quality to start with (EIB 2018). However, 
were the drop infrastructure investment driven by diminishing returns to the 
construction of new infrastructure, the opposite would be the case. In addition, the 
EIB Municipalities Survey shows that about one in three municipalities report that 
infrastructure investment activities in the last five years were below needs (Figure 
8). Finally, and again in contrast with the view of a saturation-driven decline in 
infrastructure investment activities, there is evidence that the construction of new 
infrastructure continues to produce large positive economic spillover effects (EIB 
2018).
Fig. 7 Change in subnational investment share by overall government investment trend
Note: blue bars in Panel b refer to countries in which regions have relatively high fiscal autonomy, red 
bars to countries in which fiscal autonomy is relatively low. The change in subnational investment 
share by fiscal autonomy is based on a relatively small number of observations and should therefore 
be taken as indicative.
Source of data: Eurostat, Projectware, EPEC (for infrastructure investment) and Eurostat for 
subnational government investment in infrastructure sectors. Fiscal autonomy data comes from 
Hooghe et al. (2018). Figure created by the authors.
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Weak infrastructure investment has led to substantial investment gaps. A 
bottom-up estimation suggests an annual “investment gap” of roughly €155 bn for the 
EU27 (i.e. all Member States except the United Kingdom) until 2030. This corresponds 
to 1.2% of the current EU27 GDP and 5.8% of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Table 
1). The investment gap is defined as the difference between investment needs and 
current investment levels. The infrastructure investment gap of €155 bn per year is 
only one part of the estimated overall investment gap of €403 bn, as investment needs 
in innovation and energy efficiency are also substantial. If dynamics in infrastructure 
investment do not reverse, this gap is likely to increase.
Fig. 8 Underprovision of infrastructure by Country and Sector
Note: the Figure plots the net balance of municipalities that report underinvestment by country/ 
region and sector. A green circle signifies a share of mentions below the median; a red circle above 
the median. The number inside each circle states the net balance of municipalities that report 
underinvestment vis-à-vis over-investment for a particular area in a country/country grouping. 
Source of data: EIB Municipality Survey. Figure created by the authors. 
Question: for each of the following, would you say that, overall, past investment in your municipality 














































































































































































Table 1 Annual infrastructure investment gaps for EU 27
Note: GDP and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) refer to 2017. All numbers refer to EU27, i.e. 
all Member States except the UK. Estimates of infrastructure investment gaps are based on EU policy 
targets and EIB expert judgements. Notably, EU policy targets for broadband (European Gigabit 
Society targets), energy (EU 2030 climate and energy targets) and water and sanitation (compliance 
with EU Directives) are considered. For mobility and social infrastructure, investment needs reflect 
past investment backlogs combined with higher future needs to accommodate demographic trends, 
migration and other megatrends. Source of data: estimates by the EIB Projects Department.
Fig. 9 Infrastructure financing and infrastructure quality
Note: bottom (top) tercile refers to the third of municipalities reporting the lowest (highest) average 
infrastructure quality relative to country mean. Source of data: EIB Municipalities Survey 2017.  
Figure created by the authors.
Questions: can you tell me approximately what proportion of your infrastructure investment 
activities were financed by each of the following? Thinking about all of the external finance you 
used for your infrastructure investment activities, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with: the 
number of available external funding sources; amount of external funding available; interest rates 
offered; maturities available (i.e. the length of time over which the external finance has to be repaid); 
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1.3. How to Support More Infrastructure Investment
Tight funding conditions are a key bottleneck to more infrastructure investment. 
This is true in particular for regions with low infrastructure quality. Cities with a low 
infrastructure quality (relative to the country average) perceive external finance, the 
budget balance and debt limits more often as major obstacles than municipalities with 
high infrastructure quality, according to the EIB Municipalities Survey 2017 (Figure 9). 
The Survey also shows that municipalities with low infrastructure quality fund their 
infrastructure more often through transfers and external financing. This may reflect 
that those municipalities more often face fiscal constraints.
Besides overcoming funding constraints, careful project selection and 
implementation are key to ensure that the funding goes to where it is needed the 
most. Cities that report infrastructure gaps seem to suffer more often from technical 
deficiencies in selecting and implementing complex infrastructure projects. 43% of 
municipalities that report their infrastructure quality to be lower than their within-
country peers also report the technical capacity to implement infrastructure projects 
as being major obstacle, compared to 30% for within-country peers with high quality 
infrastructure. Moreover, municipalities with low infrastructure quality conduct 
independent assessments along different dimensions less often before going ahead 
with an infrastructure project. They also consider this kind of information to be 
important or highly important less often when taking decisions on individual projects 
(Figure 10). This is problematic as it suggests that, even if the necessary funding were 
available, municipalities may have difficulties in using it effectively to address gaps 
due to limited infrastructure governance. 
The need to increase infrastructure spending and building up technical capacity 
must be assessed in the context of other challenges (EIB 2018). Notably, geographical 
and socioeconomic obstacles can create spending pressures and hamper governments’ 
ability to invest more and better. The EIB Municipalities Survey suggests that low 
infrastructure quality is often associated with geographical challenges constraining the 
ability to upgrade infrastructure. For example, municipalities with low infrastructure 
quality tend to be more often characterised by a small population, a lower population 
density and are situated in border areas. Moreover, municipalities that assess the 
quality of their infrastructure to be low also face a number of socioeconomic challenges 
more often. They suffer more often from weaker safety conditions, lower income per 
capita, a lower share of fast-growing firms and employment ratios. 
1.4. Policy Implications 
Public investment and government infrastructure investment activities have been 
exceptionally weak in recent years. Despite increased fiscal space in most parts of 
Europe, thus far we see, at best, a modest reversal in the negative trend in public 
investment.

















































Fig. 10 Independent assessment of projects and infrastructure quality
Note: bottom/top third refers to the third of municipalities reporting the lowest (highest) 
average infrastructure quality relative to the country mean. Panel a. reports the share of 
municipalities that respond “always” or “frequently” to the question “Before going ahead with 
an infrastructure project, do you carry out an independent assessment of …?”. Panel b. reports 
the share of municipalities that respond “critical” or “important” to the question “And how 
important would you say are the results of the independent assessment/s when deciding 
whether or not to go ahead with a project?” Source of data: EIB Municipalities Survey 2017.  
Figure created by the authors.
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The sluggish investment performance cannot be explained by saturation 
effects, but rather reflects underinvestment. Notably, spillovers to new infrastructure 
investment for the business sector continue to remain high. Moreover, one in three 
municipalities state that recent investment volumes have been below their needs. In 
some parts of Europe (particularly in weaker regions), this share is even higher.
Sound project selection, preparation and implementation are key to addressing 
infrastructure gaps, in disadvantaged and leading regions. Evidence suggests 
that a key obstacle to more investment is access to funding. However, infrastructure 
investment is also often hampered by limited implementation and planning capacity 
(Oprisor et al. 2015). To ensure the efficient use of available funds, sound infrastructure 
governance is key. A comprehensive analysis of all economic and social costs and 
benefits should thus accompany any spending increase (Kline and Moretti 2014). 
Application procedures for EU funds can be used to promote the comprehensive use 
of cost-benefit analysis. 
The EU’s upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework provides an opportunity 
to address the identified infrastructure gaps through a coherent policy mix. The first 
proposal of the European Commission (EC) includes important steps in this direction 
(European Commission 2018). Notably a countercyclical investment support scheme 
is envisaged, to avoid a lasting decline in infrastructure investment after economic 
downturns. Moreover, the EC proposal aims to strengthen the link between EU funding 
and respect for the rule of law. It also includes proposals to expand the Reform Support 
Programme, which offers technical and financial support for reforms. Such initiatives 
can ensure that infrastructure planning, governance and funding go hand in hand. 
The EIB has traditionally worked towards delivering such coherent policy solutions. 
Notably, the EIB combines the financing of projects with high socioeconomic returns, 
including those with high risks, with technical assistance solutions. 
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Introduction
Public investment in France has seen contrasting trends in recent decades. While it 
was rather dynamic until the late 2000s, a real inflection took place at the turn of 2010, 
when the fiscal stance changed, and a substantial part of the adjustment was achieved 
by reducing capital expenditure. Indeed, the reduction of public investment has 
contributed to 30% of fiscal consolidation even though investment only represented 6% 
of public expenditure. The share of public investment on GDP, that was largely above 
4% since the 1960s (Figure 1), has fallen below that level in 2011; it averaged 3.4% 
of GDP since then, its lowest level since 1952. Despite the commitment of President 
Emmanuel Macron to put in place a large investment plan on the five-year period of 
his term, and the will to preserve local governments’ investment by constraining only 
their current expenditure, the share has not recovered yet. This sustained weakness in 
general government investment raises the question of the evolution of public capital in 
France. This is relevant because it provides an historical picture of the assets cumulated 
over time by the government (and of their composition), the counterpart of its public 
debt.
How did public capital in France evolve since the late 1970s? What are its main 
characteristics and how is it measured? Which public institutions hold this capital? 
How did investment flows and depreciation shape it? What is the net position of 
public administrations today? This chapter will address these questions by tracing the 
historical evolution of public assets, both financial or non-financial, and by looking into 
the components of public capital. We will look at general government figures as well 
as their components (central government plus local government and social security 
administrations). We will specifically investigate non-financial assets, especially fixed 
assets that represent the accumulation of public investment net of its depreciation. 
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What is referred to as public capital covers a wide variety of assets, such as land, 
residential buildings, ports, dams, roads but also intellectual property rights. It is 
necessary to break down the “wealth of the State” into these different components to 
understand its dynamics considering, as we will show below, that price (most notably 
land prices) and volume effects may play a significant role in explaining the evolution 
of the different components, and of aggregate figures.
The data we use are from the INSEE national accounts, which are public; our 
analysis covers the period 1978–2018. INSEE reports the consolidated level (General 
Government, GG) and its components, distinguishing between the central government 
(CG), local governments (LG), social security administrations (SSA) and other 
government agencies (OGA).
Fig. 1 General government investment rate (as a percentage of GDP).
Source of data: Insee. Figure created by the authors.
In section 2.1. we will look at the evolution of government net wealth from the late 
1970s to the present day. Consistently with the general aim of this volume, we will 
then focus, in section 2.2., on the stock of non-financial assets held by the government. 
Section 2.3. will detail the gross and net (of depreciation) flows of capital for different 
types of assets, documenting a shift from material to immaterial investment. After this 
essentially descriptive assessment, we will analyse, on the basis of a multi-sectoral 
macroeconomic model (Callonnec et al. 2013, 2016), the impact on the growth rate of 
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we will give an assessment of public capital needs in different sectors of the French 
economy.
2.1. The Net Wealth of Public Administrations
In 2018, the consolidated public sector had a positive net wealth (Table 1). Total assets 
represented 148.5% of GDP, of which 89.9% for non-financial assets and 58.6% for 
financial assets. Financial liabilities totalled 135.7% of GDP. The net worth in 2017 was 
therefore 12.9% of GDP, around 4,500 euros per capita. (47,650 of debt and more than 
52,000 of assets, including 31,600 non-financial assets).
Table 1 Decomposition of General Government Net Wealth
As a % of GDP In euros  
per head
1978 2007 2018 2018
Non-financial assets 60.8 90.4 89.9 31592
Financial assets 62.7 52.6 58.6 20585
Financial liabilities 78.6 84.9 135.7 47654
Net worth 49.6 58.1 12.9 4523
Source of data: INSEE, authors’ calculations.
While still positive, consolidated net wealth is today at an all-time low, a level that is 
mostly explained by the financial and economic crisis. Indeed, after reaching a record 
level in 2007 (58.1% of GDP), it has lost 45 points of GDP in the space of eleven years. 
The reasons for this sharp drop are to be found on the net financial liabilities (debt) 
side that increased substantially while non-financial assets remained broadly constant 
(Figure 2).
This net worth is unevenly distributed among different levels of government. 
Indeed, it is very positive for local administrations (62% of GDP in 2018), very negative 
for the central government (-63.9% of GDP) and slightly positive for social security 
administrations and other government agencies (7.7% and 7.4% respectively). Broadly 
speaking the central government, that runs recurrent public deficits, has accumulated 
public debt; low-debt local governments hold non-financial assets, be it land, buildings 
or civil engineering works. With the economic and financial crisis, from 2008 on, the 
net worth of the central government deteriorated considerably (it lost 44 points of 
GDP between 2007 and 2018), as public deficits and debt increased. On the other hand, 
the net worth of local governments remained high and relatively stable over the same 
period due to a stable value of non-financial assets and of their debt. This follows a 
decade (1998–2007) in which the value of non-financial assets increased by almost 
30 percentage points of GDP, due to the sharp increase in land and real estate prices 
(mostly held by local governments), while debt remained constant.
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Fig. 2 Evolution of General Government Net Wealth as a percentage of GDP
Source of data: Insee. Figure created by the authors.
2.2. Evolution of Public Non-Financial Assets
In 2018 non-financial assets (NFAs) of the general government represented 61% of 
total assets and accounted for 90% of GDP. These can be further divided into fixed 
capital (produced NFAs), which are the result of past public investments, and land 
(non-produced NFAs).
Fixed assets account for 53% of GDP, mostly civil engineering works and non-
residential buildings (43% of GDP). The remaining (10% of GDP) are public housing, 
machinery and equipment, weapons systems and intellectual property rights. Non-
produced-NFAs account for 39% of total assets (37% of GDP) most of which (98%, or 
36.2% total assets) are constituted of land owned by the general government. Unlike 
fixed assets, non-produced NFAs do not depreciate, and their evolution depends 
mainly on land prices.
From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the value of public NFAs fluctuated, between 
60% and 70% of GDP. Then, from 1998 to 2011, it increased by 38 points of GDP, 
reaching 96% of GDP in 2011. Over the past six years, this value has fallen by 7 points 
of GDP, and in 2018 its level was close to 2006. Most of the increase (around 90%) in 
the value of total NFAs can be attributed to the increase in the value of non-produced 
NFAs, that went from 8% of GDP in 1998 to almost 40% in 2011 (Figure 3). The large 
increase in valuation of non-produced NFAs is largely explained by the revaluation 
of built land prices, and not by an increase of volume (investment flows). There are 
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French phenomenon. A scarcity of undeveloped land, either because of insufficient 
supply or because it is subject to retention, tends to drive up its price (for details, see 
Levasseur 2013). The retention of land is due to several factors: increased retention 
in the ascendant phase of the cycle enhanced by the fact that in France there are no 
statistical databases which produce information on the non-built land (its location and 
the sale price previously recorded for land of equivalent quality), low cost of keeping 
undeveloped land, etc. Furthermore, price increases could be traced to the long-term 
agglomeration effects of economic agents trying to exploit positive externalities (as 
long as these are not more than compensated by congestion costs). Another structural 
reason is to be found in land use regulations (especially in urban areas), that empirical 
research has shown to play a major role in explaining rationing in the real estate and 
land market. 
Besides these long-term trends, contingent factors such as expansionary monetary 
policies in the early 2000s, and the increase of private debt, probably played a role 
in explaining land price dynamics and the related increase in the valuation of non-
produced NFAs.
Fig. 3 Decomposition of public non-financial assets as a percentage of GDP
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2.2.1. The value of fixed assets remained constant
Fixed capital is given by the past accumulation of realized investments, net of 
depreciation. Between the end of the 1970s and 2018, the value of fixed assets held 
by the general government ranged from 47% to 53% of GDP, showing significantly 
lower volatility than the value of non-produced NFAs. This is because fixed assets 
experience much smaller price fluctuations than land. Between 1998 and 2018, the 
value of fixed assets grew by 2.7% of GDP, ten times less than the value increases of 
non-produced NFAs.
“Non-residential buildings” account for 28% of fixed assets (14% of GDP in 2018). 
These are buildings that are not intended for residential purposes, such as warehouses 
and industrial buildings, commercial buildings, performance halls, schools, hospitals, 
etc. The evolution of their value sees a decrease in the 1980s and 1990s (from 14% of 
GDP to 11% in 2000), then a steady increase until 2013 (to 16% of GDP). The last few 
years have seen a contraction, as for most other items, and in 2018 their value stands 
at 14% of GDP like in the early 1980s but their share in fixed assets is currently higher 
than before the crisis of 2008. It should be noted that around three quarters of these 
assets are owned by local governments.
Civil engineering works, other than non-residential buildings, account for 
more than half (54%) of fixed assets held by the general government. “Other civil 
engineering works,” in the INSEE accounting classification, corresponds to everything 
but buildings. This category includes, for example, highways, roads, streets, railways, 
airfield runways, bridges, tunnels, waterways and water lines, ports, dams and 
other hydraulic works, communication and transmission of electricity, pipes and 
cables of urban networks; but also includes maintenance costs of roads, of sewerage 
systems and the works related to sites’ clearing and preparation. Like non-residential 
buildings, the vast majority of “other civil engineering works” (76%) are owned by 
local governments. The evolution over time of this class of assets makes no exception. 
The stock of “other civil engineering works” in value peaked in 1982, approaching 30% 
of GDP; this period marks the end of the long catching up phase of the post-Second 
World War period. Subsequently, its value declined (while remaining relatively high) 
to fluctuate between 26% and 28% of GDP over the period 1985–2000. At the turn of 
2000, the value of the stock of “other civil engineering works” increased steadily to a 
high point in 2012, at 30% of GDP. Since 2012, its value has declined significantly, to 
reach 28% of GDP in 2018 and its share in fixed assets currently represent 3 percentage 
points less than in 2007. 
Since 1978 — but also since 2007 — it has been the non-residential buildings, and 
to a lesser extent the intellectual property rights, which have seen the major increase 
of their share in fixed assets. By contrast, the share of weapon systems and of civil 
engineering works has decreased (since 1978 and 2007 respectively).
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Fig. 4 Fixed assets by item (as a percentage of fixed assets) in 1978, 2007 and 2018
Source of data: Insee. Figure created by the authors.
2.3. The Dynamics of Gross Investment
The previous section showed a substantial stability of the public capital stock, whose 
dynamics for most categories followed the long cycles of economic activity. The only 
exceptions were non-produced NFAs, whose increase in value was mostly driven 
by land prices. Nevertheless, stock analysis only gives a partial picture: while non-
produced NFAs account for 40% of the value of the total stock of capital, they account 
for less than 3% of NFA flows (i.e. gross public investment, in the terminology of 
national accounts). In fact, 97% of these flows are accounted for by fixed assets. And 
when we turn our attention to flows, valuation effects do not play any role. 
As we said above, the flow of fixed assets, i.e. gross investment, has declined 
sharply since 2011. It has stood between 3.3% and 3.5% of GDP since 2015, its lowest 
level since the early 1950s. In 2018, 29% of general government gross investment 
consisted of “non-residential buildings”, 29% of “other civil engineering works”, 27% 
of “intellectual property rights” (of which 22% are research and development and 
5% are software and databases), 7% are “machines and equipment,” 3% are “weapon 
systems” and 2% is “housing”.
Most of these items had similar dynamics over time, with peaks in the early 1990s, 
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financial crisis). Two items nevertheless warrant further consideration. The first is 
investment in “intellectual property rights”, of which more than 80% is research and 
development expenditure. It increased significantly during the 1980s, from 0.7% of 
GDP in 1980 to 1% in 1990. Over the past thirty years, it averaged 0.9% of GDP, the 
value it had in 2018. Finally, investment in “other civil engineering works” was high 
in the 1980s through to the early 1990s, ranging from 1.3% to 1.5% of GDP. From the 
mid-1990s to 2013, it has swayed between 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP. But, since 2014, it 
has shrunk leading to a historically low level in 2015–2018 (1% of GDP). Overall, 
except for intellectual property rights, all components of public investment are at 
historic lows and it is “civil engineering works” that have experienced the greatest 
decline.
2.4. Net Flows of Fixed Assets Give Another  
(and Different) Picture
The earlier description of investment (the fixed asset flow) by asset type captures gross 
investment. However, the most relevant measure must include capital depreciation. 
Indeed, considering the net flow of fixed assets (net investment) gives information 
on whether the stock of capital is expanding or shrinking, abstracting from the effects 
of revaluation of the existing stock. Thus, if gross investment is larger (smaller) than 
the depreciation of capital (consumption of fixed capital, CCF, in national accounts’ 
nomenclature), then net investment is positive (negative) and the stock of capital 
increases (decreases). Unlike fixed assets, non-produced NFAs (land) and inventories 
may experience changes in value but are not subject to consumption of fixed capital. 
CCF only applies to fixed assets.
Historically, net flows of non-produced NFAs and inventories are relatively stable, 
with the sum of the two hovering between -0.1 and 0.2 % of GDP over the period 
1979–2018. Changes in the net flow of non-financial assets are the result of the net 
flow of fixed assets. Over the period from the late 1970s to the first half of the 1990s, 
general government net investment was strong, averaging more than 1% of GDP 
per year (Figure 5). It even experienced a strong boom over the period 1987–1992, 
averaging above 1.4% of GDP per year. From 1993 to 1998, general government’s 
net investment declined sharply, reaching 0.5% of GDP in 1998, a decrease of 1% of 
GDP in the space of six years. Like in other European countries, this is mostly due 
to the effort to meet the Maastricht criteria in the run up to the Euro: the cyclically 
adjusted deficit for France decreased from 4.6% of GDP in 1993 to 1.8% in 1998. 
Past this phase, net investment recovered, then fluctuated between 0.7 and 0.9 % of 
GDP over the 2000–2010 period, without ever returning to the level observed during 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. But it is mainly from 2011, following the 
global financial crisis that net investment experiences a break. Between 2010 and 
2015, it dropped from 0.7% of GDP to zero, and has since remained at a very low 
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level (between 0 and 0.1% of GDP). It is the lowest level since the late 1970s when the 
wealth accounts were introduced.
Fig. 5 Net General Government investment by component as a percentage of GDP
Source of data: Insee. Figure created by the authors.
Thus, since 2015, France has spent about 0.8 percentage points of GDP (about 19 billion 
in constant 2018 euros) less on net investment than it did during the period 2000–2010, 
and 1.5 points (approximately 35 billion in constant 2018 euros) less than during the 
period 1990–1992.
Looking at the components, the main determinants of the net investment dynamics 
described above are “other civil engineering works” and, to a lesser extent, “non-
residential buildings”. Net investment in “non-residential buildings” has gone 
through various cycles since the late 1970s; over the past decade has declined sharply 
(like most other government expenditures) and has reached historically low levels: 
since 2015 it has averaged -0.1% of GDP, meaning that since 2015 the stock of “non-
residential buildings” decreased. Overall, “other civil engineering works” has been the 
main determinant of fluctuations in the net flow of fixed assets. For these investments 
we can distinguish three periods: the first — from the late 1970s to the first half of the 
1990s — is characterized by a high level of net investment, close to or above 0.6% of 
GDP for almost every year and with peaks in 1991–1992 (0.8% of GDP). The second 
period  —  from 1995 to 2008  —  is characterized by an intermediate level ranging 
from 0.4% to 0.5% of GDP per year. Finally, from 2010, net investment in “other civil 
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If we look at the evolution of net investment by level of government, we can learn 
four lessons. The first is that the net investment in “other civil engineering works” of 
Other Governments Agencies (OGA) is low and relatively stable over the period 1979–
2015. Secondly, while the central government contributed positively, albeit weakly, to 
net investment, during the period ranging from 1987 to 1992, it gradually reduced 
its engagement. From 1995 to 2004, the investments made by the central government 
barely offset the depreciation of existing capital and, since 2005, the central government 
net investment has moved into negative territory, with the exception of 2010 (when, 
as a part of the stimulus plan following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, significant 
investments in weapons systems were made). Thus, since 2005, the stock of fixed capital 
owned by the central government has decreased. It is in fact very clear, and this is the 
third remark, that local governments have historically been the main contributors to 
net government investment. However, since 2007 — on the one hand, with the Global 
Financial Crisis that reduced own resources levied by local governments, and, on the 
other hand, with the reduction of endowments to local governments that followed 
fiscal consolidation — net investment by local governments has collapsed from 0.8% 
of GDP in 2007 to 0% in 2016. In 2017 and 2018, it recovered slightly respectively to 
0.1% and 0.2% of GDP, a level that barely offsets the destruction of capital by the 
central government and by social security administrations. Finally, social security 
administrations (SSA), that historically are not a major investor, but which posted a 
positive net investment over the period 1978–2014 (0.1% of GDP on average) have 
been destroying fixed capital for the past four years, with negative net investment for 
the first time in four decades.
The picture that emerges from the analysis of stocks and flows is rather consistent 
and gives two main messages: the first is that public investment and the stock of 
capital hve been largely affected by the macroeconomic cycle. In the two significant 
phases of consolidation, the run-up to the euro in the 1990s and the aftermath of the 
sovereign debt crisis, investment was strongly reduced. Especially in the latter case, 
net investment turned negative of zero for all levels of government, thus reducing the 
stock of capital that is today at an all-time low. The second message, that emerges in 
particular from the analysis of stocks, is that in spite of these trends in investment, 
the capital stock in France is still significant (and larger than in other countries, as the 
other chapters of the Outlook show). One might ask then if the effort of consolidation, 
and the disproportionate burden that it has laid on public investment, at least led to 
more sustainable public finances.
2.4.1. Since 2009, debt has not been used to finance  
an accumulation of assets
If we compare the evolution over the last twenty years of non-financial assets net 
flows in relation to the primary net financial flow (financial assets  —  financial 
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liabilities — interest expenses) which we consider here as a proxy of the net worth, 
two sub-periods emerge clearly (Figure 6). The first, which runs from 1996 to 2008, 
can be seen as a period in which the additional public net financial debt (excluding 
interest expense) was more than offset by the net accumulation of non-financial 
assets, leading to a positive net value on this period, which means that the general 
government stock of wealth has increased in value over this period, even abstracting 
from price effects. The second period, which runs from 2009 to 2018, describes a 
new pattern in which the net debt increase is no longer offset by an increase in 
public non-financial capital, generating a sharp deterioration in government net 
worth. The economic and financial crisis led to a sharp increase in public debt. In 
2011, France embarked on a process of fiscal consolidation: while on one side it has 
partly reduced new financial commitments, on the other side it has been more than 
offset by a reduction in the net accumulation of non-financial assets. This is further 
proof of the fact that the burden of fiscal consolidation was disproportionately laid 
on the shoulders of public investment. The sharp reduction in net worth therefore 
casts doubts on the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation in strengthening the public 
finances outlook for France.
Fig. 6 Net flow of non-financial assets and primary net financial flows as a percentage of GDP
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2.5. Assessing the Impact of an Investment Push in France
2.5.1. A quantification of investment needs for France
According to a report of the French entrepreneurial association MEDEF (2015), which, 
as of today, represents the most comprehensive attempt to assess the French public 
capital gap, the network infrastructure needs for France would be €50 bn per year for 
five years, half of which would be financed by the general government, the rest being 
shared between public and private companies (Table 2).
Transportation is an important part of the network infrastructure, and its needs are 
estimated as €28 bn per year, almost two thirds of which are funded by the general 
government. More than half of that (€15 bn) would be absorbed by the extensive road 
network. The maintenance of the rail network and the construction of a high-speed 
line would represent €7 bn. The rest corresponds to infrastructures related to other 
public transportation: airports, ports and fluvial works.
Table 2 Network infrastructure needs per year for France for five years
General government: 25.1 Public companies: 13.8 Private companies: 11.2
Transports: 17.7 Transports: 8.1 Transports: 2.0
Water: 4.0 Energy: 5.7 Water: 5.0
Energy: 2.3 Digital: 2.0
Digital: 1.0 Gas: 2.2
Electric charging  
stations: 0.1
Note: values in euro bn. Source of data: MEDEF (2015).
Power distribution networks are also high on the agenda, representing €8 bn, with 
funding from the public electric company (ERDF) and from the general government. 
These figures would take into account the introduction of Linky smart meters and the 
adaptation of the network-connected objects and new technologies.
A special effort should be made for water, estimated to cost €9 bn each year (funded 
in equal parts by the general government and private companies) according to the 
association “Canalisateurs de France”. The maintenance of pipelines is particularly 
urgent: in France, more than 20% of the potable water introduced into the network is 
lost, causing an important economic cost. In total, notes the MEDEF, costs (economic, 
among others) of non-action could exceed those of investment.
Finally, the coverage of the entire French territory with ultra-high-speed internet 
would require €3 bn a year; in this case, two thirds of funding would have to come 
from private companies and one third from the general government. 
The report numbers are most probably underestimated, as stated by the authors 
themselves, to the extent that they do not integrate the totality of the investments 
necessary to carry out the ecological transition or prevent natural or climatic hazards 
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(rising waters, storms, floods etc.). Investment needs for the digital transition are also 
most probably underestimated. Thus, these figures are to be seen as a lower bound. 
2.5.2. The macroeconomic impact of an investment shock
Based on the OFCE’s Three-Me macro-sector model (OFCE 2016), we simulated a 
permanent increase of 1 point of GDP (approximately €23 bn) in public investment. 
This amount roughly corresponds to the infrastructure investment needs to be funded 
out of the general government, that have been put forward in the MEDEF report. 
Three-ME (Multi-sector Macroeconomic Model for the Evaluation of Environmental 
and Energy policy) is a macroeconomic model. It has been built on a calibration of 
the French economy. Its main purpose is to evaluate the medium- and long-term 
impact of public choices on the economy at the macroeconomic and sectoral levels. 
Three-Me exhibits the main features of neo-Keynesian models: a slow adjustment of 
effective quantities and prices to their notional level; an endogenous money supply; 
a Taylor rule and a Phillips curve. Compared to standard multi-sector CGEs, this has 
the advantage to allow for the existence of suboptimal equilibria, characterized by the 
presence of involuntary unemployment. Furthermore, production and consumption 
structures are represented with a generalized CES function which allows for the 
elasticity of substitution to differ between each couple of inputs or goods.
In the medium term, i.e. over a five-year horizon, an increase in public investment 
of 1% of GDP would generate a gain of 1.2% of GDP (a value of the multiplier that 
is in the same ball park as the consensus in the literature, see Gechert’s 2015 meta-
analyis) and would create or safeguard 290,000 jobs (Table 3); this would reduce the 
unemployment rate in France by 1 point.
Table 3 Impact of a 1% of GDP increase in public investment on GDP  
and employment in France
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
GDP 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Value Added 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
Employment 
(in ’000s)
120.5 213.7 269.4 290.8 286.5
Source of data: Modèle Three-Me, OFCE.
Quite logically, the first sector to benefit from an increase in public investment would 
be construction, with 46% of the jobs created (Table 4). The increase in activity in that 
sector would also have a crowding-in effect on all other sectors that are experiencing an 
increase in their added value and job creation. Note that these effects are particularly 
pronounced in sectors with low import content and little chances of delocalization 
(construction and services). 
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Table 4 Sectoral impact of a 1% of GDP increase in public investment
Domestic employment  
(in full-time equivalents)
Added value  
(in %, volume)









+ 530 + 2 480 + 0.2 + 0.5
Other 
manufacturing
+ 12 970 +21 480 + 0.9 + 0.7
Construction + 63 500 +132 180 + 7,5 + 7.8
Transport + 2 000 + 1 960 + 0.3 + 0.2
Mainly market 
services
+ 40 430 + 106 050 + 0.6 + 0.9
Source of data: Modèle Three-Me, OFCE.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter showed that France did not escape the recent trend of most European 
countries, towards a drastic downsizing of its public capital stock. In spite of the 
rhetoric of the time, national accounts data show that the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis was not countered with a public investment push: the sharp increase of debt 
between 2007 and 2017 did not correspond to an accumulation of public capital. On 
the contrary, investment paid the heaviest toll in the subsequent consolidation phase, 
when both expenditure reduction by the central government, and cuts in transfers 
to local administrations (the largest owner of non-financial assets) resulted in a 
significant loss of public capital. Thus, in the space of a decade, the French general 
government saw its net investment drop to negative levels, and its net worth decrease 
by 50 points of GDP, to an all-time low in 2018. An even greater source of concern is 
that the previous increase of the net worth, in the years 2000s, is mostly attributed to a 
price effect of non-produced non-financial assets (land and real estate).
Investment needs in network infrastructure are important (transport, energy, 
water, digital etc.) and public investment deficiencies of course have important 
macroeconomic consequences both in the short and in the long run. We highlighted 
the results from OFCE (2016) that state how a 1% public investment push would have 
important growth effects (with a multiplier above 1) in the short and medium run. 
Yet, it is in the long run that the multiplier associated with public investment is larger 
than the overall expenditure multiplier. Stabilizing the flow of investment is crucial to 
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maintain a public capital stock that is a necessary complement to private investment 
(Creel et al. 2015).
The European institutional setting has played a role in the widespread reduction of 
investment expenditure. The exclusive focus on structural deficit built into European 
rules has introduced a strong bias against capital spending, since investment is easier 
to cut than current expenditure. We documented how, already in the run up to the 
introduction of the euro, in the 1990s, the drop of structural government deficit in 
France went through a drastic cut of net investment. The same happened in the past 
decade. The bias against public investment leads to a chronic deficiency of public 
capital, barely compensated by government action in good times.
Thus, France makes no exception to the general trend documented in this Report, 
even if in levels its capital stock remains relatively high with respect to its partners. 
This leads to an obvious conclusion: the introduction of a Golden Rule excluding 
public investment from the deficit limits, similar to the one implemented in the UK 
by Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown in the 1990s (for details, see Creel et 
al., 2009), would certainly help fill the investment gap. The new rule would require 
countries to balance their current budget, while financing public capital accumulation 
with debt. Investment expenditure, in other words, would be excluded from deficit 
calculation, a principle that timidly emerges also in the current Commission practices. 
Such a rule would stabilize the ratio of debt to GDP, it would focus efforts of public 
consolidation on less productive items of public spending, and would ensure 
intergenerational equity (future generations would be called to partially finance 
the stock of public capital bequeathed to them). Last, but not least, especially in 
the current situation, putting in place such a rule would not require treaty changes, 
and it is already discussed, albeit timidly, in EU policy circles. Furthermore, a broad 
definition of investment would allow to coordinate the policies of Member States 
towards growth enhancing items, and could even be an important piece of a renewed 
European industrial policy (Saraceno 2017, Ducoudré et al. 2019).
The current environment of low interest rates, that is bound to persist into 
the medium term (Summers 2014) is an additional reason to try to fill the public 
investment gap that was progressively dug in the past decades. In a recent issue of the 
World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2014) went as far as 
defining a public investment boost, in the current environment of scarce public capital 
and low interest rates, as self-financing (a ‘free lunch’).
Furthermore, the preceding pages show the importance of properly measuring 
capital. Thus, it seems increasingly crucial to be able to distinguish, within the balance 
sheet, between the capital account and the operating account (in which it seems 
sensible to add a structural/cyclical division), to understand the past dynamics of debt 
and its use. We are pursuing this work.
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For a number of years, Germany has been at the centre of the European debate about 
increasing public investment. With record-large current account surpluses, increasing 
public investment in Germany has often been seen as a possible remedy to imbalances 
in the euro area (OECD 2016; IMF 2018). Within Germany, the debate has focused on 
insufficiencies of the public capital stock and especially public infrastructure and has 
intensified over time (Expertenkommission 2015; Bardt et al. 2019), with the federation 
of German trade unions (DGB) and the federation of German industries (BDI) jointly 
endorsing a big, debt-financed, ten-year investment programme in November 2019.
This chapter takes a closer look at public investment in Germany. It first describes 
the development of German public investment and the German public capital stock 
over the past decades (section 3.1.), then defines quantitatively and qualitatively needs 
for public investment (section 3.2.) and gives a first model-based evaluation on the 
economic effects of a debt-financed, ten-year €450 bn public investment programme 
(section 3.3.) both on the German economy and on other euro area countries.
3.1. The German Public Capital Stock 
After the unification boom at the beginning of the 1990s, public investment in 
Germany has steadily declined. Net public investment (gross public investment minus 
depreciations) dropped from almost 1% of GDP in the early 1990s to around 0.2% of 
1  Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft  —  HTW Berlin; Institut für Makroökonomie und 
Konjunkturforschung — IMK.
2  Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung — IMK.
3  Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung — IMK.
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GDP towards the end of the decade and turned negative in 2004. Since then, it has 
been hovering around zero (Figure 1). As a consequence, while Germany’s population 
and GDP have still been growing, its public capital stock net of depreciation has been 
stagnating for the past two decades (Figure 2), resulting in a falling ratio of public 
capital stock to GDP. Lately, increases in public investment spending have led to a 
slight increase in the net investment-to-GDP ratio, but the increase has been too small 
to stop the declining trend in the public capital stock to GDP.4 
The stagnation of the public capital stock has become a problem for the economy 
at large. While the large bulk of overall investment takes place in the private sector, 
government investment plays a decisive role. Government investment provides 
important public goods and is often complementary in private production and 
investment. State-owned infrastructure, such as transport networks and energy grids, 
is a crucial factor affecting potential output and productivity growth (Baxter and King 
1993; Clemens, Goerge and Michelsen 2019).5 It is hence plausible that the weakness 
in private sector fixed capital formation in Germany is at least partly a consequence of 
insufficient public investment.
Fig. 1 Net public investment in Germany, in percentage of GDP, 1991–2018
Source of data: Destatis 2019. Figure created by the authors.
4  Given reasonable assumptions about the trend growth of German GDP, net public investment of 0.6 
% of GDP are necessary to keep the public capital stock-to-GDP ratio constant. See Dullien (2017).
5  Clemens, Goerge and Michelsen (2017) find that 1 bn euro of public investment in Germany will 
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Fig. 2 Net capital stock in Germany from 1991–2018, in constant prices (index, 1991 = 100) 
Source of data: Destatis 2018. Figure created by the authors.
In particular, transport infrastructure is a fundamental factor for economic growth. 
Insufficiently maintained and expanded, it can lead to delays in passenger and goods 
transport. In the case of Germany, while the gross stock of publicly owned structures 
(a large part of which is transport infrastructure) has only marginally grown since 
the beginning of the decade, passenger as well as freight vehicle and railway traffic 
expanded considerably, both in absolute and per-capita terms (Figure 3). For example, 
the overall freight mileage on German roads increased by 16.6% between 2010 and 
2017, while the economy grew by only 13.7%.6 Moreover, this data probably even 
underestimates the degree of underinvestment, as the gross capital stock concept 
ignores the wear and tear of the roads and bridges.
For evaluating the quality of German infrastructure, it is important to keep in mind 
that vast parts of it were built during the major construction programs in the 1970’s in 
the West and in the 1990’s in the East. For example, almost half of all motorway bridges 
(measured by surface area) were built between 1965 and 1975 (Bundesministerium 
für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur 2016, p. 2). Those bridges were not designed 
to carry today’s heavy traffic and would require a complete overhaul even if they had 
been properly maintained over the last decades (which often has not been the case).
6  One reason for the disproportional increase for transport services has been the eastward expansion of 












1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
A European Public Investment Outlook52 
All in all, expanding traffic volumes are pushed through an outdated transport 
infrastructure of deficient quality. This is also felt by the German business sector: in a 
recent survey, two thirds of German companies stated that their business was regularly 
hindered by deficiencies in the public infrastructure, especially by unsatisfactory traffic 
conditions (Grömling and Puls 2018).
Fig. 3 Development of various economic indicators in Germany, percentage change 2010–2017
Source of data: Dullien and Rietzler (2019). Figure created by the authors.
The poor development of the German public investment of the last decades can be 
traced back to several, partly interlinked causes (Bardt et al. 2019).
First, from a politician’s point of view, cutting infrastructure investment has the 
advantage that citizens usually only become aware of the infrastructure deterioration 
with a delay. So, especially when confronted with the need of cutting public 
deficits, investment cutbacks can become a preferred choice and might therefore be 
implemented before taxes are raised or other government expenditure is cut. 
Second, economists and officials for a long time assumed an imminent decline 
in Germany’s working population and potential GDP growth rate, which did not 
materialize. A smaller economy would have needed a smaller capital stock, and debt 
dynamics would have been more toxic under more pessimistic growth assumptions. 
As a consequence, third, the so-called debt brake (“Schuldenbremse”) was written into 
the German constitution which limits structural public sector deficits to 0.35% of GDP, 
replacing the former Golden Rule of public finance which allowed the government to 
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Fourth, welfare reforms shifted the fiscal burden of unemployment towards the 
municipalities. As in Germany, the municipal level is in charge of maintaining a large 
part of road infrastructure, public transport, schools and other local infrastructure, this 
further squeezed out public investment. This trend has been aggravated by the fact 
that the Länder (the federal states) had to move towards balanced budgets under the 
debt brake and have hence cut their respective transfers to the municipalities’ budgets.
In a nutshell, due to fiscal consolidation pressure, investment in public infrastructure 
has been greatly neglected in Germany in recent decades. This has resulted in the 
deterioration and depletion of Germany’s public capital stock that does not anymore 
meet the requirements of a modern economy.
3.2. Quantifying Investment Needs
In addition to the gradual closing of the accumulated infrastructure gap, imminent 
challenges for the German economy require massive additional investments. 
Decarbonization in accordance with the Climate Action Plan 2050 will need 
additional spending on the expansion of renewables, modernization of the energy 
and transport networks, as well as making existing residential buildings more 
energy-efficient. To cushion demographic change, it is necessary to invest more in 
early childhood education and care. Early childhood education increases people’s 
chances of a productive participation in the economy later in life, while childcare 
makes it possible to boost the current labour force participation by enabling both 
parents to work.
In what follows, we outline the rough estimation of the magnitude of the required 
public investment in Germany in the upcoming decade, adopted from Bardt et al. 
(2019). The term “investment” is used here in a broad sense, so that it also includes 
government measures to promote private investment (such as subsidies for energy-
efficient building refurbishment) or spending on human capital development, which 
is not accounted for as public investment in the national accounts. The concept of 
public investment is thus defined as government expenditures capable of increasing 
the production potential of the German economy in the future or of generating long-
term net returns to the economy as a whole. As the counterfactual scenario, we assume 
a price-adjusted continuation of the investment positions listed in the government 
budget 2019.
Indeed, every attempt of such a comprehensive calculation is vulnerable to critique. 
For example, one can argue that suggested figures in specific areas are too high or too 
low. However, our estimations are based on well-founded studies of individual sectors 
and, most important, the goal of this exercise is only to deliver a convincing first idea 
of the rough monetary size of the overall economic challenge to be addressed.
For a ten-year horizon, our estimate of the investment requirements in Germany 
(based on Bardt et al. 2019) includes:
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• Repair and modernization of public infrastructure: the municipal panel of 
the public KfW bank states an investment need of €138.4 bn (Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau 2019). For this paper, it is assumed that the infrastructure 
gap should be closed within ten years.
• Significant expansion of early childhood education and full-day schooling is 
desirable and economically efficient from a demographic point of view. Over 
ten years, the necessary investment adds up to €50 bn for the improvement 
of early childhood education, as well as €9 bn for the construction and €25.5 
bn for the operation of full-day schools (Krebs and Scheffel 2019).
• Expansion of the local public transport is necessary to enable decarbonization. 
Currently, infrastructure projects of around €8.2 bn have been registered 
or accepted for financing via the Municipal Transport Financing Act 
(Gemeindeverkehrsfinanzierungsgesetz  —  GVFG). If investment were 
to be financed from existing funds provided under the GVFG, it would 
take twenty-four years to complete these projects. In order to ensure their 
finalization within the next decade, larger funds are required. According to 
surveys among providers of local public transport, €15 bn are needed here 
(Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen 2017). All in all, investment 
needs sum up to approximately €20 bn in this sector.
• The long-distance and freight services of the German railway (Deutsche 
Bahn) also require a massive modernization and capacity expansions. The 
necessary investment adds up to €60 bn. In addition, an expenditure of 
approximately €20 bn is needed for the maintenance and refurbishment of 
German highways.
• In comparison to other rich countries, Germany lags behind in both financing 
of universities and promotion of research and development. Overall, 
additional expenditure of €2.5 bn per year should be budgeted to modernize 
universities and strengthen research funding.
• There is currently a housing shortage in many large German cities. Yet, 
estimates for the demand for residential dwellings in the coming years differ. 
Ralph Henger and Michael Voigtländer (2019) expect that, due to the current 
construction activity, the housing market will gradually relax. However, Till 
Baldenius, Sebastian Kohl and Moritz Schularick (2019) conclude that the 
lack of housing will continue until 2030, especially in metropolitan areas. 
Either way, at least €1.5 bn per year are needed as additional public incentive 
for housing construction.
• In Germany, the telecommunication network coverage is poor by international 
standards, particularly outside big cities. A country-wide expansion of 
broadband internet would cost 60 to €100 bn (Expertenkommission 2015), a 
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5G network expansion some €60 bn more. Much of these expenses are likely 
to come from private telecom operators. Still, public funding is crucial to 
mend the patches in digital infrastructure. We assume that a government 
spending of €20 bn will be necessary in the coming ten years.
• The decarbonization of the German economy poses a particular challenge. 
Current studies show that, in sum, between €1700 bn (Dena 2018) and 
€2300 bn (Gerbert and others 2018) will be required to reduce the German 
economy’s carbon emissions by 95% until 2050. If one takes the lower limit 
of the estimated cost and distributes the total expenditure over the entire 
period up to 2050, further assuming that the state bears approximately 15% 
of the costs, then a public investment need of approximately €7.5 bn per year 
results.
Table 1 summarizes the above calculation. All in all, public investment needs sum 
up to a volume of at least €450 bn over the next ten years. The required financing is 
thus not excessively large in relation to the German economic output. Spread over the 
years, this would average an annual additional expenditure of around €45 bn, which 
corresponds to approximately to 1.3% of GDP.
There is no good economic reason why the type of investments listed above should 
be paid from the current year’s budget. On the contrary, as the investments benefit many 
generations to come, it is reasonable to spread also the cost over several generations. 
For example, decarbonization will lead to a massive reduction in Germany’s energy 
import bill. Today’s expenditure will thus be offset by saved costs in the future. 
Similarly, improvements in early childhood education today are expected to translate 
into higher employment, higher productivity and higher incomes in the future.
Moreover, current financing conditions for Germany are extremely favourable, 
such that long-term bond (with maturity of at least ten years) yields are negative. In 
other words, Germany would not have to pay back the full amount of debts taken on 
today. At the same time, the German government debt-to-GDP ratio has been steadily 
decreasing in the recent years and is about to fall below the 60% benchmark. Combined 
with the long-term productivity effects of the above described public investment, it is 
advisable to enable debt-financing of the investment program. It would be inefficient 
and unfair to burden the current generation with the entire cost of the restructuring of 
the economy. Much worse, it would be greatly dangerous to forgo current and future 
opportunities because of fear of an increase in public borrowing.
The actual fiscal policy framework —  including the debt brake, the Stability and 
Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact — should therefore be used (and, if necessary, 
modified) in a way that the financing of investment requirements becomes possible 
through new borrowing. From the economic point of view, it makes sense to follow a 
Golden Rule which exempts investment — at least up to a fixed amount — from the 
deficit limit, as in Truger (2016). 
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Table 1 Public investment requirements in Germany
 Sum over 10 years, base 
year prices (bn €)
Infrastructure investment on municipal level  
Updating of existing local infrastructure 138
Public transport 20
Education  
Early childhood education 50
Development of full-day schooling 9
Operation of full-day schooling 25
Funding of universities and R&D 25
Housing investment  
Public sector share 15





Public sector share 75
Total 457
Source of data: Bardt et al. (2019).
There are two possibilities for the technical implementation of such a Golden Rule. 
Firstly, it would be conceivable to change the German constitution. Secondly, one 
could use the room for flexibility built in the debt brake so that debt financing of 
new investment becomes feasible. For example, a separate legal entity (fully owned 
by the federal government) could be established as a federal investment fund for 
development goals, responsible of precisely defined investment tasks. This entity 
could be allowed to borrow while its debt is not counted under the German debt brake. 
The local authorities could then lease the corresponding capital goods from this fund 
against payment of the financing costs and depreciation. In this way, an amendment of 
the constitution would not be necessary. 
The European budget rules would count such an entity to the public sector, but 
since Germany’s public debt is expected to fall under the 60% benchmark, the usual 
fiscal rules will be relaxed, so that the limit for the medium-term structural deficit 
rises from 0.5% to 1% of GDP. Moreover, Germany could (and should) lobby at the 
European level for an exemption from new borrowing for certain types of growth 
enhancing green investment.
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3.3. Macroeconomic Implications of  
a Public Investment Program in Germany
It is important to consider the potential macroeconomic effects of such a large 
investment program for Germany, and its spillover effects for the rest of the euro area. 
In this section, we use a modified version of the NiGEM model developed by the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)7 to come up with some 
first evaluations.
In line with current market-based EONIA forecasts (European Central Bank 
2019), our baseline forecast assumes that the ECB’s monetary policy stance will 
remain accommodative for a prolonged period of time. Specifically, we assume ECB 
interest rates to remain zero well into the 2020s and thereafter slowly rise to 1%. 
From a fiscal policy perspective, our baseline forecast fully adheres to the German 
debt brake, so that budget deficits are ruled out. This restriction is removed for the 
shock scenario.
The scenario for our proposed €450 bn debt-financed public investment program 
is modelled as follows: quarterly public investment is assumed to be €11.25 bn (about 
1.5% of GDP) higher vis-à-vis our baseline forecast starting in the first quarter of 2020 
and remaining so over a period of ten years. Importantly, we model this additional 
public spending as entirely debt-financed. In addition, we assume the ECB’s policy 
rate to remain constant at the baseline rate.
The government investment program triggers an increase in accumulation of both 
public and private capital. The capital build-up acceleration peaks at the end of the 
investment program with the overall capital stock being 4% higher than in the baseline.
The simulated investment program results in a significant boost to the German 
economy with GDP initially increasing slightly above 1% vis-à-vis the baseline and 
about 0.9% (again vis-à-vis the baseline) on average during the public investment 
program span (Figure 4). Importantly, GDP remains persistently higher, also after the 
end of the investment program. Due to the increased overall capital stock, potential 
output increases and remains sustainably higher even beyond 2029, reaching a level of 
about 1.5% above the baseline in 2029.
7  NiGEM is a comprehensive multi-country simulation and forecasting model for the global economy 
with detailed country models for all OECD countries as well as numerous emerging nations. See 
also nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/. We use a slightly modified version with re-estimated import equations for 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain (see Behrend et al. 2019).
As mentioned above, the investment program is assumed to be completely debt-
financed with tax rates kept constant. The evolution of the government debt ratio 
under the debt-financed public investment program together with the debt ratio of 
our baseline forecast is shown in Figure 5. Relative to the baseline, the reduction of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio slows significantly. However, despite the additional borrowing, 
the ratio continues to fall and constantly stays on the modest level of just above 50% 
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Fig. 4 German GDP and potential output increase, level difference in %







of GDP (Figure 5). Hence, the simulation shows that it is possible to implement a 
comprehensive public investment program without jeopardizing debt sustainability.
Another important result of our simulation is that the program in fact leads to a 
reduction in the German current account surplus which falls by almost 1.3 percentage 
points. The rebalancing is possible through a stark increase in imports, whereas exports 
essentially remain unchanged.
Last but not least, the investment expenditure triggers positive spillover effects on 
other euro countries. The main beneficiaries of the German fiscal expansion seem to be 
the nearest small open economies, such as Belgium, Netherlands and Austria (Figure 
6). These countries experience a substantial boost to GDP which increases by 0.2 to 
0.45% vis-à-vis baseline GDP over the duration of the investment program. GDP in 
the euro area in total will be positively affected by around 0.4%, again vis-à-vis the 
baseline.
All in all, the proposed debt-financed public investment plan has the potential 
to bring about substantial and continuous boost to economic activity in Germany, 
stimulating domestic demand in the short run and increasing the country’s public 
and private capital stock in the long run. In addition, our results indicate that 
such an investment program would considerably rebalance the German current 
account bringing it in line with levels agreed on under the European Commission’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Moreover, positive spillover effects are likely to 
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Fig. 5 Government debt, in percentage of GDP










Fig. 6 GDP of selected countries and euro area, deviation from baseline, level difference in percent
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the stagnating German public capital stock poses significant 
risks for future economic growth of the country. Various indicators point at severe 
and persistent underinvestment, a significant part of which can be traced back to lack 
of funding. Additional investment needs have been estimated to be roughly €450 bn 
over the coming decade. As simulations show, such a program could be entirely debt-
financed while keeping the German debt-to-GDP ratio below the Maastricht threshold 
of 60% of GDP. Moreover, it would significantly lift both German potential and actual 
GDP. It would also contribute to bring Germany’s current account surplus from its 
currently very high levels of 7–8% to below 4%, bringing it in line with the levels set 
by the European Commission’s Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedures. Whilst the 
spillover effect to other European economies would be limited, they will nevertheless 
be felt positively and might even be reinforced if other European governments follow 
the German example and also start modernizing their public capital stocks. 
A potential obstacle might be existing fiscal rules such as the German debt brake, 
but at least for a significant part of the investments needed, technical solutions such as 
public entities devoted to investments could allow some sort of debt-financing. Beyond 
what is possible under current fiscal rules, a reform of the legal framework should 
be considered, given that it has been designed under the assumption of persistently 
much higher interest rates compared to what we have been observing in the past years, 
and given that sticking to current fiscal rules while neglecting much needed public 
investment might carry high welfare costs.
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4. Public Investment Trends across 
Levels of Government in Italy
Floriana Cerniglia
1
 and Federica Rossi
2
Introduction
Italy, over this last decade, has experienced the worst economic crisis in its history. A 
double recession, during which GDP contracted by approximately 9%, was followed 
by weak and stunted expansion: from 2013 to the present day, less than half of the 
ground lost has been regained. As a result of the crisis, Italy has seen a real slump in 
investments. In this context, there is mounting pressure for greater public investment 
to stimulate economic activity in the short run and to impact the potential for long-
term economic growth. 
As a result of the severe economic and financial crisis, Italy has had to implement 
extraordinary actions to contain and reduce its public debt. Public investment has 
been curtailed the most, with respect to other categories of expenditure. Sub-national 
governments (Regions, Provinces and Municipalities) have been forced to implement 
quite stringent containment measures. According to the Parliamentary Budget Office 
(Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio (UPB)), from 2009 to 2016 the primary expenditure 
of central government increased by 5.7%, while the primary expenditure of sub-
national governments decreased by 7.2%. 
It has not been easy for Italian sub-national governments to implement the necessary 
fiscal adjustments since they have been subject to continuously changing fiscal rules 
and regulations. From 2010–2015, Italian sub-national governments were subject to the 
so-called Internal Stability Pact. According to this law, sub-national administrations 
were only allowed to spend revenues collected during the fiscal year, while savings 
accumulated over the previous years were “frozen” at the Central Treasury in Rome. 
This created the need for a budget surplus. However, since the existing, immediately 
available, public revenues were just enough to cover the current expenditure, public 
1  Director of CRANEC — Facoltà di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Università Cattolica, Milano
2  CRANEC — Università Cattolica, Milano.
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investments collapsed. And unfortunately, sub-national investments account for more 
than half of overall public investments.
Moreover, in 2016, the Internal Stability Pact was substituted by a new fiscal rule 
(law 164/2016) which requires a non-negative budget. Under this new framework, 
the control of debt once again prevails over the aim of relaunching investments, since 
debt (the main source for financing public investment) and the use of surpluses are 
excluded from calculating the “final budget” (Giorgiantonio et al. 2018). Another 
change was the introduction of vertical/horizontal National Agreements and Regional 
Agreements (also known as Solidarity Agreements). These measures do not allocate 
new financial resources for investment, but only increase the sub-governments’ 
budget-margins. This does allow for greater public capital expenditure in specific 
strategic sectors (i.e., school buildings, the prevention of hydro-geological risk, 
post-earthquake reconstruction). Moreover, the National Agreements support the 
development policies of disadvantaged local governments (e.g. small municipalities), 
while Regional Agreements aim to optimize the use of budget-margins at multiple 
levels of government, consolidated at the regional level. Unfortunately, the Solidarity 
Agreements in general have had little success, with the exception of Lombardy and 
Emilia Romagna (Sciancalepore 2017; Ferretti et al. 2018).
This chapter aims to provide a run-through of the public investment trends 
across levels of government in Italy from 2000 to 2017. We consider the breakdown 
of public investment by levels of government as quite important. Since the reform 
of the Italian Constitution in 2001, the interactions between levels of government 
in Italy has become increasingly challenging. Coordination challenges between the 
central government and sub-national governments in running current and capital 
expenditures as well as the financing of local expenditures (both current and capital) 
remain unsolved problems, which most obviously impact the time required to make 
an investment. As stressed by Lee Mizell and Dorothée Allain-Duprè (2013), since 
sub-national governments are important actors when it comes to implementing public 
investment strategies for economic growth, it is important to develop good practices in 
terms of institutional arrangements. For instance, it must be clearly established “who is 
responsible for what.” An effort in this direction has been pursued over the last years, 
as just mentioned above; and these types of interventions have ensured that, at least 
for some municipalities, investment resources stopped declining (Ferretti et al. 2019).
The chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1. provides an overview of major 
trends in public capital expenditure, including local and national public companies, 
which in Italy are significant contributors to public investment. We focus in particular 
on investment data on infrastructure, machinery and equipment funded by public 
expenditure.
The focus is on both the central government and sub-national governments and on 
investments made by public companies at the national and local levels. This overview 
is possible considering the “Conti Pubblici Territoriali” dataset (hereafter CPT), 
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released by the Italian Agency for Territorial Cohesion. The dataset covers annual data, 
in nominal terms, of revenues and expenditures by the Italian Public Administration 
(PA) and by the Enlarged Public Administration (Enlarged PA). Notice that the PA 
includes the central government plus local governments and regional governments.3 Data 
on the Enlarged Public Administration includes the PA described above plus national 
and local public companies and utilities.4 
Considering that the last available data date back to 2017, in section 4.2. we present 
more recent data taken from 2018, 2019, 2020 budget laws concerning regulatory 
interventions and proposals to increase public investment. Section 4.3. provides some 
final remarks and concludes with policy prescriptions.
4.1. Public Investment in Italy
Over the past seventeen years, public expenditure by the Italian PA has steadily grown 
from 46.5% of GDP in 2000 to 48.7% of GDP in 2017, with a peak of 51% in 2013. The 
growth is mainly due to total current expenditure excluding interest (from 36.2% of 
GDP in 2000 to 41.1% of GDP in 2017). As for gross fixed capital formation, the GDP 
ratio was 2.8% in 2000 and 2.1% in 2018, with a peak of 3.7% in 2009).5 Consequently, 
Italy’s infrastructure gap has widened. The “Global Infrastructure Outlook” (published 
in 2017) calculated for Italy, with reference to seven sectors (electric energy, roads, 
railroads, telecommunication, water, ports and airports), an annual infrastructural 
investment need (for the period 2016–2040) of $67 bn, a much higher level of public 
investment made in 2018.
Real GDP has also declined: -1.4% from 2008–2012, and 0% from 2013–2016.6 Even 
though a precise assessment of the macroeconomic effects on growth of an increase 
in public investment is shrouded with uncertainty (as is well known, the size of the 
multiplier depends on many factors), estimates by the Bank of Italy indicate that, for 
3  The central government includes the State, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, ISTAT, ISAE, ENEA, CNR, INFN, 
ENIT, ICE, AGEA, CRI, CONI, ANAS, Social security institutions, ENAV, Patrimonio dello Stato S.p.a., 
EQUITALIA, Customs and Monopolies Agency; local governments include provinces, municipalities, 
metropolitan cities, agencies and institutions linked to provinces or municipalities, sub-regional 
tourism promotion institutions, universities, chambers of commerce, mountain communities, 
port authorities, national parks; regional governments include regional administrations, public 
health providers (ASL), hospitals, agencies and institutions linked to regions, regional agencies 
for promoting tourism. CPT data are cash flows. Notice that all budgetary data for each level of 
government are presented according to both a functional and an economic classification and — most 
importantly  —  data are consolidated, namely net of intergovernmental financial flows such as 
transfers among levels of government. See Conti Pubblici Territoriali (2007).
4  A caveat is required here: for purely operational purposes, CPT has chosen the threshold of 30% 
for public shareholdings, below which it is generally presumed that public control does not exist. 
Concerning CPT data on investment by public companies: both private and purely public financial 
resources can be used to contribute to investments. 
5  See http://www.bdap.tesoro.it/sites/openbdap/cittadini/contabilitanazionale/ContiSatellite/Investi 
mentiFissiLordi/Pagine/ccn_inv_consuntivo.aspx
6  See European Commission (2020), Table 1.1., p. 15.
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the Italian case, the multiplier is greater than one (Busetti et al. 2019). The positive 
effect on growth will also determine a decrease of the debt/GDP ratio. The scenario 
that a sustained public investment stimulus would create sizeable output effects and 
positive cross-border spillovers is simulated in the Country report on Italy 2020.7
Fig. 1 Enlarged PA: public capital expenditure components (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
In what follows, we shall focus on public capital expenditure, which consists of three 
components: i) public investment, broken down as infrastructure expenditure, and 
machinery and equipment expenditure; ii) money transfers, for example to private 
companies, public institutions, etc; and iii) shareholdings and the provision of loans. 
The shares for each component of the Enlarged PA are shown in Figure 1. On average, 
public investment accounts for 43%, money transfers for 18% and shareholdings and 
provision of loans for 39%.8
Figure 2 shows the trends of public capital expenditure9 without shareholdings and 
the provision of loans by national and local public companies and by the PA.
7  See European Commission (2020), Box 3.1., p. 23. 
8  Focusing only on PA capital expenditure: public investments on average accounted for 35% of capital 
expenditure, money transfers accounted for 23%, and shareholdings and loans for 41%. For further 
details and data, see Cerniglia and Rossi (2020).
9  In this chapter, we focus exclusively on flows of public capital expenditure and public investment. For 
an overview of the stock of public capital, please refer to: International Monetary Fund, Investment 
and Capital Stock Dataset, 2017, which estimates that the Italian infrastructural endowment was about 
56% over GDP in 2015 (Spain’s was 57%, Germany’s 48% and France’s 72%); the first census (2011) 
of the Public Administration’s real estate holdings (http://www.dt.tesoro.it/it/attivita_istituzionali/
patrimonio_pubblico/censimento_immobili_pubblici/rapporti_annuali_immobili/); and Banca 
d’Italia (2019), pp. 217–20.
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Since 2009, public capital expenditure by the PA has had a negative trend, and it 
plummeted to only 1.8% of GDP in 2017. Public capital expenditure by national and 
local public companies, on the other hand, has had a positive trend: from 1.3% of GDP 
in 2000, to 2.2% of GDP in 2017.
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Fig. 2 Public capital expenditure (percentage of GDP) in Italy 
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In 2000 the PA’s public capital expenditure was almost €40.9 bn in absolute value, and 
that of national and local companies was €16.2 bn. In 2017, it was respectively €31.4 bn 
and €37.2 bn.
As the boost to economic growth comes from investment  —  which, as stated 
above for the period considered accounts for on average almost 43% of public capital 
expenditure by Enlarged PA — we believe it is important to break down this figure 
and provide more details. We shall do that by focusing on the public investment trend 
(Figure 3) and the weights of the PA and of public companies (Figure 4).
Fig. 3 Public investment as percentage of GDP
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
Over the past seventeen years, 54% (on average) of public investments in Italy were 







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Public administration National and local public companies
A European Public Investment Outlook68 
Fig. 4 Public investment by PA and public companies (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
Looking at the trend as a percentage of GDP (Figure 3), three periods can be 
identified):10 i) 2000–2004 — with an increase in investments by both the PA (from 
2.1% to 2.5% of GDP) and public companies (from 1.2% to 1.7% of GDP); ii) 2004–
2009 — investments by the PA ranged from 2.3% to 2.5% of GDP, while investments 
by public companies increased from 1.7% to 2% of GDP; iii) 2009–2017 — with a fall 
in PA investments (from 2.3% of GDP in 2009 to 1.1% of GDP in 2017) and a decrease 
in public companies’ investments (from 2% of GDP in 2009 to 1.4% of GDP in 2017, 
excluding a positive peak in 2012).
10  Consider these additional figures: investment by public companies in 2000 were €15.2 bn, while in 
2017 they were €24 bn. Investments made by the PA were €26.3 bn in 2000 and €19.5 bn in 2017. 
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Fig. 5 Public investment components (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
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Moreover, public investments consist of different components which are reported 
in Figure 5: on average, infrastructure investments by the PA and public companies 
accounted for 69%, while machinery and equipment investments accounted for 32%. 
The PA predominantly invested in infrastructure (on average, 46%), while, from 
2005 onwards, public companies increasingly invested in machinery and equipment. 
Let us provide a few examples in monetary terms: for instance, in 2017, investments 
in infrastructure by the PA amounted to €15.2 bn, investment in machinery and 
equipment by PA amounted to €4.2 bn; investment in infrastructure by public 
companies amounted to €9.6 bn, investment in machinery and equipment by public 
companies amounted to €14.4 bn.
Since sub-national governments have a crucial role in Italy, it is interesting to 
figure out the contribution of each level of government and of public companies to 
the Enlarged PA. Figure 6 speaks for itself: public investment was primarily made by 
sub-national governments (local and regional governments, on average 41%) followed 
by national public companies (30%), and local public companies (15%). 
Fig. 6 Public investment by PA levels of government and by public companies (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
To have a deeper understanding of the period considered, Figure 7 shows the 
evolution of the annual growth rates of public investment considering in turn central 
government and sub-national levels of government as well as public companies 
(both national and local). Between 2001 and 2009, the annual growth rate remained 
positive, with the exception of 2005 (-2.8%). Excluding 2012 (when an increase in 
investments by national public companies compensated for the decrease in investment 
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by the other actors), the annual growth rate of public investment remained negative 
until 2017.11 It must be pointed out that the reduction in investment by sub-national 
governments and national public companies contributed the most to this negative 
trend in public investments over the period considered. Not only in Italy, but also 
in most OECD countries (see OECD 2017) —more than half of public investments 
occurred at the sub-national level. However, in the economic literature, an issue 
which needs investigation is to estimate the effect of capital (de)centralization on 
economic growth. An attempt has been made by Cerniglia et al. (2017) with reference 
to Italy. The findings are that decentralization in current expenditure has no effect 
on economic growth, whereas a critical mass of decentralized capital expenditure 
may have a positive effect. Results suggest a positive role for local governments in 
creating conditions for effective public investments.
Fig. 7 Contributions to public investment growth by PA and public companies (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
Finally, it may be useful to look at specific sectors of investment. Figures 8 and 9 
show the average shares over the 2000–2017 period for public companies and the PA 
respectively.
11  Notice that in 2015 data indicate the extraordinary expenditure reporting due to the 2007–2013 
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Fig. 8 Investment by public companies by sector (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
Fig. 9 PA investment by sector (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
First, we can highlight that public companies and the PA invest in different sectors.12 
Indeed, the majority of investments by public companies were in transports13 (30%, or 
on average €7.2 bn per year), energy (28%, or on average €6.9 bn per year), others in 
12  . The Global Infrastructure Outlook (Global Infrastructure Hub (2017)) calculated the annual 
infrastructure investment needs for Italy, for the 2016–2040 period. The annual estimates for the seven 
sectors are as follows: 15$ bn for electric energy, 12.3$ bn for roads, 19.6$ bn for railroads, 8.1$ billion 
for telecommunication, 3.5$ bn for water, 4.6$ bn for ports and 1.1$ bn for airports.
13  The building, running and maintenance costs of the following transportation infrastructures: rail, 
maritime, aviation, lake, river, including ports, airports, stations and freight villages. 
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the economic field (10%, or on average €2.5 bn per year), telecommunications (8%, or 
on average €1.9 bn per year) and water (6%, or on average €1.4 bn per year). While 
the majority of investments by the PA went to roads, highways and motorways (24%, 
or on average €6.9 bn per year), general public administration (13%, or on average 
€3.9 bn per year), education (9%, or on average €2.6 bn per year), health (8%, or on 
average €2.4 bn per year) and residential and urban buildings (7%, or on average €1.9 
bn per year). Other somewhat relevant sectors include the environment (6%), other 
transports (5%), culture (5%) and public safety (5%).
4.1.1. Public investments across regions
Italy’s regional divide remains large, and sadly, it continues to grow. The population in 
the southern regions (or “Mezzogiorno”) is almost 34% of the total population, but in 
2018, its share of GDP amounted to almost 22.3%,14 in 2000 it was 24.7%. In the last decade, 
public expenditure has decreased in the southern regions.15 Since public investment 
is a powerful instrument to promote convergence across regions, it is fundamental to 
consider its territorial distribution. We do so in the present section. It should be noted 
that data include both ordinary and additional resources (i.e., from the European Union 
Funds). This explains the positive trend for some of the years in the Mezzogiorno. 
Table 1 shows the shares of public investment and public capital expenditure 
(without shareholdings and provision of loans) in the Mezzogiorno, considering both 
the Enlarged PA and PA. In 2017 only 30% of the public investment by the Enlarged 
PA was devoted to the Mezzogiorno (€11.6 bn  —  in constant 2010 euros), overall, 
during the period considered (2000–2017), the share was always below 34% (with the 
exception of 2015). On the other hand, in 2017, 36.4% of the public investment made 
by the PA were devoted to the Mezzogiorno (€6.04 bn — in constant 2010 euros). The 
largest share (44.5%) of public investment made by PA in the Mezzogiorno in 2015 
can be exclusively ascribed to the expenditure reporting of the 2007–2013 European 
Structural Funds programme.
14  See SVIMEZ (2019). Notice also that per capita GDP (2010 price) in 2018 was €31.498 in the Central-
Northern area and €17.436 in the Mezzogiorno. North-Central Italy includes the following Italian 
regions: Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria, Valle d’Aosta, Emilia Romagna, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Marche, Toscana and Umbria. The Mezzogiorno consists of: Abruzzo, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia.
15  See SVIMEZ (2019); Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio (2017); and Conti Pubblici Territoriali (2019, 
p. 17).
Disparities across regions still emerge if we look at per capita investments. Figure 
10 shows the relation between per capita GDP in euro and per-capita public investment 
by the PA in 2016. In the bottom-left part of the graph, we see that the Mezzogiorno 
area is characterized by low per capita GDP and low per capita public investment, 
while the upper-right part shows the three Northern regions with the highest GDP 
and per capita investments in Italy. 
Table 1 Public investment and public capital expenditure shares in Mezzogiorno by the 
PA and Enlarged PA
Public investment Public capital expenditure








2000 31.5 34.1 35.9 39.2
2001 30.8 35.1 36 40.8
2002 29.3 33.6 34.6 39.7
2003 26.8 30.4 32.2 37
2004 27 31.6 31.7 36.7
2005 27.7 32.8 31.5 36.7
2006 27.8 33.7 32.2 36.3
2007 27.4 32.4 29.9 33.9
2008 29.2 35.4 30.3 33.6
2009 27.6 33.8 30.1 34.8
2010 30 35 30.9 32.6
2011 30.1 34.5 33.1 35.7
2012 31.3 36.4 32.4 34.1
2013 30.4 35.4 32.8 34.1
2014 30.5 37.5 33 35.8
2015 35.9 44.5 36.9 40.9
2016 32.4 38.6 34 34.1
2017 30 36.4 31.8 31.9
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali.
Fig. 10  Per capita public investment by the PA, and per capita GDP by Italian regions in 2016
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Figure 11 shows the distribution of public investment by the PA and by public 
companies, GDP and population for each Italian Region in 2017: Lombardia is the 
region with the highest population concentration (17%), GDP (22%) and investments 
by the PA (12%). If we look at investments made by public companies, the main 
beneficiary is Lazio (21%), followed by Lombardia (16%), Emilia Romagna (9%) and 
Veneto (8%). In all of the Mezzogiorno area, the shares of investment by the PA are 
higher than the shares of investment by public companies.16 
Fig. 11 Population, GDP and public investment by PA and public companies shares by Italian 
regions in 2017 (%)
Source of data: Conti Pubblici Territoriali. Figure created by the authors.
The issue of having shares of public investments in North-Central Italy and the 
Mezzogiorno that proportionally reflect the population in those areas, has been a 
serious political concern these last years. Two aspects are at stake: i) investments by 
public companies have been incredibly low in the Mezzogiorno, with few exceptions;17 
ii) if we exclude resources coming from EU funds, the proportion of public investment 
16  For an overall picture of annual data see Cerniglia and Rossi (2020). Moreover, SVIMEZ (2019, 
pp. 483–84) provides indexes on transportation infrastructure (highways, roads etc.) in relation to 
the population by region. For example, the Italian infrastructure index for 2015 was 116.0 overall, 
but 156.5 for the North Central regions, and barely 38.6 for the Mezzogiorno. In other words, the 
Mezzogiorno has seen a constant decrease in investments in public works from 1970 to 2018. This 
means that while the nation-wide decrease was 2%, the Mezzogiorno had a whopping 4.6% cut, but 
investments for the Central Northern regions contracted by only 0.9% (SVIMEZ 2019, p. 488). 
17  See CPT (2019, p. 46). For instance, the Ferrovie dello Stato (the Italian Railway Network) reduced the 
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in the Mezzogiorno is much lower that 34%.18 Indeed, when analysing the breakdown 
of public capital expenditure between North-Central Italy and the Mezzogiorno, 
it is important to distinguish between ordinary and additional resources. The CPT 
data presents the so-called Single Financial Framework (“Quadro Finanziario Unico 
(QFU)”), which estimates the shares of both ordinary and additional resources 
attributed to the two macro-areas. For instance, CPT data show that in 2017 the public 
capital expenditure of the PA was around €32.548 bn.19 However, only €27.600 bn 
were ordinary resources and of this amount about €6.04 bn went to the Mezzogiorno. 
Therefore, the Decree-Law n.243/2016 and Law n.18/2017 introduced the “34% clause”, 
meaning that this proportion (net of additional resources) is the amount of capital 
expenditure that should be allocated to the Mezzogiorno since the population in this 
area is around 34%. The 2019 Budget (Law n.145/2018) modifies the aforementioned 
Law n.18/2017 extending the “34% clause” also to public companies (Anas and the 
Italian Railway Network). 
Very recently, an appreciable emphasis on the regional divide, caused also by a 
lack of public investments by the government, was highlighted in “Piano Sud 2030”.20 
According to this document, in order to allow the Mezzogiorno to reach its 34% 
benchmark, €5.600 bn in ordinary capital expenditure need to be given from 2000 to 
2022. 
4.2. 2018, 2019 and 2020 Budgets:  
The Financial Resources for Public Investments
Additional funds for public investment were allocated in the 2018, 2019 and 2020 
Budget Laws.21 The main instrument for managing public investments in the 2017 and 
2018 Budgets was the Fund for Investment, Financing and Infrastructural Development 
(Investment Fund, from here on). The 2017 Budget (Law n.232/2016) established this 
Fund with an initial endowment of €47.55 bn spread over fifteen years: €1.9 bn in 
2017, €3.15 bn in 2018, €3.5 bn in 2019 and €3 bn for each following year from 2020 to 
2032. The 2018 Budget (Law n.205/2017) added €36.1 bn to the Investment Fund for 
the period from 2018 to 2033. Therefore, the Fund’s financial endowment rose to €83.7 
billion spread over the 2017–2033 period. Also, both the 2017 and 2018 Budgets allowed 
local governments, in good financial conditions, to use budget surpluses and take out 
new loans (limiting the allocation of the resources for investments). The Investment 
Fund should have become the cornerstone of the Italian infrastructure policy, but it 
accumulated numerous setbacks, which deeply limited the impact of the investments, 
as compared to the Government’s forecasts. Other negative aspects are the extremely 
18  See Tortorella (2019). 
19  Of this amount €10.402 (30.9%) goes to the Mezzogiorno. 
20  Ministro per il Sud e la Coesione territoriale (2020). 
21  Further details on these budget laws can be found in Cerniglia and Rossi (2020).
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long time-lags for the actual allocation of funds, and the uncertainty derived from 
the Constitutional Court case (n.74/2018), which found certain constitutional-related 
problems in the law establishing the Fund. Notwithstanding, the Fund does contain 
effective and policy measures, for example: bridging the technical-organizational gap of 
public administrations in planning and evaluating public investments and simplifying 
the regulatory framework (in particular, the Public Procurement Code and the fiscal 
rules for local authorities). The 2019 Budget (Law n.145/2018) establishes a new Fund 
with the aim of relaunching the central governments’ investments and the country’s 
economic development. The total budget package is €43.6 bn for the 2019–2033 period 
(broken down as follows: €740 mn in 2019, €1.26 bn in 2020, €1.6 bn in 2021, and €40 bn 
spread over the 2022–2033 period). In addition, the 2019 Budget has established a Fund 
for re-launching local government infrastructure investments: €2.78 bn for 2019, €3.18 
bn for 2020, €1.255 bn for 2021 and €27.88 billion spread over the 2022–2033 period 
(for a total of €35.095 bn). Furthermore, the Government has decided to consider 
small public works (for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance) a priority. In order 
to address the problem of an existing technical-organizational gap between public 
administrations in planning and evaluating public investments, the Government has 
planned to create various agencies. A new temporary agency, InvestItalia, has the aim 
of supporting the initiatives of the Prime Minister in the political and administrative 
management of public and private investments. In particular, InvestItalia analyses 
and evaluates investment programmes for tangible and intangible infrastructures; 
determines the feasibility of investment projects; and supports public administrations 
in implementing investment plans and programmes. Finally, it also identifies obstacles 
and critical issues related to the implementation of investments and implements 
the appropriate solutions to overcome them. InvestItalia should work alongside the 
Centrale per la progettazione delle opere pubbliche, which is supposed to support 
central and local governments in the following fields: designing the proposal for the 
public work, managing the procurement procedures, and providing economic and 
financial evaluations of the works and technical assistance to the administrations 
involved in public/private partnerships. These two new temporary agencies should 
cooperate with “Strategia Italia”, an economic control room instituted by the so-called 
“Genova Decree” (d.l. n.109/2018). Strategia Italia verifies the state of implementation 
of infrastructure investment plans and programmes, in particular those related to 
hydrogeological instability, and the seismic vulnerability of public buildings and 
environmental degradation. Moreover, it proposes suitable solutions to overcome 
obstacles or delays. The Government has also prepared two sets of measures to support 
investments. The first is the so-called “Growth Decree-Law” (n.34, 30 April 2019), has 
introduced measures to stimulate capital accumulation and private investments. The 
second instrument, “Sblocca Cantieri” (d.l. n.32/2019, converted into Law n.55/2019), 
aims to speed up procurements, especially in the field of public works, by overcoming 
some weaknesses of the Public Procurement Code. Sub-contracting procedures 
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have also been simplified, for instance the threshold for the sub-contracts have been 
increased to 40% of the total amount of the procurement, and the requirement to 
indicate the list of sub-contractors in the tender has been eliminated till 31 December 
2020. Finally, one of the most significant measures in the 2020 Budget (Law n.160/2019) 
is the establishment of the Fund for relaunching central government investments: 
around €110 mn in the first year, €400 mn in the second year and €770 mn in the third 
year. The 2020 Budget will provide resources up to 2034, with a budget of €22 bn 
for the 2020–2034 period. In particular, the Fund aims to finance investments which 
improve environmental sustainability (e.g. reduction of emissions, increase of energy 
efficiency) and, more generally, innovation. This Fund has the same characteristics 
as the one (with the same name) established by the 2019 Budget. The 2020 Budget 
also allocates some resources for investments by local administrations, especially for 
municipalities. Indeed, the Budget assigns resources to every municipality, based 
on its population (from €5,000 for the municipalities with up to 5,000 inhabitants, 
to €250,000 for municipalities with at least 250,000 inhabitants), for an overall total 
of €235 mn in 2020, €400 mn in 2021 and €500 mn in 2022. These resources aim to 
support small investments in the fields of energy efficiency and sustainable territorial 
development. Another new aspect of the 2020 Budget which is worth mentioning is 
the so-called Green New Deal, with an endowment of €470 mn for 2020, €930 mn for 
2021 and €1.4 bn euro to be distributed over the 2022–2023 period. Moreover, the 2020 
Budget has strengthened the 34% clause in favour of the Mezzogiorno: according to 
this budget, the additional resources are excluded from the computation of the 34%.22
4.3. Conclusions and Some Policy Prescriptions
As underlined throughout the chapter, there has been a dramatic decline in public 
investment in Italy since 2009, implying a substantial investment gap. This decrease has 
mainly been driven by the decrease in investments by local governments, which have 
historically accounted for roughly 60% of the country’s overall public investments.
However, Italy is not only facing a strained situation, where smaller and smaller 
amounts of financial resources are allocated to public investment. Indeed, one of its 
main obstacles is transforming the allocated financial resources into actual construction 
sites: a gap between the planned expenditure for investment and the results exists. The 
situation is particularly critical regarding suspended public works. Since April 2018, 
Associazione Nazionale Costruttori Edili (ANCE) has monitored (through www.
sbloccacantieri.it) the infrastructure works throughout the country, which are delayed 
or suspended, due to complex procedures, suffocating bureaucracy, impediments 
linked to the application of the Public Procurement Code or lack of financial resources, 
as well as political vetoes, which call into question the start and/or continuation of 
already planned works.
22  For further details see Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio (2020).  
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Between April 2018 and January 2019, ANCE identified 574 suspended works 
worth approximately €39 bn (ANCE 2019). Looking at their territorial distribution, 
380 works (66% of the total, worth about €25 bn) were located in the Northern regions; 
62 works (accounting for €9 bn) were in Central Italy and 132 works (the remaining €5 
bn) were in the Mezzogiorno.
Regarding the size of the suspended sites, 544 are small-medium sized, worth €2.6 
bn; 30 are above the €100 mn threshold (for a total value of €36.4 bn) and mainly 
concern the construction of new transport infrastructures or the modernization of 
existing ones, aimed at improving the territory’s competitiveness. In addition, there 
are relevant works underway to improve citizens’ health and safety, such as hospitals 
and projects which limit hydro-geological instability. Projects greater than €100 mn are 
mainly concentrated in Northern Italy (17 works account for €24 bn), five works (€8.2 
bn) are in Central Italy and eight projects (€3.5 bn) are in the South.
Concerning unfinished work, “Anagrafe delle opere incompiute” (managed by the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, according to Law 214/2011) identified 647 
public works, which were started, but not completed, for a total value of almost €4 bn 
at the end of 2017. Among the causes of the stalemates, a lack of funds is indicated in 
more than half of the cases (a phenomenon that includes slowdowns in the supply of 
resources).
In conclusion, the limited effectiveness of relaunching economic growth policies is 
not ascribable to a single factor, but rather lies in the coexistence of several elements. 
Certainly, the accounting harmonization process has introduced innovations in 
the management of resources, which have not been completely transposed by 
administrations, and thus influence their spending capacity. Indeed, the changes to 
fiscal rules require time to be assimilated by the institutions, especially since their 
investment capacity, after years of inactivity, has been further weakened by employment 
turnover (ANCE 2019).
Another element to consider is the implementation of the new Public Procurement 
Code, and more generally, the excessive bureaucracy and the complex institutional 
and regulatory framework, which together lead to innumerable obstacles for the actual 
creation of public infrastructure.
To sum up, policy prescriptions, coming from the main findings of our analysis are 
as follows: 
• Since one of the main causes reported by Anagrafe delle opere incompiute 
is the lack of funds, an appropriate management of time mismatches in the 
availability of resources, which come from different sources, is necessary.
• Addressing greater public investments in the Mezzogiorno area, in order 
to reduce the infrastructure gap. In particular, it is important to avoid the 
substitution effect between ordinary and additional resources. Indeed, 
additional resources have often replaced ordinary ones in recent years, 
rather than being added to them.
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• Unlocking the turnover of PA personnel and the resources dedicated to 
professional training, in order to rebuild the technical skills within the 
administration.
• Establishing a precise and clear governance framework, which excludes 
overlaps and conflicts of competences between institutions and levels of 
government.
• Improving the quality of infrastructure projects.
• The reconstitution of a complete and reliable regulatory framework 
(interventions on Public Procurement Code, the role of the Italian 
Anticorruption Authority (ANAC) and of Corte dei Conti).
• Rationalizing the entire process of public procurement, in particular by 
eliminating the inefficiencies creating long ‘idle times’.
• Paying attention to the maintenance of public infrastructures: the available 
empirical evidence suggests that, in Italy, the provision of infrastructure is 
inadequate, or is at risk of becoming so, due to a lack of maintenance. 
For Italy, implementing a massive investment program over the next years is a key 
challenge that needs to be addressed in order to improve GDP growth. But, how 
might it be financed, given the current concerns regarding Italy’s public finances? As 
stated by other authors in the above report, the obvious and necessary conclusion is 
the introduction of a Golden Rule, which excludes public investments from the deficit 
limits. 
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5. Trends and Patterns in Public 
Investment in Spain:  
A Medium- and Long-Run Perspective
José Villaverde
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 and Adolfo Maza
2
Introduction
In the last decade, the Spanish economy experienced its most acute crisis since the 
end of the Second World War. GDP, employment and unemployment were deeply 
affected after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and, although the economy registered a 
certain recovery from 2014 onwards, the levels of these three variables have not made 
up for the lost ground; that is to say, all of them still remain below pre-crisis levels. 
Because of this, there have been calls from various quarters for the government (at the 
central, state and local levels) to play a much more active role in the economy, mainly 
by means of increasing public spending.
There are several reasons justifying these appeals. As is well known, according 
to both theoretical and empirical analysis (Aschauer 1989; Abiad et al. 2015; DeJong 
et al. 2017, among others) there is a positive relationship between the rate of growth 
of an economy and productive government spending and, more specifically, public 
investment. This relationship takes place both in the short and long run; in the short 
run, because public investment adds to aggregate demand; in the medium and long 
run, because this spending increases the productive capacity of the economy. 
Considering the relevance that public investment has for economic growth, this 
chapter unveils (some of) its main characteristics in Spain. In section 5.1., it pays 
attention to the levels, evolution and composition of public investment over the period 
2000–2017; here, the Spanish performance is compared with that of six key reference 
areas: the European Union (EU), the euro area (EA) and the four largest economies 
in the EU (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). In section 5.2., the focus 
1  Departamento de Economía — Universidad de Cantabria.
2  Departamento de Economía — Universidad de Cantabria.
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of the analysis changes in two respects: on the one hand, it refers just to Spain and to 
a much longer sample period (from 1964 to 2014); on the other hand, attention is paid 
not only to public investment but also to the public capital stock. Section 5.3. presents 
the main conclusions.
5.1. Trends and Patterns of Public Investment in Spain  
in the EU Context, 2000–2017
In line with the empirical literature on the topic, total (private plus public) investment 
and public investment are most commonly approximated through gross fixed capital 
formation and general government gross fixed capital formation. Using Eurostat’s 
annual government financial statistics as the source of information for these variables, 
Table 1 shows that, in this respect, Spain experienced a pro-cyclical trend throughout 
the sample period. While the average rate of growth of total investment in the country 
between 2000 and 2008 was 4.6%, it fell to an astonishing -6.2% from 2007 to 2014, 
before gaining momentum, once again, in the next sub-period (2014–2017) with an 
average increase of 3.6% per year. For the whole period, the average growth rate of 
investment in Spain was a mere 0.7%; this rate is higher than that of Italy and the UK, 
both of which recorded negative figures, but similar to that of the EA and lower than 
those for France, Germany and the whole of the EU.
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, Spanish real total investment experienced a 
trend similar to the one mentioned above, from an initial level of 25.4% in 2000 to a 
final level of 21.6% in 2017, with a maximum of 29.6% in 2007 and a minimum of 20% 
in 2013. Although the trend was rather alike for each one of the six reference areas, 
two points need to be highlighted. First, the ratio “investment/GDP” was, up until 
2010, much higher in Spain than in any other of the benchmarking areas. Second, the 
decrease in the ratio in the aftermath of the financial crisis was, as in the absolute value 
of the investment, much greater in Spain than in any one of those six areas. 
Regarding public investment, the main trait is that its evolution clearly differs from 
that of total investment. As shown in the first two blocks of Table 1, there are at least 
three important differences to account for. First, public investment grew faster than 
total investment over the boom years of the sample period (2000–2008); second, public 
investment did not evolve as well as total investment over the next two sub-periods 
of crisis and recovery; and third, public investment experienced an average annual 
decline of 1.6% while, as mentioned, total investment increased by an average of 0.7%. 
Putting it in other words, this means that private investment (see the third block of 
Table 1) in Spain performed worse than public investment during the boom time but 
much better over the next years (see second and third periods of Table 1). 
Overall, the ultimate result of all the aforementioned developments imply that 
there have been some changes in the share of public investment in total investment in 
Spain. First, it remained rather stable between 2000 and 2007; then, it increased rapidly 
in 2008 and, in particular, in 2009; finally, it decreased very sharply over the next eight 
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Table 1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation: growth rate (%)
2000–2008 2008–2014 2014–2017 2000–2017
To
tal
Euro area 2.0 -2.5 2.9 0.7
European Union 2.4 -1.9 2.7 1.1
France 2.4 -1.0 2.1 1.3
Germany 0.5 0.6 2.0 0.9
Italy 1.5 -5.2 2.5 -0.6
Spain 4.6 -6.2 3.6 0.7




Euro area 2.7 -3.2 0.6 0.2
European Union 2.7 -2.1 0.2 0.5
France 1.3 -0.7 -1.0 0.1
Germany 0.6 0.9 3.7 1.4
Italy 1.6 -5.6 -2.6 -1.9
Spain 6.1 -11.5 -0.1 -1.6




Euro area 1.9 -2.3 3.2 0.8
European Union 2.3 -1.9 3.2 1.1
France 2.7 -1.0 2.7 1.5
Germany 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.8
Italy 1.5 -5.1 3.2 -0.4
Spain 4.3 -5.4 4.0 0.9
United Kingdom -2.8 0.6 0.5 -1.0
Source of data: Eurostat database. Table created by the authors
years, reaching a minimum of 9.6% in 2017. Although public investment in the EU, the 
EA and the four EU largest economies followed a similar pattern to that of Spain, two 
points need, once more, to be underlined. On the one hand, none of them experienced 
such an abrupt increase of public investment from the onset of the financial crisis and 
such a huge decrease in the consecutive years. On the other hand, although in four 
of them (the exceptions being Germany and, above all, the UK) the share of public 
investment in total gross capital formation diminished between 2000 and 2017, the 
decline was sharpest by far in Spain.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there tends to be a close and 
positive correlation between public investment and GDP; there is no doubt, however, 
that this is quite often disrupted, especially at crisis times, simply because public 
investment is, everywhere, the most volatile component of aggregate demand. As 
depicted in Figure 1, this is precisely the case of Spain: against an average of some 3.5%, 
the share of public investment over GDP has varied greatly over time, in particular 
immediately after the eruption of the crisis.3 Initially representing 3.6% of GDP in 2000, 
3  It is also important to note that, on average, public investment in Spain accounted for 8.4% of public 
expenditure; this average, however, masks the fact that the evolution of the ratio followed the shape 
of an inverted U, with a maximum of 11.9% in 2007 and a minimum of 4.6% in 2016.
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one of the highest values among the reference areas, it increased somewhat steadily to 
5.1% in 2009. However, from then on, and because of the efforts imposed to consolidate 
the very weak Spanish public finances,4 the share began to decrease continuously 
(the only transitory exception, and by a little margin, was 2015) to the much lower 
level of 2.1% in 2017. Once again, despite the fact that this was also roughly the trend 
followed in all reference areas, it must be pointed out that the extent of the changes 
(both upwards and downwards) was, as a norm, much higher in Spain than in any 
one of these areas. Additionally, it must be said that over the boom years of the sample 
period all reference areas, with the only exception of France — which recorded ratios 
very like those of Spain  —  registered levels of public investment that, as shares of 
their respective GDP, were much smaller than the Spanish ones. Throughout the crisis 
years, however, things changed dramatically for Spain, to the point of becoming the 
country in which the fall in public investment as a percentage of GDP was the highest.
Fig. 1 Public investment effort: public investment over GDP (%)
Note: EA = euro area; EU = European Union; F = France; G = Germany; I = Italy; S = Spain; UK = 
United Kingdom. Source of data: AMECO database. Figure created by the authors.
Although all public investment contributes to fostering economic growth, not all of 
its components do it in the same way; in particular, empirical evidence shows that 
investment in transport infrastructure and investment in R&D are the items that 
4  According to the Bank of Spain, “the contribution of public investment to the recent fiscal consolidation 
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contribute the most to the aggregate productivity of the economy. In this respect, it 
is convenient to remember that, as stressed by the OECD, “investment spending has 
a high multiplier, while quality infrastructure projects would help to support future 
growth, making up for the shortfall in investment following the cuts imposed across 
advanced countries in recent years” (OECD 2016, p. 6).
Therefore, it is always appropriate to ask in which areas or activities does the 
Spanish Government invest?5 To answer this question it is convenient to make use of the 
Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which distinguishes between 
ten categories: General public services (01), Defence (02), Public order and safety 
(03), Economic Affairs (04), Environmental protection (05), Housing and community 
amenities (06), Health (07), Recreation, culture and religion (08), Education (09) and 
Social protection (10). Considering this classification, it can be seen (Figure 2) that in 
Spain, and indeed everywhere else, public investment in Economic affairs — which 
mainly refers to infrastructure — gets, on average for the whole sample period, the 
5  Although here we do not pay attention to the distribution of public investment by different levels 
of government, it is worth remembering that, in Spain, the shares of the central, state and local 
governments were, on average for the period 2000–2017, 31.1%, 42.3% and 26.6%. 
Fig. 2 Distribution of public investment by type of asset: average for the period 2000–2017 (%)
Note: EA = euro area; EU = European Union; F = France; G = Germany; I = Italy; S = Spain; UK 
= United Kingdom. 01 = General public services; 02 = Defence; 03 = Public order and safety; 04 
= Economic affairs; 05 = Environmental protection; 06 = Housing and community amenities; 07 = 
Health; 08 = Recreation, culture and religion; 09 = Education; 10 = Social protection. Source of data: 
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highest share: specifically, in Spain it accounts for around 43% of total public investment. 
Additionally, it should also be appreciated that Spain is the country in which this item 
is the most important; while in the EU and the EA, the average share of it was 33.8 
and 35%, respectively, in all the other four countries of reference the share was even 
lower, with the UK registering the lowest value (25.3%). This notwithstanding, public 
investment in Economic Affairs was, after Housing, Social protection and Recreation, 
culture and religion, in Spain the item that suffered the largest fall in the aftermath 
of the Great Recession; on average, it declined by 8.9% per year between 2008–2017. 
Because of this, the share of Economic affairs in total public investment lost about ten 
percentage points in the last years of the sample period, from a maximum of 48.6% in 
2011 to a minimum of 38.8% in 2017.
5.2. Public Investment and Public Capital in Spain:  
A Long-Term Perspective
Having examined in the previous section the dynamics and main characteristics of 
public investment in Spain relative to that of the whole EU, the EA and the four largest 
economies in the EU, over the period 2000–2017, we change our focus in this section 
in two respects. First, we now pay attention not only to public investment but also 
to the public capital stock in the country; and second, we adopt a much longer time 
perspective, as the sample covers a period of some fifty years, from 1964 to 2014. All 
data used in this section are taken from the Valencian Institute of Economic Research 
(IVIE) dataset on public capital.6
According to Figure 3, two main characteristics concerning investment have to be 
stressed. First, both total and public investment roughly followed the same pattern 
over time. They grew moderately until the mid-1980s, they accelerated their rate of 
growth from then on to the second half of the 2000s (in particular public investment), 
and they experienced an abrupt decline since then up to 2014. Second, the share of 
public investment in total investment experienced many ups and downs around an 
average of 11.2%. Here several sub-periods are clearly noted. From 1964 to 1980, the 
ratio, although very volatile, stood around 9%. The arrival of democracy in Spain, the 
integration of the country into the EU, and the sharing of power between the central 
and regional governments brought about a huge increase in the ratio to the point 
that it reached maximum values in the neighbourhood of 17% at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Afterwards, the ratio declined for a period of about five years to stabilize 
approximately at 11% for the whole next decade, between 1996 and 2006. Finally, it 
experienced a huge rise after the crisis outbreak to reach, in 2009, a near maximum 
of around 16%. Unfortunately, and once again as a result of the fiscal consolidation 
6  Specifically, the database used is ‘Stock and Capital Services’ (https://www.ivie.es/en_US/
bases-de-datos/capitalizacion-y-crecimiento/el-stock-y-los-servicios-de-capital/).
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efforts previously mentioned, it decreased markedly from then on to a level close to 
the minimum of the 1970s; in fact, between 2008 and 2014 public investment in Spain 
fell by nearly 60%, which implies a negative rate of growth of 13.8% per year.
Fig. 3 Investment (1964 = 100): total and public
Note: the ratio P/T is measured (in percentage points) in the right-hand axis. Source of data: IVIE 
database. Figure created by the authors.
This last point is confirmed (Figure 4) if we consider the evolution of the public 
investment effort, as measured once again by the “public investment/GDP” ratio, 
over time. This ratio, being between 2 and 2.5% for over the first twenty years of the 
sample period, increased very rapidly in the second half of the mid-1980s to reach a 
maximum above 4%. Afterwards, it declined also very sharply until the mid-1990s to 
keep a level around 3% up to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when it increased to 
achieve, once more, a level of 4%; this, however, was only a very transitory increase as 
in 2010 it began to decrease to reach a level of just 1.5% in 2014. On average, the public 
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of public investment by type of assets. Although 
IVIE offers a very rich classification, we have reduced it to just five types for reasons 
of simplicity: Dwellings, Non-residential structures (Infrastructures), Transport 
equipment, Machinery and other equipment,7 and Intangible assets (Information and 
7  Considering its limited relevance, we have included “Biological property assets” within the 
“Machinery and other equipment”.
Fig. 4 Public investment effort: public investment over GDP (%)































































Fig. 5 Distribution of public investment by type of asset (%)
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communication technology, ICT). As can be seen, the lion’s share of public investment 
corresponds to one single asset, Infrastructures, to which roughly between 60 and 80% 
of total public investment is devoted. Additionally, Machinery and other equipment 
is also relevant, as it contributes to around 20% of total public investment. Albeit still 
very low in relative terms, it is important to note that the share of public investment in 
Intangible assets grew slowly but steadily until the beginning of the nineties but that, 
since then, it has grown more rapidly, reaching levels of around 8% in the last final 
years. In fact, investment in Intangible assets grew much more rapidly than any other 
type of public investment; it is also true, however, that this investment is the one that 
was most negatively affected by the outbreak of the crisis (its annual average rate of 
growth between 2008 and 2014 was -12.9%).
As is well known, the stock of capital of an economy is the result of investment 
accumulation and de-accumulation over time. As mentioned before, in addition to 
offering information about investment, IVIE also provides information about the stock 
of capital (both net and productive) in the economy. Net capital is the result of net 
investment accumulation while productive capital is equal to net capital minus the loss 
of capital efficiency due to the ageing of capital assets. As the estimation of the loss of 
efficiency always implies making some arguable assumptions and, additionally, the 
evolution of net and productive capital has moved along very similar paths, here we 
decided to focus exclusively on net capital (referred to henceforth in short, as simply 
“capital”).
Total and public capital in Spain increased a lot over time. Initially and until the 
mid-1980s, both grew steadily at a similar rate, but afterwards public capital rose much 
faster. Consequently, the share of public over total capital was very stable over the first 
twenty years of the sample period at a level of 8%; afterwards, however, it increased 
sharply to up a maximum of around 12% in the mid-1990s, to remain stable since 
then at a level between 11 and 12%. Regardless, this performance cannot obviate the 
fact that public capital suffered a little decrease during the crisis years: while, taking 
1964 as the base year with a value of 100, the index rose from 100 to 804.5 until 2011, it 
declined from 2011 to 2014 to a level of 764.3.
When we consider the ratio public capital/GDP (Figure 6), the most salient trait 
is that, after long periods of relative stability (1964–1980 and 1994–2008), it increased 
very markedly. That is to say, the two most expansionary phases took place, roughly, 
between 1980 and 1995; and immediately after the burst of the Great Recession. 
Consequently, the ratio rose from slightly more than 20% of GDP in 1980 to around 
36/37% at the end of the sample period. Regarding public capital per inhabitant, its 
evolution differs from that of net capital over GDP in that now, with the exception of 
the first fifteen years of the sample, the ratio increased almost continuously over time. 
In any case, its evolution mimics that of public capital/GDP in that the average for the 
second half of the period (close to €8,000 per inhabitant) was much higher than that 
for the first (€3,500).
Fig. 6 Public capital ratios: over GDP (%) and population (thousand euros per inhabitant) 
Note: the ratio public capital/population (in thousand euros) is measured on the right-hand axis. 






































































Fig. 7 Distribution of public capital by type of asset (%)
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Regarding the distribution of the public capital stock by type of asset (Figure 7), it is 
important to stress that, naturally, it is much in line with that of the public investment 
previously mentioned. Once again, it happens that Infrastructures is, by far, the most 
important type of capital asset of the five here considered; it represents, on average, 
nearly 84% of public capital. As is obvious, this implies that the other types of 
capital assets contribute with very low percentages to the total; in particular, these 
contributions were of some 8% for Machinery, 6.3% for Dwellings, 1.3% for ICT, and 
0.6% for Transport equipment. What cannot be seen in Figure 7, is that there are three 
additional relevant characteristics related to this distribution. First, as expected, all 
types of capital assets increased in net terms over time. Second, ICT is the type of 
capital asset that grew more rapidly since the early 1990s (between 1990 and 2007/2008 
it grew at an average yearly rate of 8.9%). Third, capital for all types of assets declines 
(in three out of the five cases very abruptly) from the outbreak of the financial crisis.
5.3. Conclusions
Like some other European countries, namely Greece, Spain was hit badly by the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. Because of this, the country faced some important constraints 
in its public finances; namely, public investment experienced a severe blow after the 
outbreak of the crisis. In fact, during the period 2000–2007, Spain was the country 
that registered the second highest increase in public gross fixed capital formation 
among the five biggest European countries, a rate (6.8% per year) that was also much 
higher than that of the EU (2.3%) and the euro area (2.6%). However, over the next 
period, 2008–1013, the situation changed completely: public investment dropped, on 
an annual basis, at a rate close to 11%. Thus, Spain became the country that suffered 
the most acute decline in public investment among the big five. 
In relative terms, the situation did not improve. Although Spanish GDP also 
registered a large drop in the aftermath of the recession, public investment decline 
was even larger. Therefore, the ratio “public investment/GDP”, that had been among 
the highest of the EU, also recorded an intense fall to the point of becoming one of the 
lowest of the EU. In fact, from being at a level closer to or over 4% between 2000 and 
2009 (when it reached a maximum over 5%), the ratio decreased to a minimum of 
around 2% in 2016 and 2017.
From the point of view of the asset composition of public investment, two results 
are worth mentioning. On the one hand, the Economic affairs category is clearly the 
most important category, even to a much higher extent than in any of the reference 
areas: it represents, on average, around 43% for Spain against less than 35% in both 
the EU, the euro area and the other four big countries. On the other hand, the share of 
this category of investment declined, because of the crisis, from 2007/2008 onwards.
However, a longer, although less updated, time perspective (1964–2014) offers 
a somewhat different picture of the evolution of public investment in Spain. After 
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having experienced a more or less stable increase between 1964 and 1980 (it rose from 
an index of 100 to one of 200), this type of investment scored an impressive increase in 
the next decade, to reach an index level over 600. The first half of the 1990s was more 
turbulent (the index declined below 500), but afterwards and up until 2008 it achieved 
another impressive increase, registering an index value close to 1000. Unfortunately, 
and as mentioned before, the Great Recession very negatively affected Spanish public 
investment, to the point that the index fell to a minimum of less than 400 in 2014. 
Regarding the public investment effort, there are three results, somewhat in 
tune with the evolution previously mentioned, that should be highlighted: first, its 
continuous ups and downs, reflecting a high volatility; second, the huge increase 
recorded in the 1980s; third, the even stronger decline underwent from 2008 to 2014.
As for the composition of public investment, there are also two important facts 
that should be stressed: on the one hand, the huge (albeit declining) share of public 
investment devoted to infrastructure, and, on the other, the low but increasing share 
devoted to ICT. 
The results for (net) public capital roughly mimic those of public investment. The 
main difference is that, as expected, public capital has been growing constantly over 
time (from an index of 100 in 1964 to one of more than 750 in 2008); the only exception 
to this positive evolution took place in the last few years, in which the index declined 
to around 720 in 2014. A very similar evolution was registered by the ratios “public 
investment/GDP” and “public investment/population”. 
To sum up, the following points should be stressed:
1. Public investment in Spain has been very volatile and pro-cyclical over time. 
It has experienced large increase periods during boom times and huge fall 
periods during recessions.
2. Public capital has been increasing fairly constantly (but not always at the 
same rate) over time, with the only exception being developments during 
the most acute phase of the financial crisis.
3. Investment in infrastructures always represents the main component of 
public investment, but the most expansive item has been investment in ICT. 
This is also true regarding public capital.
Considering all of this, it seems that the agenda for public investment in Spain in the 
future should have three main goals: 
1. To reduce the level of volatility, for which the development of long-run 
investment strategies would be an important instrument.
2. To adopt a more anti-cyclical stance. As part of the aforementioned strategies, 
public investment should be considered as an anti-cyclical policy tool, in 
particular to smooth future drops in the business cycle.
5. Trends and Patterns in Public Investment in Spain  95
3. To increase the share devoted to ICT. Without forgetting the importance of 
physical infrastructure, it is clear that improving access to ICT infrastructure 
should become a priority for policy makers, since ICT may act as a remarkable 
enabler of economic development. In other words, the growing trend in this 
type of public spending should be consolidated and, if possible, expanded 
in the coming years.
Although there is no doubt that this is a hard agenda to accomplish, it should obviously 
be pursued. The fate of public investment and public capital in Spain (and, for that 
matter, of economic growth) is, to a great extent, in the hands of policy makers, as it 
ever has been.
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Introduction and Main Points at Issue
The role of research and innovation (R&I) as key drivers of economic growth has been 
gaining increasing importance and has now become an object of renewed concern 
in the European policy agenda. The intensity of research and development (R&D) 
expenditure on GDP in the European Union (EU) has grown over the past decade, but 
at decreasing rates, and it is still well below that recorded for Japan and the United States 
(US). Globally, however, the growth of R&D expenditure has been driven by massive 
investments in newly industrialized Asian countries, especially by China, whose share 
of world R&D expenditure has increased from 5% in 2000 to 21% in 2015 (European 
Commission 2018b). In line with this trend, China has recently outperformed the 
EU R&D investment in terms of both total amount and GDP percentage, and further 
growth is expected to continue, according to the current Five Year Plan (Figure 1).
1  Agenzia nazionale per le nuove tecnologie, l’energia e lo sviluppo economico sostenibile — ENEA.
2  CRANEC  —  Centro di Ricerche in Analisi Economica e Sviluppo Economico Internazionale, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano; Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche — CNR.
3  Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche — CNR; Università degli Studi di Urbino, Carlo Bo
© D. Palma, A. Silvani and A. M. Stilo, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0222.06
However, the sluggish growth of R&D investment in the EU is also the result of 
large differences across the Member States. This calls not only for a closer assessment of 
major patterns of R&D expenditure at the country level but also for special attention to 
the role played by public funding with respect to the more-than-ever complex evolution 
of technological innovation and the need for the productive structure to be supported 
to continuously capture the potential of new technologies. It is, in fact, not by chance 
that such a perspective now appears at the core of the strategic guidelines devised by 
the next Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe (European 
Commission 2018a). A major emphasis of the Programme has been put on the need to 
build new and stronger synergies between the public- and private-side stakeholders in 
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Fig. 1 Evolution of R&D intensity, 2000–2016
Notes: (1) KR: There is a break in series between 2007 and the previous years. (2) JP: There is a 
break in series between 2008 and the previous years and between 2013 and the previous years. (3) 
US: (i) R&D expenditure does not include most or all capital expenditure; (ii) There is a break in 
series between 2003 and the previous years (4) CN: There is a break in series between 2009 and the 
previous years. Source: DG Research and Innovation — Unit for the Analysis and Monitoring of 
National Research and Innovation Policies – Science, Research and Innovation performance of the 
EU 2018. Source of data: Eurostat, OECD. 
order to overcome the main barriers that still hold back industrial scale-up processes 
and competitiveness of the EU economy. Nonetheless, this should constitute only part 
of an advanced stage of the EU approach to research and innovation policies.
Looking at all of the EU strategies to support and boost research and innovation, 
we also have to consider direct and indirect funds used to create new research 
infrastructures or support existing ones (European Commission 2019a). These 
include scientific equipment and instruments, scientific data archives, communication 
networks, computing systems and any other research and innovation structure open 
to external users. With the actions on infrastructure, the EU aims to not only reduce 
fragmentation of the research and innovation ecosystem and avoid duplication 
of effort but also enhance public-private cooperation, by making industries more 
aware of opportunities to improve their products and by facilitating programs of 
co-development of advanced technologies. Bearing in mind that the infrastructure 
strategy is quite relevant, we nevertheless consider this funding as a part of the total 
EU R&D expenditure and will do so for this chapter. 
Although it is clear that the EU as a whole still lags behind the US and major Asian 
countries in terms of R&D intensity and that in recent years the gap has widened 
further with regard to business R&D expenditure, the emergence of deeper divides 
across the Member States (notably between major northern and southern countries as 
well as between the western and eastern areas) may very well be the result of existing 
country-specific structural divergences that have developed on different grounds. This 
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requires a better understanding of differences in country patterns of R&D expenditure, 
with a more detailed look at the evolution of the various main sources of R&D funding 
and their relationship to major structural factors shaping the characteristics of national 
research and innovation ecosystems. The objective is to put into perspective the need 
for R&D investment across the Member States, trying to assess to what extent the role 
of public R&D funding is consistent with the development of national research and 
innovation ecosystems and in which terms the lack of sufficient R&D investment could 
be adequately refrained in the EU policy framework.
6.1. The EU in Depth
The EU vocation for public investment in R&D has been largely confirmed over the 
past decade, and only a slight decrease in public R&D intensity (on GDP) has emerged 
after 2012 (Figure 2). This contraction was smaller than that in the US and Japan, 
and the EU still holds the highest share of global public R&D investment (European 
Commission 2018b). As a matter of fact, an increase of total public R&D expenditure 
in the EU took place every year between 2007 and 2015, while a similar dynamic 
occurred in a more limited period between 2012 and 2015 with regard to the total of 
national government budgets for R&D (European Commission 2018b). This last trend 
is only partially reflected in the variations of national government budgets for R&D 
as a share of total general expenditure. The share of public budget allocated to R&D, 
which increased until the beginning of the international crisis up to nearly 1.5% and 
Fig. 2 Evolution of public R&D intensity, 2000–2016
Notes: (1) KR: There is a break series between 2007 and the previous years. (2) US: (i) Public R&D 
expenditure does not include most or all capital expenditure; (ii) There is a break in series between 
2003 and the previous years. (3) JP: There is a break in series between 2008 and the previous years 
and between 2013 and the previous years (4) CN: There is a break in series between 2009 and the 
previous years. Source: DG Research and Innovation — Unit for the Analysis and Monitoring of 
National Research and Innovation Policies — Science, Research and Innovation performance of the 
EU 2018. Source of data: Eurostat, OECD.
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Fig. 3 R&D intensity, 2000, 2007, 2016 and 2020 target 
Notes: (1) CZ, UK: R&D intensity targets are not available. (2) EL, SE: 2001, HR: 2002, MT: 2004. (3) 
BG, CZ, EE, FR, LV, LT, HU, PL, RO, SI, SK: 2015 (4) PT: The R&D intensity target is between 2.7% 
and 3.3% (3.0 % was assumed). (5) LU: The R&D intensity target is between 2.3% and 2.6% (2.45% 
was assumed). (6) IE: The R&D intensity target is 2.5% of GPN, which is estimated to be equivalent 
to 2.0% of GDP. For DK, EL, FR, LU, HU, NL, PT, RO, SI, SE, UK: breaks in series occur between 2000 
and 2016. Source: DG Research and Innovation — Unit for the Analysis and Monitoring of National 
Research and Innovation Policies — Science, Research and Innovation performance of the EU 2018. 
Source of data: Eurostat, Member States.
Fig. 4 Share of government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D — percentage of total general 
government expenditure 
Source of data: Eurostat. Figure created by the authors.
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declined between 2010 and 2012 up to 1.36%, shows a very slight increase after 2012, 
staying between 1.37% and 1.39% with an adjustment to 1.4% only in 2017. By and 
large, it is interesting to note that over the past decade (2007–2017) the EU’s total of 
national government budgets for R&D has increased by 16.5% and that the share of 
public budget allocated to R&D in 2017 is only -5% lower than the peak percentage of 
1.48% in 2009.
The present dynamics of public R&D investment in the EU is the result of large 
divergences among the Member States in the pattern of change of the share of public 
budget allocated to R&D. A first divide with respect to the EU global trend can be 
observed between countries that increased their investment in R&D as a share of public 
budget and those that went in the opposite direction. But deeper insights into the 
behaviour of public R&D budgets in the EU can be gained by looking at the differences 
among the Member States with regard to the share of total R&D expenditure on GDP 
(GERD/GDP) (Figure 3), especially within the EU15 aggregate. Increasing shares 
of the public budget allocated to R&D are observed for most of the northern EU15 
countries, characterized by the highest shares of total R&D expenditure on GDP 
(Figure 4), including Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium; another two 
countries, Finland and the Netherlands, still rank well above the EU average in 2017 
but show a contraction of the R&D share of the public budget. On the other side, 
EU15 Member States with the lowest share of total R&D expenditure on GDP, notably 
the southern countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Ireland, show sharp 
contractions of the share of public budget allocated to R&D during the central years of 
the international crisis, with only partial adjustments to higher levels at the end of the 
period (2016–2017) in the case of Portugal and Greece. Compared to the other EU15 
countries, and with the exception of Belgium and France, these countries still have the 
lowest shares of the public budget allocated to R&D, well below the EU average. This is 
clearly a point of concern as, among the core Member States, and unlike Belgium and 
France, southern European countries and Ireland still have the lowest shares of R&D 
intensity. A different case is that of the United Kingdom, where the R&D intensity 
on GDP is well above that of southern countries but slightly below the EU average 
and where the share of public budget allocated to R&D declined sharply over the 
past decade (although with some upward adjustments between 2013 and 2017). The 
dynamics of public R&D investment as a share of government spending is somewhat 
more erratic in the case of the Eastern EU countries; with the exception of Estonia and 
the Czech Republic, the use of public budgets to finance R&D expenditure is much 
more limited here than in the EU15 countries. 
Fig. 5 GERD financed by sector (%), 2015 
Notes: Sweden, Israel: 2013; France: 2014; Greece, Austria, Iceland, Serbia: 2016; United States: R&D 
expenditure does not include most, or all capital expenditure; Israel: Defence (all or mostly) is not 
included. Source: DG Research and Innovation — Unit for the Analysis and Monitoring of National 
Research and Innovation Policies — Science, Research and Innovation performance of the EU 2018. 
Source of data: Eurostat, OECD, UNESCO. 
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6.2. Public Investment
Looking at the extent to which R&D public funding contributes to the whole of 
R&D expenditure, another remarkable fact is that the share of total R&D (GERD) 
financed by government in the EU has declined all the time, although, at 31.1% it is 
still higher than comparable shares of the US, China, Japan and South Korea (Figure 
5), while the share of government financed GERD on GDP is still below that of the 
US. This trend is reflected in all Member States, but large differences can be observed 
across countries. In the EU15 Member States, the share of R&D public funding is 
generally higher in southern countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain), mainly as 
a result of less research carried out by the business sector. This is true only in part 
for the eastern Member States; they show an even smaller share of total research 
expenditure financed by the business sector, but, as the result of the much higher 
incidence (largely well above the EU average) that contribution from abroad has on 
the smaller total R&D expenditure of these countries. At the same time, it should be 
observed that the decline of the share of GERD financed by government is also the 
effect of the fall of direct government contributions to business research, which have 
dropped sharply in all countries since the beginning of the financial crisis (OECD 
2018). Instead, the decrease of public funding of R&D involved public research only 
to a more limited extent, both as a share of GDP and in terms of total government 
expenditure (OECD 2018). This latter trend is mostly in line with the dynamics 
already observed for the EU share of the public budget allocated to R&D and is well 
reflected in the higher education (HERD) and government (GOVERD) components 
of public R&D expenditure on GDP (Figure 6). 
Thus, given the remarkable divergences among the Member States recorded for 
all public R&D spending, this suggests a more in-depth analysis of the main patterns 
of public R&D expenditure emerging at the country level. The attempt is also that of 
unveiling the possible main direction of public R&D spending (and hence the direction 
of public R&D investment) while accounting for the whole of the R&D funding 
structure. The aim is twofold: to overcome important drawbacks that characterize the 
allocation of R&D funds in the public budget with respect to specific socio-economic 
objectives, and to assess to what extent the need for public R&D investment is 
consistent with broad R&D country strategies that are supposed to be followed. In fact, 
given the still substantial lack of information necessary for analyzing the real content 
of governmental appropriations and the structure of public R&D outlays, crossing 
data on R&D spending with those on actual R&D expenditure would be of little 
help in understanding R&D investment strategy by government, especially from the 
perspective of a comparative analysis between countries. Looking then at the patterns 
of public R&D expenditure, it is first of all relevant to compare, in terms of GDP and at 
the EU level, the steep decline of GOVERD expenditures with the upward trend found 
for both HERD expenditures and BERD (business) expenditures (Figure 6). 
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Fig. 6 BERD, HERD and GOVERD % of GDP per country, 2007, 2012, 2017
Source of data: Eurostat. Figure created by the authors.
This appears to indicate the increasing importance of research and innovation as a 
driver of economic activity, with the consequent need to adequately support the growth 
of human capital. However, the patterns of R&D expenditure at the country level are 
generally consistent with the EU trend only for the higher education and the business 
sectors, while both the dynamics and the intensity of the government expenditure are 
more country-specific. Furthermore, it should be noted that increasing intensities of 
R&D expenditure on GDP in the higher education’s sector are widely observed with 
the highest and/or increasing intensities of R&D expenditure in the business sector, 
although there are some remarkable exceptions in countries where the intensity of R&D 
expenditure in the business sector is still well below the EU average. Trend reversals to 
lower intensities of the higher education expenditure are common instead in countries 
still boasting the lowest business R&D intensities (such as southern countries among 
the EU15 members) and to countries with the highest business R&D intensities (such 
as the Netherlands and the UK), although, excepting the UK, the latter still stand well 
above the EU average of higher education expenditure intensity.
All in all, the growth of R&D in the business sector appears to be an important 
driver of the total R&D expenditure in the EU as a whole. This is a result of remarkable 
differences in the R&D business intensities among countries, which were in part 
reflected in the growth of the higher education expenditure. This is a point of concern 
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especially for Member States with the lowest business R&D intensity, as, in most cases, 
they have very low growth rates for the higher education expenditure and still show 
a large gap with respect to the EU average. Moreover, and most importantly, it should 
be noted that, despite the increase in R&D business expenditure, the EU R&D business 
intensity still lags well behind that of the US, Japan, Korea and China. However, there 
does not seem to be enough evidence to conclude that this is a consequence of the 
decrease of direct government support for business R&D. As has been widely observed 
(OECD 2018; European Commission 2018b), this decrease has, in fact, been largely 
compensated for by an increase in indirect support through tax incentives, the growth 
of which has been much higher in the EU than in the US, Japan, Korea and China, 
and which are now higher than they have ever been. It has also been pointed out 
that, among the Member States with the highest business R&D intensities, Germany 
and Finland did not adopt tax incentives, while more generally it has been observed 
that the use of tax incentives can hardly turn into expenditure additionality unless it 
becomes part of a more comprehensive strategy involving direct investment activity by 
government within a more targeted “mission-oriented” investment view (Mazzucato 
2013). Indeed, significant evidence has emerged about additionality effects on R&D 
business expenditure, pointing out that greater benefits arise for high-tech sectors that 
already boast a higher R&D orientation (Freitas et al. 2017). As the entire amount of 
the R&D business expenditure is consistent with the industry specialization (Moncada 
2016), this should also call for a closer consideration of the structure of the economy 
where tax incentives are to be implemented.
 Additional R&D financing from abroad has also played an increasing role in all EU 
countries (European Commission 2018b) and, as mentioned above, has become a key 
component of total R&D investment, especially in eastern countries. However, when 
looking at the main public sources of R&D financing as represented by the European 
Commission Structural Funds and the Horizon 2020 program, we cannot help but 
notice that they hide major infrastructural divergences among the Member States.
With regard to the Structural Funds, also bearing in mind that in many more 
developed countries they cover a limited portion of the territory, it is quite clear that 
the share of funding explicitly allocated to R&I (research and innovation) projects 
is marginal among eastern countries (Figure 7), with only a few exceptions slightly 
above the EU average (16%). 
Moreover, in these last countries, the extent to which R&I funds contribute to 
innovation in the business sector is well below the EU average in most cases, while 
shares well above the average are noticed mostly for countries that also hold the 
lowest shares of Structural Funds allocated to R&I projects. This could suggest that 
the initial development lag of these countries was such that funds were first used for 
the macroeconomic context as a whole, including support for the activity of research 
centres. The explicit contribution of R&I funds to innovation in the business sector is 
instead much higher among the EU15 Member states, although a remarkable variability 
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Fig. 7 Structural Funds: share of funding allocated to R&I (devoted to small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) and to research); total per country 
Source of data: 2007–2013 database of the cumulative allocations (European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion Fund (CF)) to selected projects and expenditure at NUTS2 (https://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp13_3_db_nuts2_
ae.xlsx). Figure created by the authors.
Fig. 8 Horizon 2020: average of European contribution per project and per country
Source of data: Horizon 2020 country profiles, May 2019. Figure created by the authors.
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is observed across countries. In particular, the share of research and innovation funds 
allocated to innovation projects is quite specific for each country and, most importantly, 
does not show any relationship with the R&D intensity in the business sector.
With regard to the Horizon 2020 program, the latest figures show (Figure 8) that 
the average EU contribution per project is higher, the higher the countries’ total R&D 
is as a share of GDP, although a further difference emerges between EU15 countries 
and the eastern Member States. Southern EU15 countries lag behind northern ones, 
but eastern countries lag almost always (excepting Portugal) behind southern EU15 
countries, even when these are countries in which the total R&D expenditure makes 
up a similar share of GDP. 
6.3. Final Remarks and Policy Considerations
The first paragraph of the Joint Statement on “New Economic Growth: The Role 
of Sciences, Technology, Innovation and Infrastructure” of the G7 of Academies of 
Science, which met in Rome in 2017, states:
Science, technology and innovation have long been important drivers of economic 
growth and human development. Growth relies on the integration of basic and applied 
research, at both public and private levels, on an international scale. The challenge is 
to ensure that, even during phases of economic slowdown, science and technology 
continue to support the objectives of sustainability and improved living standards in 
all countries. Institutional arrangements are needed to make sure that the potential of 
science and technology is aligned with the paths and strategies of economic development, 
social inclusion and environmental sustainability, as argued by the United Nations 
report “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” (G7 
Academies of Science 2017) 
This implies an increasing investment in infrastructures  —  both tangible and 
intangible — that contribute to inclusive development and to progress in science and 
technology, as mentioned in policy recommendations of the statement. 
In this respect, the quantity (intensity of the R&D effort and the number of 
researchers) and the quality of the research produced, measured by the scientific 
impact and the ability to transfer it as innovation in the economy and society, determine 
measurable rankings that place the different scientific and innovative systems and 
their aggregations on a supranational scale, according to criteria and indicators that 
we have examined and compared in this chapter. All the most recent comparative 
analyses based on statistical data and their processing as quoted in the bibliography 
agree in registering a worldwide growth of these indicators (the effort in R&I), marked, 
however, by strong differentials between countries. The positioning of individual 
countries is confirmed, combining a strong economic dynamic with a corresponding 
commitment in R&D. Within this general framework, different groupings of countries 
are outlined on the basis of the industrial structure, the importance of the commitment 
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to research by companies, and the ability of the public actor not only to compensate for 
weaknesses and “market failure” but also to stimulate the propensity to research and 
innovation with planned and targeted initiatives and not simply contextual policies 
and interventions.
The existence of differentials between countries in research and innovation 
performance, and within them between areas and regions, cannot, however, be tackled 
simply by rebalancing the resources used and/or orienting them towards common 
initiatives. Likewise, higher efficiency cannot be derived from strategies based on 
a reduction of public funding or on forcing public/private interaction, without 
the corresponding guidelines, or delegating the motivation for public funding of 
companies to the tax incentives and the choice of contents and objectives to a generic 
“demand-pull force” (Mazzucato 2013, 2019). In fact, it is necessary to assess to what 
extent the resources dedicated to R&D, and the relative spending modes are able to 
turn into an effective development lever, starting from the structural characteristics 
of the entire research and innovation system (Wirkierman et al. 2018). Moving from 
this last consideration, the present chapter, therefore, aims to underscore the “system 
infrastructure” nature of the research activity. It does so by highlighting, through the 
main results of the analyses and the most recent data on the subject, that the investment 
in research cannot be separated from policies and/or strategies that take into account 
the strengths and weaknesses of the productive fabric of each country.
In this context, the public actor is committed to playing a key role in orienting 
processes, both with respect to triple or quadruple helix models and to the construction 
of a strategy that is able to face the challenges of new technologies as well as of the 
behaviour of companies at the global level. To this is added, in particular for Europe, 
the dimension of supranational cooperation and the supporting role exercised by 
Structural Funds, which, beyond the purpose of overcoming structural imbalances 
among countries, highlight different propensities with respect to their use in support 
of research and innovation. Partnership and subsidiarity are, therefore, two particular 
elements of the strategy in support of research and innovation that must be integrated 
into the evaluation of the public budget allocation for research spending.
The lines of analysis followed in our work focused in particular on public 
investment, both direct and in support of companies, including the infrastructural 
endowment. Some trends have emerged that have already been highlighted by the 
various institutional organizations, from the OECD to the European Commission. As 
far as Europe is concerned, there are clear distinctions in the country profiles that, with 
considerable simplification, can be characterized with respect to two “geographical” 
directions: from north to south and from west to east, where a strong correlation seems 
to emerge between a substantial and growing public intervention and the presence 
of a significant business system with a strong propensity for R&I. By contrast, in less 
developed countries (which are characterized by a poor effort in R&D in the business 
sector) it is difficult for the public actor to exercise a leverage function with respect 
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to the role of the companies. This turns to “contextual” infrastructural interventions, 
both in the technological field and as related to the overall infrastructural country 
endowment, by means of a “targeted” use of Structural Funds. Also, in this regard, even 
the examination of technological infrastructures as such and those aimed at research, 
despite the specificity of individual cases, indicates the presence of country-specific 
models. It was therefore considered useful, as analogous to what the OECD already 
does, to examine the vertical relations between public financing to beneficiaries and 
the executors, i.e. subjects in charge of performing R&D (in most cases public bodies), 
by analyzing the relationship between direct funding and the role exercised by support 
through tax incentives. As an example, Germany and Finland, which are high-tech 
countries, have not implemented tax credit policies that means giving priority to direct 
financing.
With respect to the use of Structural Funds, the attractiveness of funds “from abroad,” 
or the propensity to participate and win on competitive funds, the differences among 
countries make it clear that we are not in the presence of a single “winning model” to 
follow. A careful analysis of the Community Scoreboard (European Commission 2019b) 
presents the double advantage of a reading over time and a spatial representation, 
according to the indicators used, of the positioning of individual countries. The report, 
while confirming the nature and characteristics of this positioning, points out that there 
are specific features of the countries that the indicators are hardly able to represent and 
that could offer the possibility of targeted interventions to be calibrated with respect 
to the desired objectives without requiring substantial resources. However, it seems 
clear that the confirmation of a polarization of “cases of excellence” does not help 
the realignment process called for by the cooperation, particularly with respect to the 
ability of weaker countries to use research results. This effect appears to be even more 
negative the more one considers the advance of newly industrialized countries and the 
potential reduction of interactions at the international level linked to new protectionist 
trade policies.
In the European context there is an attempt to tackle the above-mentioned 
polarization and the related growth of disparities between countries with, essentially, 
two instruments: (1) strengthening the infrastructural endowment, according to a logic 
of subsidiarity that uses different means such as Structural Funds and more generally 
other EU policies, and (2) promoting at the same time scientific excellence, cooperation 
and innovative capacity with the framework program instrument. In this regard, the 
choices made in Horizon Europe, both on method and merit of the “missions,” and in 
general the policy to promote innovation and to build up and use technological and 
research infrastructures, even with limited resources, seem to provide a response to the 
role of guidance and support of the public actor coordinated at a supranational level. 
It remains to be seen how this translates into concrete contextual actions, in a correct 
balance between direct intervention and fiscal incentives and in not confining research 
to a “subsidiary” and “ancillary” role with respect to the more explicit industrial and 
commercial policies.
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Our analysis has made use of a harmonized system of data that, born in the 
OECD context almost sixty years ago, has developed and established itself as the 
dominant data system, and has given rise to “supporting tools” both in the form of 
the production of manuals and through the promotion of committees to settle and 
elaborate proposals. This is a precious reality that has directed not only the collection 
phase, but also the use of data by analysts, scholars and decision-makers. However, on 
the whole, analysis of the data underlines the need to overcome some deficiencies that 
make difficult a better use of available information. In fact, it is difficult to interpret 
the strategy that guides investment processes, also considering the logic of the 
so-called “black box” of research that links decisions to results and their use, through 
implementation. This is due to the inherent limits of the GBARD (Government Budget 
Allocation for R&D) set-up and its classification (OECD 2015) and to the difficulty of 
establishing a link with the decision-making processes exercised by the beneficiaries 
of the resources. Also, the ex-post reading on the expenses does not help with respect 
to additionality, directionality and, above all, determination of the mix of resources 
needed to guide choices. We respond today to a growing demand for measurability 
of the impact of public R&D investment (in particular to facilitate the choices and the 
optimal allocation of resources) in a way that is not fully coordinated and without a 
fully equipped “toolbox” at our disposal.
It follows that better knowledge tools are required, starting from a structured 
evaluation of the policies, the related information, and the knowledge baggage that 
enables the establishment of relationships between the different interventions and the 
promotion of an impact assessment that is not related to merely a single intervention. 
The experience gained concretely and in several exercises at the European level within 
the Framework Program, although not unique and always successful, constitutes an 
undoubted point of reference from which to start.
Given this framework, the implementation of a new course of public investment 
research policies should, therefore, envisage a renewed orientation of the strategies 
consistent with the new course of missions/objectives formulated at the European 
level and, at the same time, point to a coordination with policies aimed at increasing 
the innovative potential of the economic system, in relation to the characteristics of the 
productive specialization of each country.
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Introduction: The Welfare Lesson from the Great Recession
Ten years after the first economic crisis of twenty-first century capitalism, Europe 
seems to have passed the nadir of the Great Recession. Time to count our blessings: a 
rerun of the Great Depression has been avoided and recovery, albeit timid, is under 
way, while unemployment and poverty are coming down. The jury is still out on 
whether economic and job growth will return to pre-crisis levels. Unemployment 
remains high in the European Union (EU), especially in the economies heavily scarred 
by the European debt crisis, such as Greece and Spain. The political aftershocks of the 
Great Recession — ranging from a rather hard Brexit, the rise of populism in Western 
Europe, the spread of illiberal nationalism in Eastern Europe, and escalating trade 
tensions between China and the United States (US) — forecast the deceleration of the 
world economy, and the challenges of a costly transformation into a greener world 
economy now confront the European Union project, anchored on a premise of peace, 
prosperity and democracy, underpinned by an existential predicament. 
In the final quarter of the twentieth century, the friction between welfare states’ 
social and economic priorities has often been described as irreconcilable. The American 
economist Arthur Okun coined the “big trade-off” between equality and efficiency, 
proclaiming that, to the extent that welfare spending is used as a political instrument 
to reduce inequality, this harms economic growth because of the market distortions 
that come with comprehensive social protection. However, as Figure 1 reveals, this 
predicament no longer holds. Many welfare states in Continental and Northern Europe 
have proven capable of reconciling high levels of employment with comparatively low 
inequality (see the upper-right side of Figure 1). 
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Even though social spending levels have been consolidated over the past two 
decades, practically all European welfare regimes have been recalibrating the basic 
policy mixes upon which they were built after 1945 in a multi-dimensional fashion, 
most importantly to address new social risks (Hemerijck 2013). Before the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis struck, across the more mature welfare state of Europe social 
investment reform was swiftly becoming the fil rouge in welfare reform. In the face 
of intensified demographic ageing and disruptive technological change, future 
economic growth will rely heavily on high levels and employment and improvements 
in productivity. Today there is ample proof that social investments in child-care, long-
term care, education and training, active labour market policy, lifelong learning and 
active ageing, paid parental leave, family services and benefits, in a complementary 
fashion, significantly contribute to employment, productivity, demographic balance, 
even through improved fertility, and tax revenue, and help reduce long-term reliance 
on compensatory social protection policies, at lower levels of poverty. Although the 
Great Recession interrupted the social investment turn in many countries, social 
investment reform today is even more imperative than before to make up for a lost 
decade. Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries with independent currencies, inclusive 
safety nets and a strong social service tradition, have been best able to protect social 
investment progress. Euro area countries, under the Fiscal Compact, have, by and 
large, taken a back seat on social investment. 
Fig. 1 Employment rate, equality and welfare spending in selected OECD countries (averages 
2010-2015). Note: Only OECD countries with at least 5 million inhabitants are shown; missing data 
for Canada. The black line marks the Lisbon employment target of 70%. The size of the pie-chart 
markers indicates the total welfare spending. 
Source: Hemerijck and Ronchi (2020).
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For almost two decades, EU institutions have professed their support for social 
investment welfare provision, from the idea of “social policy as a productive factor” 
in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, through Social Affairs Commissioner Laszlo Andor’s 
“social investment package” in 2013, to the principles laid down in the 2017 European 
Pillar of Social Rights. However, in practice, the social investment impetus has been 
put on ice with the onslaught of the Great Recession. There is no justification for this 
continued volatile and contradictory policy orientation. Today, the evidence on social 
investment returns is stronger than ever before. Moreover, structurally low interest 
rates present us with a post-crisis opportunity not to be wasted. Not least, European 
publics expect pro-EU political forces to put their money where their mouth is in 
terms of enabling citizens to live dignified, secure lives. It is time for EU-institutions to 
abandon austerity and make a real commitment to social investment and its supporting 
infrastructure. 
7.1. The Social Investment Life-Course Multiplier Effect
As the Great Recession was triggered by a financial crisis, just like the Great Depression, 
rather than a stagflation real-economy crisis (as in the 1970s and 1980s), it offered up 
a test-case for the Keynesian-Beveridgean welfare state. This welfare state is based 
on compulsory social insurance, able to act as an automatic stabilizer in times of 
recession, cushioning crises through anti-cyclical consumption smoothing. By and 
large, automatic stabilization social security, largely absent in the 1930s, provided the 
largest stimulus in most countries while protecting household income after 2008. 
The number (quantity) and productivity (quality) of current and future employees 
and taxpayers are central to the long-term financial sustainability of the welfare state. 
Maximizing employment, employability and productivity helps to sustain the “carrying 
capacity” of the modern welfare state. To do this, states need to effectively coordinate 
the following three policy objectives: (1) raising and maintaining the employment 
“stock” (human capital, skills, health of population); (2) facilitating “flows” between 
various labour market and (gendered) life-course transitions; and (3) using “buffers” 
for the mitigation of social risks (unemployment, sickness) through income protection 
and economic stabilization (Hemerijick 2017). Commitments in these areas produce 
mutually reinforcing positive effects over the life cycle. They generate aggregate 
economic growth and social well-being at the individual and household levels, and 
are key to making social investment work.
The growing evidence on how effective social investment reinforces high 
employment, low poverty, decent growth in fiscal balance, has inspired Anton 
Hemerijck to conjecture the operation of a social investment “life-course multiplier”, 
whereby cumulative social investment returns over the life-course plausibly generate 
a cycle of well-being, in terms of employment opportunities, gender equity, and 
a significant mitigation of intergenerational poverty. The virtuous cycle initiates 
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from early investments in children through high quality ECEC (Early Childhood 
Education and Care), which translate into higher levels of educational attainment, 
which in turn, together with more tailor-made vocational training, spill over into 
higher and more productive employment in the medium term (Brilli 2014; Heckman 
2006; Cumba and Heckman 2007). To the extent that employment participation is 
furthermore supported by effective work-life balance policies, including adequately 
funded and publicly available childcare, higher levels of (female) employment 
with potentially lower gender pay and employment gaps can be foreseen (del Boca, 
Locatelli and Vuri 2005; Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2009). On top of protecting 
households against worklessness and poverty (Härkönen 2014; Cantillon and 
Vandenbroucke 2014), more opportunities for women and men to combine parenting 
with paid labour, moreover, is likely to have a dampening effect on the so-called 
“fertility gap”, the difference between the desired number of children (aspirational 
fertility) and the actual number (Beaujouan and Sobotka 2014; Borgstrom et al. 2016; 
d’Albis, Greulich and Ponthière 2017) A final knock-on effect is a higher effective 
retirement age, provided the availability of active ageing and lifelong learning 
policies, including portable and flexible pensions, for older cohorts (Walker, 2002; 
Jenkins et al., 2003; Schmid, 2015). Higher and more productive employment implies 
a larger tax base to sustain welfare commitments and to keep the virtuous cycle of 
capacitating social justice alive. 
For our contribution, what is important to emphasize with respect to social 
investment reform is that the welfare state has become ever more service-oriented. To 
the extent that the cash-benefit welfare infrastructure is essentially a well-functioning 
ATM-machine, the social investment welfare state is one that relies heavily on 
infrastructure (of day-care centres, schools, hospitals, nursery homes, post-graduate 
training facilities that require significant investment in both physical and professional 
prowess), and, most importantly, on state capacity. 
7.2. A Golden Social Investment Rule  
in the Stability and Growth Pact
For almost two decades EU institutions have professed their support for social 
investment. However, in practice, the social investment impetus has been put on ice 
with the onslaught of the Great Recession. It is important to remember that the single 
currency and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) were negotiated at a time 
when the “supply side” revolution in economic theory and the folk-theorem of the 
big trade-off between equity and efficiency were riding high. The architects of the 
Maastricht Treaty naively believed a monetary union tied to the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), would inescapably force Member States to keep their “wasteful” welfare 
states in check, underwritten by the Maastricht Treaty’s infamous “no-bailout” clause, 
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in the belief that all public spending, especially social spending, is wasteful. As such, 
the rule book of the SGP disqualifies public investments in lifelong education and 
training in the knowledge economy as wasteful consumptive expenditures.
There is no justification for this ideological short-sightedness anymore. Today, 
the evidence for social investment returns is stronger than ever before. Moreover, 
structurally low interest rates present us with a post-crisis opportunity not to be 
wasted. Not least, European publics expect pro-EU political forces to put their money 
where their mouth is in terms of enabling citizens to live dignified, secure lives. 
We must ratchet up domestic social investment with EMU support by exempting 
human capital “stock” investments from the rules of the SGP. The post-crisis collapse 
in interest rates should be used to establish, consolidate and expand social investments 
that benefit future generations and consolidate fiscal health, especially in the face of 
adverse demographic trends. 
We therefore propose a “Golden Rule” of exempting human capital stock spending 
from the euro area fiscal rule book for 1.5% of GDP for about one decade, as a flagship 
initiative of the new European Commission. A viable division of responsibilities 
between the EU and the Member States is possible without trespassing on treasured 
national welfare state jealousies. Social security “buffers,” the core prerogative of the 
national welfare state, should remain in the remit of national welfare provision. The 
“flow” function — which concerns labour market regulation and collective bargaining 
in synchronization with work-life balance, gender equality and family-friendly 
employment relations — is best served by mutual learning and monitoring processes 
of open coordination at national and EU level, engaging national governments with 
relevant experts and the social partners in sharing good practices. 
What we are left with is guaranteeing social investment in lifelong human capital 
“stock”. Here the EU needs to change the fiscal rules in the SGP regarding social 
investment. Citizens all over the EU are craving support for social investments, and 
the financial costs are minimal given the short- and long-term profitability of the 
economic and social returns. 
7.3. A New Deal for Social Europe:  
Boosting Social Infrastructure
Lifelong human capital “stock” includes investment in social infrastructure. In the 
EU, since 2007 investments, both public and private, have fallen by 20%. In  public 
investments, as much as 75% of the reduction is due to the collapse of the works carried 
out by local administrations which, in the European average, represent around two 
thirds of the total public investment (European Commission 2016; Fransen, del Bufalo 
and Reviglio 2018; EIB 2019). Investment in social infrastructure — infrastructure that 
pertains to social services — has been especially weakened. This is the case for three 
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sectors that are crucial for the future well-being of European citizens: health, education 
and housing.4 
Current investment in social infrastructure in the EU has been estimated at 
approximately €170 bn per year.5 The minimum infrastructure investment gap in these 
sectors is estimated at €100–150 bn, representing a total gap of at least €1.5 tn for the 
period between 2018 and 2030 (Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018). 
Social infrastructures are important because they shape the nature of our society. 
High-quality large-scale investments in social infrastructure are especially important 
for the EU given demographic projections, radical structural changes in the labour 
market and innovation. The question is, however, how to find financing to close such 
an enormous gap at a time of high public debt in many regions with a long-term 
perspective for only moderate economic growth rates?
This challenge is at the heart of former European Commission President Romano 
Prodi’s call for a New Deal for Social Europe and contained in the recently presented 
Report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe, 
promoted by the European Long-Term Investors Association (ELTI) and the European 
Commission (Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018).
Europe’s future demographics pose daunting challenges for the coming decades. 
Europe today already has one of the lowest proportions in the world of working 
population to non-working population (children and pensioners). In 2060, one in 
three European citizens will be over sixty-five (of whom one in three will be more than 
eighty years old), while only 57% of the population will be of working age (fifteen to 
sixty-four). 
This aging of the population will have significant effects, particularly on the cost of 
health care and pension systems. In addition, substantial investments will need to be 
made in prenatal, scholastic and university structures. All this will need to happen at 
the same time as demand for affordable housing for new families, students and young 
workers continues to grow.
Incentives for procreation and well-targeted immigration policies should become 
an integral part of the new European social and economic agenda. If the European 
demography is not revived, the risk of a progressive decline of the European civilization 
4  “Fiscal consolidation during the crisis has, in fact, strongly reduced fiscal space for public investments 
in some regions. For economic infrastructure (transport, energy and telecoms) which is mostly 
done at the central level, and for that done by the corporate sector and by local utilities (which is 
mostly outside the perimeter of the public sector) the reduction has been less pronounced. Some 
EU countries, where investments in small and medium-sized public works in social infrastructure 
are made at sub-national level, have seen a dramatic decrease in spending on social infrastructure. 
Because sub-national governments carry out two-thirds of total public-sector investments on average 
in the EU […] and these investments are of a small and medium size, we have a major challenge here 
that is different from general infrastructure investments” (European Commission 2016, p. 101). 
5  According to estimates of the Prodi Report (Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018), current p.a. 
spending in Education and Life Learning is estimated at €65 bn, and the annual investment gap at 
€15 bn; for Health and Long-term care current p.a. spending is estimated at €75 bn, and the annual 
investment gap at €70 bn; and current p.a. spending in Affordable Housing is estimated at €28 bn, and 
the annual investment gap at €57 bn. 
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becomes dramatically real. The speed of globalization requires us to act rapidly and 
to be ambitious. 
Among the High-Level Task Force’s recommendations are many addressed to the 
European Union and the Commission, including: stepping up the use of innovative 
financial products; providing more assistance in project development at the local level; 
implementing regulatory improvements; European Semester reporting; suggestions 
for the next Multiannual Financial Framework; proposals to move towards upward 
convergence; and a call to establish a far-reaching European public-private fund for 
social infrastructure. It should be noted that although the High-Level Task Force 
promotes a European approach, it is careful to respect the principle of subsidiarity. 
This call for action seeks the greatest social investment ever undertaken in Europe. 
We must not, however, be afraid of this initiative. In a time of political disaffection 
and distrust, an ambitious, broad and effective effort will send a strong message to 
European citizens that their institutions and governments want to bring people and 
society back to the centre of the European project.
7.4. How to Invest in Social Infrastructure to Fill the Gap?  
The Creation of a European Fund for Social Infrastructure
The Prodi Report proposes innovative solutions to finance health, education and 
social housing at a sustainable cost for European public finances. Social infrastructure 
is mostly funded through public budgets, since they barely produce cash flows on 
their own. Most of the time, direct contracts are financed by long-term loans. Thanks 
to quantitative easing, the spreads between Member States have been reduced 
significantly. But this will not last forever, and local authorities’ debt offers little room 
for manoeuvre (Prodi and Reviglio 2019). 
Two issues therefore arise. The first concerns the possibility of investments that do 
not weigh on public debt. The second is to ensure that the weakest countries and those 
most in need of social infrastructure can finance it at a lower cost. 
Suppose a municipality or region needs to invest in social infrastructure but has 
no fiscal space. It can decide to implement it through innovative forms of institutional 
public-private-community-not profit partnerships (Foster and Iaione 2016, 2019). If 
the construction risk is transferred to the private individual it will not weigh on public 
debt (Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018; EPEC 2016). The local administration 
will pay for the work through an “availability fee” which will affect expenditures year 
after year, but not its debt. Costs can be kept down by a national or European grant, 
public guarantees or tax incentives. Fiscal space can be provided through a “special 
clause for social investments”. Contributions in kind can be made using local public 
heritage assets (land or buildings, for example). An institutional “technical assistance” 
system can ensure that risks and profits are well distributed between the public and 
the private sectors. This solution, known as “blending”, helps contain debt and, at 
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the same time, may represent an incentive to reduce waste in current expenditures. 
First- and second-generation PPP in the UK and elsewhere have not been always very 
successful. But this does not mean that new, more advanced and innovative schemes 
may be structured today. More of these “urban regeneration initiatives” should be 
supported. Time is of the essence. Aging society and support to the younger generation 
must become a priority in EU policy agenda. If we don’t act bravely, Europe is destined 
for an inexorable decline. 
This means, as we shall argue in the last part of this chapter, building mutualistic 
partnerships. There are many publics in ‘the public.’ In the public value framework, 
contestation of actual value production and evaluation systems is a critical success 
factor. Involving civil society organizations in framing public policy goals (missions) is 
a central part of the co-creation process. Producing public value requires collaboration 
and co-creation; public value cannot be created from the top down. Missions present 
an opportunity to put citizen participation at the heart of social innovation policy.
Some EU countries are desperately in need of infrastructure and growth, but 
are penalized by their credit rating. The creation of a European Fund for Social 
Infrastructure would address this.6 It would issue European Social Bonds to all 
Member States. The bonds would have a high rating and mitigate the risks associated 
with certain projects. This would largely solve the problem of sovereign spreads. The 
Fund would have a technical assistance network (the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and State Investment Banks (SIBs) may be the best candidates for this endeavour) to 
assist administrations in building “European” quality economic and financial plans. 
Long-term investors, infrastructure Funds and SIBs would contribute to its capital 
through shares and investing in a liquid market of European Social Bonds issued 
by the Fund.7 This would help meet the investors’ demand for infrastructural long-
term finance instruments. In 1993, then-European Commission President Jacques 
Delors introduced Eurobonds. There are two main differences between these and 
the Euro Social Bonds proposed in the Prodi Report. First, the Fund does not require 
a guarantee from Member States. It manages uncertainty by “tranching” securities 
according to their riskiness. Second, the Fund would limit itself to social infrastructure 
and specialize in sectors with specific characteristics. The markets, along with the EIB 
and the SIBs, would remain in charge of economic infrastructure.
6  The High-Level Task Force (HLTF) produced a paper with a proposal to set up a New European 
Fund for Social Infrastructure as part of a potential EU Social Infrastructure Agenda within the 
Juncker Plan. The paper has been discussed by internal and external experts and found consensus 
both on technical and political ground. However, it was decided not to include the paper in the Report 
(Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018), but rather mention the work done with the hope that it may 
be re-discussed within the new Commission. 
7  Social infrastructure investments, as a sub-class of infrastructure investment, have some distinctive 
features: small average size of capital expenditure (capex); high level of operating expenses related to 
capex; great opportunities for portfolio diversification; bundling of projects; low volatility of returns; 
low correlation to other assets; potential attractiveness for large long-term investors (see EDHEC-Risk 
Institute 2012). 
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7.5. Firms or Markets in Infrastructure Financing 
This section argues that it would make economic sense to analyses the possible 
establishment of a large European public-private fund for financing social infrastructure 
(Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018; Prodi and Reviglio 2019). From an economic 
perspective a large fund is like a firm and as such, could have a long-term stabilizing 
role within the European financial market for infrastructure financing. We will make 
the point using a well-known debate in economic theory that started with Ronald 
Coase’s paper on “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase 1937).
Equity for project financing at the global level is worth over $350 bn (Inderst 
2017). There is a small market today which, according to most experts, will experience 
great growth rates in the coming decades. It is difficult to predict when and how fast. 
Usually, when the financial industry is moving with such strong determination, as it 
has been doing in recent years, then it may become a game changer. Policy makers and 
regulators are pressed to move fast to create the right conditions for expanding these 
markets. It is difficult to predict how the process will unfold (Bassanini and Reviglio 
2011; Bassanini 2012; Ehlers 2014; Bassanini and Reviglio 2015; Arezki et al. 2016). 
We will try to understand the main determinants of this paradigm shift. When we 
talk about public-private initiatives, we mean a variety of schemes. We may envisage 
a project finance market composed of single projects, which have a life of their own. A 
highway or an offshore wind plant may rely mostly on the cash flows it produces. A 
project finance initiative, which involves many parties for a very long time (up to fifty 
years), consists of a “bundle or web of external contracts”. The necessary involvement 
of such a wide range of parties in infrastructure projects — construction companies, 
operators, government authorities, private investors, insurers and those citizens most 
directly affected — makes designing an efficient set of contracts a complex but essential 
task. The nature of contingencies and the proper sharing of risks among the different 
agents are pivotal. The quality of institutions and the rule of law are often determining 
factors in providing finance for infrastructure, even when a project by itself appears to 
be financially viable. 
Special purpose vehicles (SPV) engage external firms to plan, construct and 
manage the infrastructure. If the projects are smaller — as in most social infrastructure 
sectors  —  the contracts are standardized and numerous projects bundled together 
to increase the size of the financial instruments issued for private investors. Such 
arrangements are doomed to face the typical complexities of the “principal-agent 
theory of contracts”. 
The point we wish to make is that firms may be preferred to markets in building 
and financing infrastructure. In economic theory, this is a question, which goes back 
to the Coase’s paper on “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), in which he tries to explain 
why some activities are directed by market forces and others by firms. The answer, 
at the time, was that firms are a response to the high cost of using markets. It is often 
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cheaper to direct tasks by fiat than to negotiate and enforce separate contracts for every 
transaction. This is easier and cheaper within the firm itself. For example, I switch an 
employee from one function to another without having to go through negotiations or 
the setting up of new contracts. For many business arrangements, it is difficult to set 
down all that is required of each party in all circumstances. Therefore, a formal contract 
is by necessity “incomplete” and sustained largely on trust. Coase defined a firm as “a 
nexus of contracts”. Most of these contracts, we have argued, are internal to the firm; 
this means that the firm has more power to change them if needed and it also means 
that they have lower transaction costs than external contracts. This is a competitive 
advantage of firms versus markets. Moreover, the firm usually has a large balance 
sheet, so it may get better financing conditions, as well as more risk-absorbing capacity. 
The firm is also made up of a long-term community. Employees and their skills tend 
to remain within the firm, increasing the long-term base for human potential. Finally, 
a firm has lower general costs because of its scale.
So, while we concentrate on a new “asset class” emerging, we should not forget 
the role of firms (including funds) in infrastructure building (including social 
infrastructure). Good examples are the European Investment Bank (EIB), The 
European Bank for Development and Reconstruction (EBRD), the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) and the large European national promotional banks 
(Bassanini and Reviglio 2012, 2015; Garonna and Reviglio 2015). What makes these 
institutions such successful cases? The answer is the typical features of a well-run 
firm, such as: highly skilled personnel and management who share a common mission 
and have long-term internal contracts with the bank; a large and well-capitalised 
balance sheet which ensures low funding costs, strong capacities to manage risks and 
operations in different sovereign risk environments; the capacity to reduce the cost 
of its co-financing by offering pricing and duration which are lower and longer than 
commercial banks, thus promoting the “crowding-in” of private/institutional money 
and, by doing so, the European process of economic and social convergence.
7.6. The Role of State Investment Banks (SIBs)  
in Financing Social Infrastructure in the European Union
State Investment Banks (SIBs) in Europe include the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and the Council of Europe Development Banks (CEB).8 They are designed to provide 
medium- and long-term capital for productive investment. They have historically 
played, among others, an important role in funding social infrastructure (Macfarlane 
and Mazzucato 2018; Luna-Martinez and Vicente 2012). 
The role of SIBs has grown during the crisis and will probably remain crucial for 
years. They have introduced a new philosophy in the European financial system. 
8  National State Investment Banks (SIBs) in the EU are also known as National Promotional Banks and 
Institutions (NPBIs).
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They have created new financial instruments and new guarantee schemes; provided 
significant additional resources to support the economy during the Great Recession, 
by financing infrastructure and small- and medium-sized businesses, either through 
the banking system or directly; and set up new European and domestic long-term 
equity funds to invest in infrastructure projects and improve company capitalization. 
More generally, they continue to play an important role in financing the real 
economy (primarily in terms of long-term, patient, capital investment), by using their 
professional banking and investment skills and risk absorption capacity, and by acting 
as brokers of developmental/transformational financing.
Moreover, they have expanded their role thanks to their credibility as intermediaries 
in financial flows. There are several reasons for this: they have a long history (track 
record); they behave in a predictable, non-volatile way; they remain untainted by 
financial crisis abuses; they are known to structure transactions carefully; they have 
in-depth local knowledge; they benefit from preferred creditor status; they have 
political weight; and they have provided returns that are consistent with the risk (and 
the market) concerned (Bassanini, Pennisi and Reviglio 2015). 
Traditionally their role in the financial system is to intervene to fill market failures, 
to be complementary to the market (and not in competition with it) being careful not 
to “crowd-out” private capital. Today, as we shall argue, these missions need deep 
re-thinking. We shall try to explain how and why we need this “radical” conceptual 
transition.
7.7. The Concept of “Public Value” and the Role of Social Action 
Public value is value that is created collectively for a public purpose (Mazzucato and 
Ryan-Collins 2019; Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018; Mazzucato and Penna 2016). This 
requires an understanding of how public institutions, such as mission-oriented public 
banks, can engage citizens in defining purpose (participatory structures), nurture 
organizational capabilities and capacity to shape new opportunities (organizational 
competencies); dynamically assess the value created (dynamic evaluation); and 
ensure that societal value is distributed equitably (inclusive growth). Purpose-driven 
capitalism requires more than just words and gestures of goodwill. It requires purpose 
to be put at the centre of how companies, public investment banks and governments are 
run and how they interact with civil society. This is especially true for social innovation 
which has a very tight relationship between the traditional mission of promotional 
banks and participatory democracy. Social infrastructure, in fact, shapes the nature of 
our society and as such needs direct participation from citizens. 
We consider “public value mapping” and “public value failure” as counterpoints 
to market failure theory, as a means of justifying government intervention and public 
policy. 
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Public value results from the collective imagination, investments and pressure from 
social movements. To produce effective social movements, knowledge and capabilities 
are required in the planning, production, management and interactions among the 
different interest groups and citizens.
The conventional view is that public goods are required to fill the gap created by 
a lack of investment by the private sector. This is another example of the state playing 
the market-fixing role. However, public value goes beyond public goods. Rather than 
asking what gap or failure public goods are filling and fixing, we should ask what are 
the outcomes that society desires, and how can we make these happen? To do this, it 
is useful to begin with an understanding of markets as outcomes of the interactions 
between different actors in the economy. 
The concept of public value enables us to overcome the dubious dichotomy between 
market and state. The market-failure justification also implies that pure private market 
goods can exist independently of public action. However, as illustrated by the seminal 
work of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, there are very few examples of such 
phenomena. Most markets were forced into existence by collective action and policy. 
Many government actions enable markets to function or create and shape markets 
through investment, demand generation through procurement, legal codes, antitrust 
policies, university scientists and physical infrastructure. Markets are co-created by 
actors from all sectors, but economic theory does not view public actors as creators 
and shapers. This new role for governments as co-creators of markets would make it 
possible to shift not only the rate but also the direction of economic growth through 
collective action. Thus, the concept of public value is fundamental for guiding public 
action in shaping markets and co-creating the direction of economic growth. Public 
investment banks can have a crucial role in this change of paradigm. 
7.8. How Social Investment and Social Infrastructure  
is Part of Public Value
The search for value should not be limited to soul-searching inside the private sector. 
Public institutions must also carefully consider their role in creating public value. The 
most ambitious public organizations did more than just fix market failures. They had 
ambition, purpose and a mission that extended beyond day-to-day politics.
We argue that public value should be understood as a way of measuring progress 
towards the achievement of broad and widely accepted societal goals that are agreed 
on by participatory processes. Creating a social space where citizenship rethinking 
public sector delivery and social infrastructure reshape the very nature of community. 
Participatory democracy in common value creating contributes to reshape capitalism. 
To get real about value we need to concentrate on purpose throughout governance 
and production, recognize that economic value is created collectively, and build 
more symbiotic partnerships among public institutions, private institutions and civil 
7. Social Investment and Infrastructure  127
society. This is not about levelling the playing field but tilting it towards the direction 
of sustainable and inclusive growth. The concept of public value must be nested 
within a theory and practice of creating value within the public sector. From a policy 
perspective, it is essential to answer and operationalize the four following challenges: 
1. What value is created: a purpose-driven approach engaged with civil society; 
2. How to create it: capabilities within the public sector and dynamic 
partnerships; 
3. How to assist it: dynamic metrics beyond cost benefit analysis; 
4. How to share its benefits: risks and rewards for inclusive growth.
7.9. The Need for Mission-Oriented State Investment Banks 
Finance is not neutral; the type of finance available can affect both the investments 
made and the type of activity that occurs (O’Sullivan 2004; Mazzucato 2013). The 
types of financial institutions and markets that exist have a material impact on activity 
in the real economy.
Financing social infrastructure requires not just any type of finance, but long-term 
patient strategic finance. Short-termism and risk-aversion means that the private 
sector will often not invest in higher-risk areas until future returns become more 
certain. Because the governance arrangements of SIBs typically do not create pressure 
to deliver short-term returns, they can provide patient financing over a longer time 
horizon, prioritize wider social and environmental objectives, and take a different 
approach to risk and reward.
Although certain sectors might be more suited for sector-specific strategies, there is 
a growing consensus that SIBs that are “mission-oriented”, with investment activities 
guided by specific missions focused on overcoming key societal challenges, tend to 
be more effective than those which are focused on more neutral economic objectives, 
such as promoting “growth” or “competitiveness”, sometimes referred to as “grand 
challenges”. These include environmental threats, such as climate change, and 
demographic, health and well-being concerns, as well as the difficulties of generating 
sustainable and inclusive growth (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2017). “Mission-
oriented” policy responds to these grand challenges by identifying and articulating 
concrete problems that can galvanize production, distribution and consumption 
patterns across various sectors. In doing so, it recognizes that:
• economic growth has not only a rate but also a direction;
• innovation requires investments and risk taking by both private and public 
actors;
• the state has a role in not only fixing markets but also in co-creating and 
shaping them;
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• successful innovation policy combines the need to set directions from above 
with the ability to enable bottom-up experimentation and learning; and
• missions may require consensus building in civil society.
A mission-based approach can help to ensure that SIBs do not end up merely 
supporting a static list of sectors — a strategy that often gets criticized for its risk of 
“picking winners”. Rather, mission-oriented policies focus the vertical element not on 
sectors but on societal challenges, that require different sectors to invest and innovate. 
This involves picking the problems and helping any organization (across the public 
sector, private sector, third sector and across all manufacturing and services) that are 
willing to engage with the investments and activities that such challenges require. In 
other words, they require picking the “willing” not picking the “winners”. 
There is therefore an opportunity to tailor the mandates of Europe’s SIBs towards 
supporting a mission-oriented agenda. To fulfil a mission-oriented mandate, SIBs 
must have a wide range of instruments at its disposal, including both debt and equity, 
suited to different areas of the risk landscape. For example, equity investments may be 
suitable for radical innovation, while debt instruments, such as long-term loans, may 
be better for lower-risk activities. This will enable SIBs to invest across the innovation 
chain from the pre-R&D phase all the way through to providing long-term patient 
capital for established firms. In addition to lending operations, many SIBs offer 
advisory services such as strategic planning, capacity building, and training programs 
that help to create viable projects and catalyze investments that otherwise would not 
happen (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2017).
A key difference between mission-oriented NPBIs and private financial institutions 
is the breadth of expertise and capacities contained within staff. In many cases this 
includes not only financial expertise but significant in-house engineering and scientific 
knowledge about the sectors the bank is active in and the nature of the investments 
being made. This enables investment decisions to be based on a wider set of criteria 
rather than relying on market signals alone, meaning that they are better placed to 
appraise social and environmental considerations (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2017).
Acting as lead investor necessarily means absorbing a high degree of uncertainty 
and accepting failures when they happen. In making investments SIBs can use their 
balance sheet to structure investments across a risk-return spectrum so that lower 
risk investments help to cover higher risk ones. For this to work, it is important that 
SIBs are able to capture some of the reward (the “upside”) that is made possible by 
their risk-taking and investment in order to cover the inevitable losses. This can be 
done by employing mechanisms such as retaining equity in the innovative companies 
it supports, or co-owning intellectual property with innovative firms it invests in 
(Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018).
SIBs and other public financial institutions are often criticised on the basis of 
“picking winners”, “crowding-out” or funding large incumbent companies. While 
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there are instances where criticism may be merited, part of the reason for this lies 
in the absence of monitoring and evaluation frameworks which adequately capture 
the dynamic spillovers generated by the mission-oriented investments made by 
these institutions. As a result, it is important to develop appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation frameworks which do not focus on market failures but which instead assess 
the extent to which they have been successful at catalyzing activity that otherwise 
would not have happened (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018)
Finally, in order to be successful, it is important that mission-oriented SIBs work 
closely with other actors in the wider financial, business and innovation ecosystems. 
In some cases, it may be most appropriate to invest directly in firms and infrastructure 
aligned with the missions of the SIB, while in other cases it may be more appropriate 
to co-invest with other actors (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018). Structured properly, 
investments should seek to “crowd-in” private investment by giving private sector 
actors the confidence they need to invest (Macfarlane and Mazzucato 2018).
7.10. Closing Remarks
In this chapter, we make three proposals. 
First, at a time where an entire generation still views the EU as the austerity 
headmaster, social investment provides an opportunity for the EU to revive its 
political capital. Reviving the EU with an assertive “social investment pact” (not 
package) would confront head on the political vacuum between right-populist welfare 
chauvinism and the ongoing calls for overnight fiscal consolidation that has emerged 
at the heart of the European project in the crisis aftermath. In this context, the EU 
is faced with two options: First, business as usual. EU Member States may choose 
to muddle-through with the ideology of the long-term myth of unproductive social 
spending, instead of adapting to new realities. In this scenario, the EU will risk not 
only bearing the expensive economic costs of blindness, but this would also precipitate 
a political backlash in undermining the resilience of the European project. A more 
constructive option would be for the EU to ratchet up domestic social investment 
with EMU rules that allow for exempting human capital “stock” investments from the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Concretely, this would take the form of a “Golden 
Rule” exempting human capital “stock” spending from the euro area fiscal rule book 
for 1.5% of GDP for about decade, as a flagship initiative of the new Commission. Given 
the absence of a stabilization budget for the euro area, investing in the economic and 
social resilience of national welfare states is imperative. As the economist Jean Pisani-
Ferry (2019) convincingly argued in a recent article: “When Facts Change, Change the 
Pact”. The time for social investment to be accounted at its just value is now. Today’s 
favourable low interest rate environment should be put to use to establish, consolidate 
and expand social investments that benefit future generations and consolidate fiscal 
health in the face of adverse demography. 
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Second, good social services need good social infrastructure. A major boost is 
needed in long-term social infrastructure investment. Such needs will have to consider 
future changes in European social models. Social infrastructure investment is very like 
economic infrastructure investment in many respects, but there are also distinctive 
features to consider.
The proportion of social infrastructure that is publicly financed is on average 
almost completely paid by tax payers’ money. How do we ensure that a member 
country with a particularly penalizing sovereign rating (and fiscal position), but very 
much in need of infrastructure and growth, can finance itself at “sustainable” rates? 
We propose the creation of a large European Fund for Social Infrastructures — with 
public-institutional-SIBs shareholding  —  which issues European Social Bonds with 
a high rating capable of distributing the risk downstream — on projects —  to give 
finance to all member countries, overcoming, at least in large part, the problem of 
sovereign spreads and foster “upward convergence”. 
The Fund would have a technical assistance network to assist administrations in 
building “European” quality economic and financial plans. In turn, the European Fund 
would have a reputation that would attract long-term patient investors. Both in terms 
of their participation in the fund’s capital (through shares) and through investment 
in European Social Bonds, this would create the match between long-term investors, 
such as pension funds and life insurance, and infrastructural financial instruments, on 
which much has been written and discussed, but that has not yet been realized in the 
dimension that both demand and offer seem to require. 
Third, recent decades witnessed a trend whereby private markets retreated 
from financing the real economy, while, simultaneously, the real economy itself 
became increasingly financialized. This trend resulted in public finance becoming 
more important for investments in capital development, technical change and social 
innovation. Within this context, we believe that a growing role should be played by 
played by a particular source of public finance: State Investment Banks (SIBs). 
The role of “mission-oriented” SIBs in social innovation  —  and how SIBs can 
play a more central role by transforming from institutions which simply “fill market 
failures” to institutions which “shape the market”, thereby becoming major providers 
of sustainable long-term and patient finance for the public good — is one of the great 
challenges that Europe must now face. We beg policy makers at all levels to take very 
seriously the present social challenge and to ask themselves, “if not now, when?”
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8.1. The Trans-European Transport Network  
and its Evolution (1996–2013)
Even before the Trans-European Transport Network (Ten-T) appeared formally in the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, European transnational transport flows have followed a 
pattern recalling this network.5
Ten-T networks (road, rail and inland navigation) have been, and still are, the 
beneficiary of a vast program of public investment, publicly funded by the European 
Union and Member States, and partly financed by the private sector. The network 
has been under planning, designing, improvement and realization ever since its 
inception in the mid-1990s. A new cycle of planning, designing and implementation 
of the network, foreseen by the EU guidelines for Ten-T’s development,6 is currently 
underway, to be completed by 31 December 2023.
The need to transform a patchwork of national networks into a single European 
one, characterized by common standards and full interoperability, has been recognized 
since the preparatory work for the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Bonnefous 1951). 
1  This chapter is the result of a joint effort by the three authors who share responsibility for it. Paolo 
Costa provided the framework and drafted sections 8.1., 8.2. and 8.4., Hercules Haralambides and 
Roberto Roson drafted sections 8.3. and 8.5., respectively.
2  Dipartimento di Economia — Università di Venezia Ca’ Foscari.
3  Dalian Maritime University (China); Texas A&M University (USA); Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
4  Dipartimento di Economia  —  Università di Venezia Ca’ Foscari; Departamento de 
Economía — Universidad Loyola Andalucía Sevilla; Green — Università Bocconi, Milano.
5  Article 129 b), c) and d) of the Maastricht Treaty (European Union 1992) provides for the construction 
of both transport and energy and telecommunication networks
6  Council Regulation (EU) 1315/2013.
© P. Costa, H. Haralambides and R. Roson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0222.08
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Notwithstanding this, infrastructure policies aimed at guiding the post-Second 
World War reconstruction of Europe remained confined within each national box 
of policy tools, in the name of “keeping national” both the anticyclical role of the 
Keynesian multiplier (of public investment), and the pursuit of the objectives of 
economic integration of the then less developed areas (especially Southern Italy and, 
since the early 1970s, Ireland). 
Ten-T reached the heart of European policy, and the “satisfaction of the common 
European interest” was added to the national criteria that filter all infrastructure 
development programs which derive their legal basis from the Maastricht Treaty. This 
has been the result of efforts to reconcile the need to accelerate the construction of 
the internal market and the EU policy objectives of growth and employment. Simply 
put, completing the internal market required the elimination of cross-border missing 
links and bottlenecks,7 so as to ensure access to the heart of the market from peripheral 
regions and to prepare transport networks and systems capable of competing globally. 
On the other hand, transport infrastructure investments, and their long construction 
periods, were seen by many Member States (in our view, often wrongly) as an ideal 
way of fighting unemployment, which, at the beginning of the 1990s, was hitting more 
than 17 million Europeans, one third of whom were young people. Of course, the 
positive effects on European competitiveness, in the medium- to long-term, did not 
escape the attention of any EU government.
The overarching goal was to combine a Keynesian approach to boost aggregate 
demand with the benefits of a substantial reduction in transport costs. The latter 
objective, it was correctly expected, would reduce unit costs of production; expand 
markets for outputs and inputs (including labour) and lead to higher international 
competitiveness of the single internal market, thus increasing growth capable of 
creating jobs (Haralambides 2019).8 These guiding principles permeated the whole 
development of the Ten-T Network and its implementation, and dictated the definition 
of its investment priorities in 1996, 2004 and 2013. 
The above principles are still central on the eve of the new Ten-T policy revision, 
enriched, however, by the 2004 and 2013 objectives of environmental and energy 
sustainability, stressed by the need to combat climate change and contain energy 
costs. Among others, lowering the pollution intensity of transport (greenhouse gases 
in particular), as well as its energy intensity, is thought of as being able to encourage 
a modal shift towards rail, sea and inland navigation, instead of the dominant 
“road” and “air” transport modes. All along, the assumption has been that a more 
7  The questions here are: how is it possible to build a European single market without physically 
connecting any given point (A) with any given point (B), and how could we do this when the road, 
rail and inland navigation network presents so many missing links at old country border crossings, 
not to mention the bottlenecks still affecting many nodes and links in the network?
8  “Networks are the arteries of the single market. They are the lifeblood of competitiveness, and their 
malfunction is reflected in lost opportunities to create new markets and hence in a level of job creation 
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competitive performance of the “non-road” and “non-sky” modes, made possible by 
infrastructural and technological modernization and a fairer allocation of external 
costs through their internalization in transport prices, would favour the “modal 
split”: a modal shift that could lead to a more sustainable satisfaction of transport 
demand.9 Finally, the integration of the European economy into the world economy 
has also been a cited objective but, as we will see below, one of very low impact on 
policy formulation until now.10
The implementation of the Ten-T policy moved on accordingly. The current 
allocation of European Ten-T funds to different modes along the nine corridors of 
the core network is represented in Figures 1 and 2: 78.8% of the money goes to rail 
infrastructure, 8.4% to inland waterways and 6.7% to road infrastructure. Maritime 
transport, including ports, gets 4.3% of the EU funds, with only 1.45% going to 
the — currently most promising — Mediterranean ports.11 
9  In turn, the shift from road to rail would lead to greater sustainability in terms of safety, as a key to a 
zero-casualty transport strategy.
10  The “opening” of the Ten-T network to the world was suggested in the Final Report written by Expert 
Group no. 4, coordinated by Paolo Costa, working at the revision of the Methodology for Ten-T 
planning dedicated to the “Ten-T Extension outside the EU” (European Commission 2010).
11  This is occurring while rail transport performance in the EU is still unsatisfactory in terms of volume 
transported and modal share. On average, road transport accounts for 75% of the market, while rail 
has actually declined slightly since 2011 (European Court of Auditors 2017).
Fig. 2 Distribution of EU Ten-T funds by transport mode 
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From 1994 to 2013 the geography of the Ten-T Network has been evolving, so as to 
address the progressive eastward enlargement of the Union, as well as the changing 
settlement patterns brought about by the long-term economic and social developments 
in Europe. Some nodes and links of the network were thus becoming technically or 
geographically obsolete, some less useful and others highly in-demand. There has been 
little consideration of the demands for change in the geography of the Ten-T networks, 
and in their modal structure, coming from both inside and outside Europe, due to new 
connectivity requirements deriving from the increasing integration of Europe into the 
global economy. 
To be more precise, there has been no lack of attention given to the neighbouring 
countries bordering the European Union, both to countries which are candidates for 
EU enlargement and to those belonging to the “ring of friends”. All of them have been 
the subject of the neighbourhood policy launched in 200412 mainly with the objective of 
avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines, new Berlin walls, between the enlarged 
EU and its neighbours. 
What was underestimated was the fact that international transport flows were 
and are changing in volume,13 and geographic patterns are changing with profound 
consequences particularly as regards, now, to the increasing importance of southern 
European ports as the gateways to the continent of Asian cargoes. 
Equally underestimated is the disruptive impact of new transport technologies and 
their “digital twin” on infrastructure networks. The authors of this chapter believe 
that the major issue to take into consideration in designing the 2023 Ten-T revision 
will probably be the geographical and technological disruptions of the existing 
infrastructure network. 
This consideration will have to be tackled, on top of dramatic disruptions 
coming from other sources, such as: e-commerce (leading to more freight transport 
and increasing the share of relatively carbon-intensive modes); increasing vehicle 
automation (pushing up demand for road freight and shifting freight from rail and 
inland waterways onto roads); manufacturing re-shoring and 3D printing (with a 
significant decrease in internationally traded goods that greatly reduces sea and air 
transport volumes); high capacity vehicles (HCV) (carrying bigger loads than regular 
trucks, limiting emissions and congestion, reducing overall costs, increasing safety, 
but causing a reverse modal shift from rail to road); and decarbonizing technologies for 
12  Five main transport axes linking the EU with its neighbours were identified by a High Level Group 
chaired by Loyola De Palacio and formalized in the “Guidelines for Transport in Europe and 
neighbouring regions (COM/2007/32)”. The interests and commitment of the neighbouring countries 
were then assessed by the communication “Progress of exploratory talks regarding cooperation in the 
field of transport with the neighbouring countries COM(2008)”. The Ministerial Conference — The 
Future of Trans-European Transport Networks: Bringing Europe Closer to its Neighbours — held in Naples 
on October 2009 paved the way to the transport neighbourhood policy still in operation.
13  Freight volumes will continue to grow strongly, with global freight demand projected to triple 
between 2015 and 2050 (ITF (2019)).
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heavy-duty long-haulage — electric roads, hydrogen, batteries — (potentially capable of 
altering the relative convenience of different transport modes).14
8.2. Demand for New Connectivity: Europe’s Economic,  
Social and Political Integration in a Global Context
The 2013 revision of Ten-T defined a “two layer” set of networks: the so-called core 
network, a set of only nine (core) corridors linking the major urban nodes among them 
and to major ports, airports and rail-road terminals and the comprehensive network, 
pervasively connecting all major European urban centres. The core network has been 
set to become efficient, safe, green and smart by the year 2030, while the completion of 
the comprehensive network is foreseen for 2050. The core network is also expected to 
cater for the growing relations between the EU economic space — assumed to remain 
the largest in the world for at least a few more decades — and the rest of the world. 
In this scenario, competition within the internal market will continue to be at the root 
of EU core business, under the understanding that growth in one Member State is 
inextricably linked to the growth in any other Member State. 
In 2008 China acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in just over 
ten years at the time of writing (2019) China’s external trade has accounted for 50% of 
global trade. At the same time, multilateral trade negotiations opened up — to their 
benefit — the economies of many emerging markets, led by BRICS. 
According to the OECD’s International Transport Forum, by 2030 the world trade 
is foreseen to have increased by a factor of 3.4 and this growth will come mostly from 
emerging economies and global markets (ITF 2019). In such a scenario, Europe’s 
dependence on trade will intensify, putting ports and airports under great pressure. 
Adjusting European ports and airports to the new level of activity becomes thus an 
absolute and immediate priority, particularly in view of the long gestation periods 
of large infrastructure investments. This priority was not neglected in the technical 
process of the 2013 revision of the Ten-T Network, and found its way through de facto, 
in the definition of the nine “core corridors”, all of which starting or finishing at a port 
city, or including major ports in their layout.
But the implementation strategy designed by each core corridor coordinator 
unfortunately did not reflect the importance of this priority: missing links and 
bottlenecks in the internal network seem still to be more relevant than creating effective 
gateways and doors to the world. The allocation of EU funds (Figures 1 and 2) reflects 
this “wrong” choice. We are convinced that it is time to move from “Europe as a single 
market” to “A single Europe in the global market”. The key question is how. 
Demand for transport, especially for goods, is a function of the size and geography 
(spatial distribution) of production and consumption. With a given transport technology, 
14  For a simulation of the combined effects of these potential disruptions on freight transport worldwide, 
see ITF (2019).
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the flows that satisfy a certain transport demand are controlled by the capacity and 
geography of the networks (links and nodes) along which these flows run. 
If the technology, the geography of flows/networks and capacity are given, then 
transport flows assigned to the network will move from any “origin” to any “destination” 
along the network, behaving “like water” that always follows the shortest (minimum 
cost) path. This will occur unless “deviations”  —  due to indivisibility, cumulative 
processes or market imperfections — take place, or because missing links or capacity 
bottlenecks in the network fail to be eliminated.
If a new geography of production and consumption areas produces a pattern of 
flows that significantly departs from the historical one, this will tend to retroact on the 
net, demanding investments in transport infrastructures aimed at transforming, à la 
Alfred Marshall, “existing plants”, which have become obsolete, into “adequate ones”. 
Disruptions in the geography of transport therefore tend to generate disruptions in the 
geography of infrastructures. 
A distinctive feature of the world of transport is that its scenarios are characterized 
by recurrent geographical transitions, where we are confronted with radical changes 
in the geography of production, income and consumption. This is exactly what is 
happening now at the global and European scale: a change has already translated 
into a revolution in the geography of international trade, which is moving along 
routes that make increasingly evident the obsolescence of historical modal and 
intermodal networks. 
8.2.1. The growing importance of the extra-EU markets
The reason why phenomena that are changing the geography of the world economy 
are of profound interest to the whole of the European Union is simple. Even if Europe 
remains the most economically integrated region in the world  —  much more than 
the USMCA (ex Nafta) and the East and Southeast Asian regions — it is nonetheless 
becoming increasingly open to the world, and the current US-China trade war is only 
slowing down this inevitable process. 
 From 2002 to 2008 the ratio of extra-EU to intra-EU exports has increased slowly 
but steadily in almost all European countries (Figure 3). On average, in the whole 
EU28, the ratio has risen from 0.464 to 0.478. Since 2009, in the midst of the Great 
Recession, the ratio has begun to grow even more significantly. The EU28 average rose 
from 0.494 (2009) to 0.612 (2015), an increase of 24%. The projection of the same ratio 
to 2030 suggests that, by that date, non-EU exports will be worth as much as 65% of 
intra-EU exports, with a clear difference between the behaviour of the countries of the 
“new Europe”, all still aiming at exploiting the potential of the internal market (ratio 
of extra-EU to intra-EU exports still less than 30% by 2030), and the countries of the 
“old Europe” whose extra-EU market will be worth 75% of the intra-EU one. 
Until a few years ago, Europe believed it could safely neglect what was happening 
around it and focused almost exclusively, and in a rather introverted way, on the 
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completion of the internal market. So great was its preoccupation with, for example, 
such things as market shares and other aspects of competition law, that decisions 
and rulings of its Directorate-General for Competition penalized European companies 
in their global competitive strife. In effect, these decisions and rulings were instead 
“music to the ears” of Europe’s international competitors.
For years, Europe’s “proud” conviction that it was the world’s largest trading bloc 
reinforced its belief that everything could continue to be played “within the Union” or, 
at most, by just taking into account the only world economic powers relevant at that 
time: the USA and Japan which, together with the EU, formed the so-called “Triad” 
(Ohmae 1985) that dominated the world. For example, only twenty years ago, the 
geography of international trade was dominated by the “transatlantic relationship” 
between Europe and the United States, and between the latter and Japan; a triangle in 
which only China and South Korea began to fit.
Fig. 3 Ratio of extra-EU and intra-EU exports, 2002–2016, and forecast to 2030
Source of data: Euro Commission, 2018. Figure created by Paolo Costa.
The Great Recession of 2009, which, for some European countries, lasted until 2013 
or beyond, suddenly made it painfully clear what was happening in the meantime in 
the rest of the world: a shift of the centre of gravity of the world economy outside the 
advanced countries of the OECD area, favoured by a formidable reduction in transport 
costs, as a result of competition and economies of scale in ocean transportation, and by 
advances in logistics and vertical integration, resulting from the fragmentation of the 
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In a way, the Great Recession urged Europe to better study phenomena beyond 
economics, which are changing the geography of the world. Among others, the 
demographic dynamics of the world population. 
Today, 60% of the world population lives in Asia (4.5 billion) and 17% in Africa 
(1.7 billion). Only the remaining 23% live in the rest of the planet (10% in Europe). 
Between now and 2050, half of the increase in world population (1.3 billion people) will 
manifest itself in Africa, while another 750 million will be added in Asia. By 2050, 80% 
of the world’s population will be living in Asia and Africa. Europe will be the only part 
of the world having a lower population in 2050 than in 2017. Obviously, demographic 
shifts such as these are already having their impact on the regional distribution of 
global income. Today, the Asian bloc represents more than a third of the global GDP, 
while North America is just under 28% and Europe is at 21.37%. Projections to 2050 
reinforce pro-Asia shifts. If to these projections one adds the significant incremental 
differences in labour productivity, one can easily assume that every long-term scenario 
will be decisively characterized by a move in global demographic and economic 
weights towards a lasting Asian centrality. 
Following OECD (2011), it seems reasonable to imagine the doubling of world 
GDP by 2030, driven by a sustained growth in the emerging economies. By the same 
year, the GDP of North America would increase by only 50% and that of Europe 
by 40%. On an even longer horizon (2050), and with a world population exceeding 
9 billion people, world GDP could grow up to four times that of 2005 (almost ten 
times for China and India). The combined effect of the low growth of the European 
population, and the even lower growth of European GDP and disposable income, 
should however mean that the per capita income of Europe and of the other advanced 
countries remains — even in 2050 — higher than that of the rest of the world. 
It is against this background that the economic geography of the world and, with it, 
that of its trade will be redrawn. 
Accordingly, the demand for freight transport could increase by a factor of 2.5 to 
3.5. In the case of emerging economies (non-OECD countries) this factor could be even 
higher, in the neighbourhood of 4 to 5. Demand for transport, now fulfilled over new, 
substantially different, transport networks, will inevitably result in heavy demand for 
new infrastructure which, in view of its long gestation period, should be planned now, 
so as not to hinder trade and world growth.
In summary, and according to the plausible scenarios above, the two ongoing 
processes that should convince the EU to shift its focus from an inward-looking 
viewpoint to the evolution of transport and transport infrastructure in a broader 
global view are: 
1. The emergence and strengthening of Asia’s central role in the world economy;
2. The rapid development of the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean.
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This picture, however, is not without further complications: the centre of gravity of the 
European economy will shift to the east, within and outside the current borders of the 
Union, driving a redefinition of the geography of production within Europe.
8.2.2. Asia’s central role in the global economy and trade
Emerging Asian economies will become central to the global economy, because they 
will be no longer just the place of origin of European, American and Japanese imports, 
but also increasingly crucial destinations of exports from OECD countries.
The Asian focus is particularly important for the European economy and its 
transport sector, as evidenced by actual maritime flows,15 which are clearly prevalent 
in Eurasian relations and, more generally, on a global scale. According to the UNCTAD 
surveys of containerized ocean traffic between the world’s macro-regions since 1996, 
there is a growing disproportion in traffic flows along the three main global routes.16 
By far, the most important exchange for Europe today is the Europe-Asia-Europe one 
(23 million TEU traded in 2017) which, although slightly lower than the transpacific 
flows between Asia and America (26 million TEU), is now three times more important 
than the transatlantic route (7 million TEU). 
In short, trends in regional growth (GDP) and world commerce show that, even 
if the market of North America will continue to remain the most important extra-
European one (as far as Europe is concerned), the affirmation of Asia as a final market, 
as well as the centre of the world manufacturing production, makes the Europe-Far 
East relationship the most important interregional relationship for the economy of the 
European continent. 
This is the reason why both researchers and traders are exploring new ways of 
fuelling this relationship, possibly through routes that had been neglected so far. For 
instance, the polar route from China to the North Sea via the Bering Strait and the 
Arctic Ocean: a route that is expected to be open soon all year round, because of the 
effects of global warming on polar ice. Other cases are the rail route from China to 
Germany via Russia or ex-Soviet Eurasian republics, the sea route that from China 
reaches the North Sea circumnavigating Africa, and the maritime one that crosses 
the Pacific and the Atlantic from China to the North Sea via the Panama Canal. This 
is also the reason why China has addressed its most important international policy 
strategy — the Belt and Road Initiative — to the Eurasian region.17 
All routes that can acquire some meaning on their own, but always without 
contesting the primacy of the “Royal Road”, i.e. the route between Europe and the Far 
East via Suez. Its superiority lies in its reduced transit times, as well as in its ability to 
intercept, on its way to the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, cargoes from such 
15  More precisely those of containerized trades assumed as a traffic numerary.
16  The sum of the traffic flows along these three main global routes, however, is of the same order of 
magnitude as intra-Asian traffic alone.
17  See below.
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countries and territories as Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, India, the 
Persian Gulf and East Africa. The organization of shipping traffic along this route, and 
its best exploitation, is crucial for the European economic growth. 
8.2.3. The potential of “MENA (Middle East and North Africa)  
shores” and the Mediterranean Sea basin 
The development of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Basin 
(Southern Europe, North Africa and the Near East) will add significant volumes 
of intra-Mediterranean maritime flows to those connecting Asia and Europe. The 
modernization and reform of ports in Greece, Italy, France and Spain, will offer the 
“southern gates” to the Asian cargo. The role of Mediterranean ports in serving the 
European “heartland”, and their increasing market share in Europe-Asia’s trades, now 
challenges the so far unquestionable dominance of the Hamburg-Le Havre range of 
ports of the European North, with Spain’s Valencia expected to overtake Bremerhaven 
in 2019. A “rebalancing” of European gateways that will call for a corresponding 
adaptation of the intra-European land transport infrastructure network (rail, road and 
inland waterways) has to be connected to the next steps of Ten-T planning.
 In the long run, however, something will be added by the economic growth of Africa 
and the Middle East. This phenomenon has unfortunately been recently overshadowed 
by political turbulence. The political instability in Libya and Syria, and the political 
and economic instability in Turkey, is stunting the growth of their economies, which 
were reaching rates not very different from those of the emerging Asian economies. 
It is reasonable to expect that the growth processes will soon recover in these areas, 
making these markets of great significance to European development. The most 
obvious example is Turkey, which, before the recent political and economic-financial 
crisis, was growing at a Chinese pace and, for European exports, has constituted a 
market of the same size as China. 
8.2.4. The shift of the European economy’s centre of gravity to the East 
If what is happening beyond Suez and the Mediterranean is affecting the economic 
geography of Europe on the sea side, on the land side too change no longer passes 
unnoticed — consider, in particular, the progressive shift of Europe’s centre of gravity 
towards the east. The 2004 enlargement that brought the “new Europe” into the Union 
started a process of geographical rebalancing of the European economy. And although 
today sees the “old Europe” still accounting for almost 90% of the EU’s gross domestic 
product, the “new Europe” is experiencing growth rates permanently higher than 
those of the “old Europe”. If one projects these processes at a 2020 and 2030 horizon, 
one could safely foresee at least a doubling of the share of the “new Europe” in the 
European gross product, with a proportional growth of the share of the European 
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domestic market, represented by countries and regions located to the east (and south) 
of the old centre of gravity. 
The European centre of gravity is bound to move further to the east in view of the 
expected economic growth of the neighbouring former Soviet republics (Moldova, 
Ukraine and Belarus), as well as Russia, despite, also here, the political interferences 
of the Ukrainian crisis and the consequent Western sanctions on Russia. Finally, one 
should note that the area of continental Europe that has most successfully overcome 
the Great Recession (with an unemployment rate in 2017 lower than 3.8%), perhaps 
with the exception of Greece, is the one that runs, eastward, from Southern Germany 
to Southeast Europe. These results are also explained by a shift to the east of the 
European manufacturing industry.
8.2.5. Consequences for the EU transport infrastructure policy
The centrality of Asia, the development of the southern and south-eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean, and the shift of Europe’s manufacturing centre of gravity to the east 
are all long-term trends whose consequences in terms of road, rail, inland waterway 
and port infrastructure policy should be obvious. 
The adjustment of Europe to these trends should consequently move along 
three parallel lines: i) maintain efficient access to Europe’s historical, productive 
and consumptive heart; ii) increase the accessibility of regions that were less central 
yesterday, but are soon bound to increase their economic centrality, possibly becoming 
an engine of development for the entire continent; iii) link Europe’s infrastructural 
plans to similar developments taking place outside its borders, most notably China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Even if there is still a lot of ground to cover to bridge a decades-long infrastructural 
gap18 between Northwest and Southeast Europe, some of the above processes are 
already underway, as evidenced by the substantial amount of investments in transport 
infrastructure made in Central and Eastern European countries. Less coherent is 
the European transport infrastructure policy, implicit in the construction of Ten-T 
networks: little attention is paid to adapting the node-ports, acting as global gateways, 
and the connected internal links. 
The relative obsolescence of historical ports, built over the past decades in response 
to a geography of traffic that no longer exists today and, in turn, the low capacity 
of many port nodes — together with the inadequacy of the networks connecting 
them to the internal market — that today would ensure the minimum cost path to 
freight, is evident. In addition, the state of many port-nodes is today in crisis (technical 
obsolescence) because of the technical progress that fuels the oligopolistic competition 
18  Investments in internal transport infrastructures (roads, railways and canals) in Western Europe have 
been at around 0.8% of GDP since 2000; the same investments, on the other hand, passed in Central 
and Eastern Europe from 1% of GDP in 2002 to 2% in 2009, a phenomenon that can be explained by 
the efforts made to reduce the initial infrastructural sub-endowment (ITF 2011).
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between shipping companies, using ever larger ships, capable of carrying ever growing 
mega-cargoes demanding new adequate port and land infrastructure.
Adapting the capacity of the port-node gates to the networks of “minimum cost 
path” would achieve the double result of reducing both the higher direct transport and 
logistic costs — paid by market operators — and those indirect negative externalities 
from pollution, congestion and accidents, that, even if not yet fully appreciated by 
the market, are nevertheless a burden on the collectivity. For instance, it has been 
demonstrated (Cappelli, Libardo and Fornasiero 2011) that the transport of a container 
that goes from China to Germany (Munich) via Rotterdam, instead of Venice, produces 
at least 78 kg of additional CO2 per TEU (up to 600 tons of CO2 for a containership 
of 8,000 TEU). In enabling, for instance, Venice to handle one million TEUs more per 
year, from the Far East and on its way to Europe, roughly 125,000 tons less of CO2 per 
year would be emitted, in addition to time savings and lower fuel costs. Unfortunately, 
this evidence has not produced results yet. 
The geography of European ports has not changed much. On the contrary, in the 
face of the changing geography of the origins and destinations of traffic, the historical 
ports have reacted by trying to achieve economies of scale that could compensate, 
at least in part, the higher transport costs due to the lengthening of distances by sea 
and land. The rest of the higher costs due to longer distances were instead passed on 
to the port users, taking advantage of the considerable market power enjoyed by the 
historical ports. Distracted or conniving infrastructure policies have so far favoured 
such inefficiencies to the detriment of traffic receivers. This is why many of them, 
actually close to the Mediterranean ports, have continued to be served by the North 
Sea ports, for traffic to and from “beyond Suez”, despite at least five more days of 
navigation and a few hundred more kilometres by land. 
This is a situation that the European transport infrastructure policy has been hoping 
to correct before 2030, the date at which the construction of the Core Trans-European 
Transport Network and its core corridors, finally taking into proper account the 
heightened significance of the Mediterranean maritime routes, should be completed. 
Crucial to this aim is the review of the Union guidelines19 that the Commission has 
to carry out by 31 December 2023. In evaluating which “amendments” are needed in 
order to take care of the “changes in passenger and freight transport flows”, as well as 
the “developments in national transport infrastructure investments”, it is advisable to 
identify ways and means for tackling the geographical and technological obsolescence 
of all current networks. 
Some ideas for addressing “geographical obsolescence” are those discussed above. 
Some thoughts on tackling “technological obsolescence” are discussed in the next 
paragraph, dedicated to the disruption of the worldwide maritime freight transport 
network and its infrastructure. On this issue, we believe that the key nodes to be 
connected should be the global ports, i.e., those connecting seaborne global flows. This 
19  Council Regulation (EU) 1315/2013.
A European Public Investment Outlook148 
is because of their role in consolidating/deconsolidating mega-cargoes moving from 
(to) ports to final destinations (origins) by rail, HCV or, why not, hyperloop. 
A further final paragraph is dedicated to the fact that moving from Ten-T to Twn-T, 
from the “European” to the “Global”, demands global agreements. The novelty is the 
necessary interlocution with foreign counterparts, in dovetailing European and global 
networks. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is possibly the most relevant strategy 
to be considered in this context.
8.3. Dealing with the Disruption of the Worldwide Maritime 
Freight Transport Network and its Infrastructure 
One major disruption reshaping the whole world of freight transport, both services and 
the links and nodes of their infrastructure networks, is that regarding global supply 
chains that comprise at least one ocean leg, i.e., the vast majority of international trade 
flows (UNCTAD 2017). 
Ships, ports, rails, roads, warehouses, etc. are under disruption all over the world, 
confronted with a clear-cut choice: either to undergo a process of upgrading or to put 
themselves under the risk of being abandoned, because of technical or geographical 
obsolescence, and replaced by new, state-of-the-art pieces of infrastructure, or private 
capital assets.
The gigantic process of global “infrastructural change”, estimated to amount to 
trillions of US dollars, is currently taking place without any comprehensive assessment 
of its efficiency, sustainability or fairness. That is, without any alignment of private 
and public objectives or, in the case of Europe, only partially achieving the Union’s 
overarching policy objective of economic convergence and greater economic and social 
cohesion. No one actually knows if citizens and businesses are getting the best value 
out of infrastructure networks and related investments, existing or under disruptive 
adjustment, as there is no international cooperation, or at least consistent dialogue, on 
this matter. 
On the contrary, donor countries and organizations such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (WB/IFC), the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), etc. appear to be competing on infrastructure, 
lending or granting funds to cash-hungry countries in an uncoordinated fashion, 
without sound, sophisticated, cost-benefit analyses that, when applied, rarely goes 
beyond a case by case partial and biased exercise. There is an urgent need for assessing 
the systemic impact of whole transport infrastructure network. Some novel analytical 
tools and approaches are now available and are reviewed below. The alternative 
reliance on the mere criterion of the amount of lending, the latter being often also the 
criterion of success of lending policies or promotion of lending officers is not leading 
to the best use of scarce financial resources. 
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However, one should not forget that infrastructure investments have long gestation 
periods until they yield fruit, while many loans need to be repaid in the meantime. In 
this regard, it should also not be forgotten that world debt is exceeding the GDP of the 
United States, while China’s Non-Performing Loans represent 25% of that country’s 
GDP. A new global economic meltdown cannot therefore be excluded, bearing in mind 
that the cause of the 2009 crisis was precarious — not to say conniving — lending to 
aspiring homeowners. 
What follows, summarized in Table 1, is a brief description of certain recent trends. 
Growth in trade (UNCTAD 2018), oligopolistic market structures, and often misplaced 
business expectations regarding the illusionary benefits of economies of scale (EoS) 
in shipping, all encourage a seminal, disrupting innovation: the construction of ever 
larger containerships. This is a development which has already started to manifest 
significant diseconomies in ports, along the supply chain, and among many disgruntled 
shippers, particularly in Europe, where shipping industry concentration (alliances) is 
higher, and the contestability of the market lower than in Asia and North America 
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(for a comprehensive analysis of “gigantism” in container shipping, see Haralambides 
(2019)). It might be interesting to also mention at this junction that, due to the new 
Asian centrality in global manufacturing, seaborne trade of manufactures has been 
carried principally along two main routes: the transpacific one, connecting China to 
the USA, and the Asia-Europe one. It is mainly along these two routes where repeated 
rounds of replacement of existing ships with new bigger ones takes place. Those 
replaced are either scrapped, or deployed as feeders to secondary markets and ports (a 
practice known as cascading) many of which have neither the trade volumes nor the 
technology to receive them. 
The progressive substitution of existing ships with larger ones is producing much 
more profound consequences on port facilities.
Only few of the existing ports can accommodate containerships of the latest 
generations, and even for those which do, serving such ships is becoming an 
increasing headache. A further increase in ship size can only be achieved by increasing 
the beam of the ship beyond the current 60 metres, something that would however 
render useless the latest generation of ship-to-shore cranes. Complying with carrier 
requests for the “same” turnaround times, irrespective of ship size, causes significant 
diseconomies in cargo handling operations. It is not so difficult to understand why: 
as crane productivity cannot be stretched much beyond 30 moves/hour (it actually 
declines after a certain crane density),20 the only way to serve a larger ship in the same 
time (e.g. 48 hours) is by adding more and bigger (in terms of air draft and outreach) 
cranes. However, increasing crane density reduces crane productivity, nullifying the 
advantages of having bigger hatches (Haralambides 2019).
Furthermore, big ships impose substantial demands on port capacity, without 
however paying commensurately for this demand. For instance, where before one 
could accommodate three Panamax vessels (i.e. three berths) along one kilometre of 
quay-wall, today, in the same space, one can only host two mega-vessels of the latest 
generation (about 400 metres long). Berth utilization obviously goes down and so 
does the utilization of Ship-to-Shore (StS) cranes, since bigger ships mean lower call 
frequency (Haralambides 2019). All this would be fine, however, as long as carriers 
were bringing more traffic to the port with their larger vessels. But this doesn’t happen 
either. Call size, it has been proven, is only moderately correlated with vessel size.
Therefore, ports eligible to handle the megaships of today and tomorrow are those 
rich both in adequate nautical accessibility (deep waters) and large spaces on land 
and efficient and sustainable connections via rail and road (and inland waterways) 
to large markets. Since all three conditions can in most cases be modified by adequate 
investments, the choice of the megaports of tomorrow is a delicate one and can lead to 
substantial port disruption, with two opposite potential risks: 
1. Creation of port overcapacity, when too many ports are trying to stay on the 
contestable global markets and/or 
20  Crane density is defined as the number of cranes per 300 metres of quay length.
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2. Rail, road and inland waterways infrastructure under-utilization when a 
lack of port capacity acts as a crucial “missing link” in the networks (rail, 
road, etc. disruption).
In conclusion, the coordinated use of all transport infrastructure, to be used along 
the routes followed by global supply chains, is crucial for “getting the best value for 
citizens and businesses” from existing or disrupted infrastructure. By definition, here 
is a delicate “governmental” role at stake at all levels: national, regional (European) 
and global.
 But the economic usefulness of megaships does not depend only on a sufficient 
level of capacity utilization, something increasingly difficult to attain were it not for 
carrier cooperation in global shipping alliances, but also on spending most of their 
time at sea. The capital intensity of these ships obliges them to limit their ports of call 
at each end to just a few hub ports or load centres such as Shanghai, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and currently in Europe, Rotterdam and Hamburg, from where huge surges 
of containers are consolidated or further forwarded (feedered) with smaller vessels, 
rail or road, to regional and local ports. Complex hub-and-spoke networks have thus 
evolved whose logistical fine-tuning and optimization bears directly on consumer 
pockets. 
The consolidation/deconsolidation of mega-cargoes passes through successive 
steps, dealing with sub-consolidation/deconsolidation phases. Mega-cargoes call 
for supply chain integration. That is why the choice of megaports will decide which 
links and nodes of the land multimodal transport infrastructure network will have 
to be constructed, or further developed, to cope with the new freight consolidation/
deconsolidation trends, along each supply chain route (land leg and port node on the 
departing country; maritime leg, and port node and land leg on the receiving country). 
The choice (competitively, when possible) among different routes is somehow in 
the hands of governments —  in the case of Europe, both at European and national 
levels — because of their final say about infrastructure provision. The choice, however, 
is also controlled by the potential “private” investor in port infrastructure, as well as 
by the supply chain user, the latter being mostly the freight forwarder or the logistics 
service provider, who combine the maritime leg, the ports, and land transport. If, as 
in the current situation, no regulator “supervises” this process, the only agent not 
controlling the cost and the quality of the service provided would paradoxically be the 
final consumer who pays the bill.
It is worth noting that the complexity of the mega-cargo consolidation/ 
deconsolidation process, and the necessity of dealing with sub-consolidated/sub-
deconsolidated cargo lots, make the value added generated in this logistics phase 
greater than that generated by the pure maritime transport service. A new business 
model is consequently emerging: the one that foresees the vertical integration, under 
the same firm roof, of the maritime and port services, and/or of the maritime, port and 
logistics services (integrated physical business model). This integration is eligible for 
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being digitally operated in a suitable platform, run by one of the operators controlling 
one leg of the supply chain or, preferably, by a specialized, independent third party 
(digital business model) (Costa et al. 2018).
The overall European transport network disruption taking place because of 
this “maritime driven” revolution assigns a primary role to those Ten-T nodes 
characterized as megaports: they become the most important missing links (missing 
nodes) to deal with, in the amendment of the Ten-T Guidelines of 31 December 2023. 
But EU megaports are also the missing links across the external EU border: they are 
connecting the EU with the rest of the world. In terms of Eurasian relations, this means 
dovetailing them with the Belt and Road Chinese Initiative.
8.4. Dovetailing the EU Ten-T Infrastructure Policy  
with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
Until 2013, the evolution of the Ten-T Network was a phenomenon entirely controlled 
by the European Union. 
Extending the Core Ten-T Network outside the EU was until recently only a matter 
of “closing” the EU infrastructure system, i.e. extending Ten-T to accession candidate 
countries, as well as to potential ones in the ring of neighbouring friends, in order to 
enlarge or deepen the internal market: a policy defined in Brussels and, of course, 
gladly accepted by her counterparts.
“Opening” and connecting the EU infrastructure system to the rest of the world 
is a totally different story, however. The physical dovetailing of the EU network with 
external networks is bound to be influenced by preceding policies and strategies, and 
the dovetailing of the EU Ten-T with the Eurasian land (belt) and maritime (new silk 
road) networks, supported by the Chinese BRI, is today the most relevant case. 
To many, BRI is above all a brilliant manifestation of China’s renewed presence on 
the world stage. The “initiative” constitutes a great diplomatic strategy, many believe, 
based on a refined exercise of soft power, that considers “power with others” as more 
effective than power “over others” (Nye 1990). 
To quote China’s president Xi Jinping (2017), 
[…] BRI aims to replace estrangement with exchanges between different civilizations, 
replace clashes with mutual learning and replace a sense of superiority with coexistence; 
it aims to boost mutual understanding, mutual respect and mutual trust among different 
countries. In this light, the BRI is seen as a path towards global peace […]. 
And on BRI and the new economic order, President Xi continues: 
[…] BRI is guided by the principles of consultation and cooperation, aiming at shared 
benefits. The initiative represents an approach to international cooperation featuring 
mutual respect, justice, equity and cooperation for win-win outcomes. BRI is committed 
to multilateralism and an open global economy. As such, BRI will help move economic 
globalization toward greater openness, inclusiveness and balance […].
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The stated objective of BRI — a one trillion US dollar program — is to achieve greater 
economic integration and development through better connectivity, the latter being the 
main enabler of trade growth and trade-driven prosperity. Ongoing research by authors 
of this chapter shows that a 10% improvement in connectivity between countries along 
the “Maritime Silk Road” would deliver a 3% decrease in Chinese trade costs which 
would, in turn, boost China’s imports and exports by around 6% and 9%, respectively. 
The latest studies by the World Bank and other international institutions also suggest 
that BRI cooperation could cut the costs of global trade by 1.1 to 2.2%.
Chinese investments of transport relevance in the EU, not necessarily always under 
the BRI umbrella, are impressive. Bloomberg calculates them to be in excess of €300 
bn in the past ten years. Ports  —  the gates of Chinese exports to Europe  —  score 
prominently among these investments, with the port of Piraeus, Greece, showcasing 
second place (after Valencia, Spain, also, presently, under Chinese interest) in the 
Mediterranean; 7th in Europe; and 36th (from 93 in 2010) in the world. 
As mentioned above, and according to many observers and researchers on BRI, China 
has adopted a refined version of projecting “soft power”, in the sense that it appears to 
be exercising a type of “multiple bilateralism”, building relations, individually, or in 
groups (e.g. 16+1), with different countries in Europe, Central- South- and Southeast 
Asia, East and West Africa and even Oceania and Latin America. But, is it really so?
In Europe, feelings are mixed, in spite of President Xi’s reassurances during his 
recent visit to Europe, according to which it is not China’s aim to play one country 
against the other, neither to advance ad hoc and uncoordinated investments, nor to 
proliferate an understandable initial “vagueness” in geographically defining BRI. On 
the contrary, at this point in time, China would welcome a joint effort in dovetailing 
BRI with the Ten-T Network going forward. 
EU Member States are not as unequivocal, however, when it comes to Europe’s 
openness to Chinese investments. A new core-periphery divide appears to have emerged, 
with Germany and France pushing for an EU-wide investment screening mechanism, 
while governments in Greece, Portugal and Cyprus are sceptical of such a move, 
arguing that it would hamper their countries’ ability to attract much-needed capital. 
In parallel, however, it is the EU Member States themselves who, in their anxiety to 
compete for Chinese funds, or to accredit themselves as marine terminals on the “silk 
road”, or as land facilities along the “belt”, visit China on an almost daily basis. This 
gives Chinese interlocutors enormous room for manoeuvre in their effort to penetrate 
the European markets.
It is true that the sale of the majority stock of the Piraeus Port Authority A.S. to 
COSCO, and especially certain activities that took place thereafter, including Greece’s 
vetoing a UN resolution on human rights, has left a somehow bitter aftertaste in 
Brussels. Moreover, the Union looks also with some concern at the Chinese penetration 
into the Western Balkans which, after having acquired the port of Piraeus, are 
concretely applying their soft power for the construction of a “Balkan Silk Road” which 
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should ideally connect Beijing to Athens and from there reach Skopje, Tirana, Sarajevo, 
Belgrade and Budapest. 
In spite of, or even thanks to, all the above, and copying similar procedures of 
the US Senate, a screening mechanism was proposed by the European Commission 
in 2017 and approved by the Parliament in February 2019. The “mechanism” aims 
to ensure that “critical infrastructure”, such as those relating to energy, transport, 
communications and data storage (but also those that concern “critical technologies”, 
such as artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors and nuclear and space 
technologies) is not predatorily targeted by foreign investors. The “mechanism” is 
seen as a coordinating tool at the EU level, which does not intend to replace national 
mechanisms, nor challenge Member States’ prerogative to decide on investments. With 
regard to transport investments in particular, the European Commission has initiated 
a discussion on Europe-China, within a so-called “EU-China Connectivity Platform”.
Confronted with BRI, each country — and the EU too — is faced with a deliberately 
complex proposal, whereby it is up to each interlocutor, along BRI, to find their place 
on one or the other of the global logistical routes, within a wide spectrum of alternative 
options, relatively indifferent from the Chinese point of view. “Choice”, naturally, has 
always an objective, and alternative options ought to be guided by it. Some logistics 
chains, for instance, are better than others because they guarantee shorter and more 
efficient paths. Often, however, sound economics is sacrificed in the altar of unfolding 
strategies, or as a result of the will, ability and bargaining power of either party. 
The strategic game is evident in the continuous redesign of BRI’s land routes, but 
also in the maritime silk road, which, from 2014 to 2017, has made its western landing 
more uncertain: as far as the Mediterranean Basin is concerned, in 2014 just the ports 
Fig. 4 Potential Ten-T/BRI dovetailing nodes
Source: Paolo Costa, 2019.
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of Piraeus and Venice were considered as the possible southern gates to Europe. In 
2017, China’s interests were also manifested in the Italian ports of Trieste, Genova and 
Palermo; Spain’s Valencia; France’s Marseilles; but also in ports outside the Union, 
such as Suez, Haifa, Istanbul (Kumport), Gibraltar and more (Costa 2017). 
Among the many potentially involved nodes, those on the “Belt” (land) are 
“dictated” by geography while those on the “Road” (sea) are, so far, “suggested” by 
China (Figure 4).
8.5. Assessing the Systemic Impact of Transport Infrastructure: 
Some Novel Analytical Tools and Approaches
The key message emerging from the discussion above is the need to elaborate transport 
and infrastructural policies, considering the broader, systemic impact on the economy, 
or on the society at large, as well as the compatibility with policies undertaken by 
other global players. Therefore, when it comes to considering alternative policies in 
the allocation of public (and private) investment funds, one would like to base the 
choice on (or at least start with) rational comparisons, based on facts and scientifically 
accepted theories and models.
Unfortunately, the typical tools such as cost-benefit analysis, multi-criteria 
analysis, input-output or computable general equilibrium models, etc., all fall short in 
completely assessing the systemic consequences of (large) infrastructure investments. 
This is clearly due to two main reasons: 
1. The extreme complexity and interplay of the effects; 
2. The lack of reliable data.
However, it may be worthwhile to briefly mention here two recent contributions and 
methodologies, which promise to provide a more useful support for decision-making 
in this context.
One is illustrated in a recent paper by Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis (2019). They 
develop a general equilibrium geographic framework to characterize the welfare effect 
of transportation infrastructure investments, tackling three distinct but conflating 
challenges. First, an analytical characterization of the routing problem, where 
infrastructure investment between any two connected locations decreases the total 
trade costs between all pairs of locations. Second, a general equilibrium geography 
setup where market inefficiencies arise due to agglomeration and dispersion spillovers. 
Third, a framework that admits analytical characterizations of traffic congestion. Allen 
and Arkolakis apply this model to calculate the welfare effects of improving each of 
the thousands of segments of the US national highway network. 
This research work paves the way for the construction of a global transportation 
general equilibrium model, which could be of fundamental importance for the 
assessment of transport infrastructure policies, such as those discussed throughout 
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this chapter. For sure, this would be a very challenging venture, in terms of data and 
computational power, which would require the collaboration of different research 
centres around the world. However, there are examples of successful consortia of this 
kind, managing complex data bases and sophisticated global models, like the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), based at Purdue University. 
GTAP-based computable general equilibrium models are being used for policy 
assessment exercises, such as effects of trade agreements, the impact of Brexit, and 
long-run implications of economic growth on natural resources and climate change. 
Therefore, we believe that the development of a new generation of global transportation 
network models is not an impossible dream. These models could provide the 
scientifically sound assessment of the policies, trends and phenomena considered in 
this chapter.
Another, albeit very different, approach has been explored by Franz Hubert and 
his co-authors (Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011); Roson and Hubert (2015); Csercsik, 
Hubert, Sziklai and Kóczy (2019)). In these works, a methodology is used for analyzing 
bargaining games on network markets, which are markets where transactions occur 
by means of distribution and transportation networks. The overall economic surplus 
obtained in the market is distributed among all network agents on the basis of their 
bargaining power, which in turn depends on a variety of factors: position of each 
agent (e.g., a country) in the network, reliability in the cooperation scheme (e.g., geo-
political stability), existence of market distortions and availability of outside options. 
From this perspective, who controls critical links or nodes in the network extracts the 
highest surplus. An interesting implication is that building/improving new links or 
nodes may be justified in terms of bargaining power, rather than in terms of narrow 
social net benefits.
The typical example here is the one of gas pipelines in Europe. It may not be 
universally known that the total carrying capacity of the existing pipeline network, in 
Europe, far exceeds its actual utilization. The construction of large new infrastructure 
such as North Stream or TAP would not be necessary, therefore, at least in terms of 
economic logic. However, geo-political considerations, for instance, associated with 
bypassing some critical countries, are rather evident.
The principle carries over to other transportation networks, and may help in 
explaining some choices which are made, for example the ones taken in designing the 
BRI initiative.
Trade is based on cooperation, but trade needs transport infrastructure, where 
cooperation is, consequently, also necessary. If cooperation generates some mutual 
benefits, the pie of surplus has to be split in some way. This is where cooperative game 
theory, when applied to transport infrastructure, can shed some light.
Admittedly, research on network cooperative games, as well as the one on global 
transportation general equilibrium models, is still in its infancy. We can therefore 
conclude that the radically changing scenario of global trade flows poses new 
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challenges not only in terms of management and policies, but also in terms of the 
supporting applied economic research and modelling.
8.6. Some Concluding Remarks 
Ten-T has been evolving from 1996 to 2013 trying to cope with the enlargement of 
the European Union and to encourage modal shifts from road and air to rail, inland 
navigation and short-sea shipping. However, during these notable efforts, little 
attention has been paid to the global dimension of European connectivity, which now 
demands a European contribution towards building a Trans-Global network, Twn-T.
Together with addressing a number of technical disruptions affecting transport and 
its infrastructure, the new wave of Ten-T revision — due by December 2023 — must 
depart from what has thus far been an introverted view of Europe as a single market 
(something that has often penalized European competitiveness) to an extroverted 
orientation of the Union as a key player in a global market.
The growing economic centrality of Asia since China’s accession to WTO; China’s 
strong interest in the Mediterranean Basin as the “super-hub” that connects four 
continents; and the eastward shift of the European economic barycentre: all of 
these developments indicate possible solutions for addressing the “geographical 
obsolescence” of the current Ten-T.
In parallel, innovation-driven disruption of the worldwide maritime freight 
transport network and its infrastructure necessitates the streamlining of port nodes 
and rail networks around the world, in a way that at the same time addresses efficiently 
the current “technological obsolescence” of big parts of European infrastructure, 
predominantly of ports.
But the new Ten-T Network evolving into a Twn-T one will not anymore be the 
product solely of European decisions: dovetailing Ten-T with China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative will be unavoidable. 
Any dovetailing of Ten-T and BRI networks into a possible Twn-T network would 
profit a lot from the availability of sound methodologies for assessing the systemic 
consequences of changes in the Twn-T Network due to large infrastructure investments. 
Such methodologies do exist even if they are in their infancy. The construction of a 
global transportation general equilibrium model that could, among others, tackle 
the routing problem is within reach. The same can be said of methodologies used for 
analyzing bargaining games on network markets where the bargaining power of each 
agent (e.g., China or the EU) depends on its position in the network and its reliability 
in a cooperation scheme.
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Anthropogenic climate change caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is widely 
understood to be the greatest existential threat to human societies in the coming 
centuries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 
1988 to coordinate a global response to the coming crisis. In 2006, the United Kingdom’s 
“Stern Review” concluded that early action to mitigate climate change would be the 
most cost-effective and therefore argued for significant expenditure to address the 
expected geophysical, political and societal changes wrought by global warming (Stern 
2006). Over the intervening decade, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and its sequelae 
distracted policy makers’ attention from the challenges of global environmental 
change. The IPCC’s publication of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C 
(SR15) in October 2018 has helped to galvanize public opinion and has given rise to 
unprecedented climate activism. SR15 made clear the scientific consensus — to halt 
global warming it will be necessary to achieve net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 
2050. This renewed urgency has, in turn, shifted the Overton window, whereby state 
actors now recognize a need for immediate action.
According to the IPCC’s formulation in SR15, possible responses to climate change fall 
into three categories: mitigation, adaptation and remediation (IPCC 2018). Mitigation 
is taken to mean measures to reduce carbon emissions (e.g. through decarbonization 
of energy and transport systems or through changes in consumption patterns) or to 
enhance carbon sinks (e.g. afforestation or reforestation); adaptation means measures 
that ameliorate the effects of climate change on human populations (e.g. ranging 
from flood control measures to changing land use and even relocation of cities); and 
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remediation means intentional measures to counteract the effects of GHG emissions, 
including global warming (e.g. through stratospheric aerosol injection, cirrus cloud 
thinning, or space mirrors) and ocean acidification (e.g. via ocean fertilization). There 
are inevitable trade-offs between the costs of mitigation and those of adaptation over 
decadal time horizons. As the 2018 IPCC’s 1.5°C SR15 states: “increasing investment in 
physical and social infrastructure is a key enabling condition to enhance the resilience 
and the adaptive capacities of societies” (IPCC 2018, p. 19). Likewise, some climate 
activists are concerned that the prospect of remediation (particularly the tantalizing 
potential of negative emissions technologies) will discourage adequate investment in 
mitigation, or at least complacency about the need to meet the net zero targets (Lockley 
and Coffman 2016). 
Nevertheless, with all three responses, large-scale infrastructure investment 
is required, with varying degrees of involvement by state actors, multilateral 
organizations, other non-governmental organisations (including religious groups) 
and, most significantly, private capital markets. In the current climate, multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) have taken a leading role. 
In concert with the publication of the IPCC report in October 2018, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) announced in late September 2018 that it would bring all its 
activities into alignment with the Paris Agreement. Two months later, in December, 
the MDBs as a whole announced a joint framework for doing so. In the past eleven 
months (at the time of writing) since the publication of the SR15 report in October 
2018, the scientific consensus that global warming can be kept to 1.5°C has weakened. 
There is no meaningful disagreement, however, with the conclusion that it should be 
limited to as close to 1.5°C as possible. As the report makes clear, the economic costs 
of adaptation rise significantly with each half degree increase, as do challenges of 
ensuring the inevitable adaptations are in line with other Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Concerns that the 1.5°C target will be missed have further catalyzed 
political movements in Europe such that “climate emergencies” are being declared at 
national, provincial and local levels. This has in turn galvanized national leaders to 
press for greater collaboration on decarbonization efforts.
Emmanuel Macron’s determination to establish a new European Climate Bank 
exemplifies this trend. His efforts have prompted discussions about whether or not 
the European Investment Bank might play that role once the Juncker Plan (formally 
known as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)) finishes. This is less 
surprising than it may seem to some, because the EIB’s purpose is to mitigate market 
failure. The main criticism of the Juncker Plan by the European Commission’s auditors 
is that a non-trivial percentage of the loans would have been made anyway. To the 
extent that climate change is the result of market failure (i.e. the inability of the market 
to internalize fully the negative externalities associated with GHGs), then there is a role 
for the EIB to play, particularly in helping to finance the rapid decarbonization of energy 
and transport which could not happen as quickly as demanded by the SR15 Report if 
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left entirely to market forces. Whether or not the SR15’s net zero target is met, there 
will be a critical role for infrastructure investment both in climate change mitigation 
and in adaptation. Institutional money managers, including those of pension funds, 
insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds will undoubtedly play an important 
role in the low carbon transition. This is a particularly promising development because 
of the intergenerational risks and rewards associated with climate change mitigation 
and adaptation; this presents an important opportunity to renew the intergenerational 
social compact and to ensure intergenerational equity. 
9.1. The Importance of Carbon Accounting
Most lay audiences are now familiar with the term “carbon footprint”, which is a 
measure of the carbon dioxide emitted through a given activity, for instance in heating 
a house or driving a car. In response to the recent Flygskam (or “Flight Shame”) 
movement in Europe, more and more air travellers are electing to “offset” the direct 
carbon emissions associated with their flights by purchasing voluntary carbon offsets 
(VCOs). Some are declining to fly, instead preferring to take voyages by train and 
even ship, as Greta Thunberg elected to do recently in her trip to the United States. 
Using “carbon footprints” to assess carbon emissions has the virtue of being relatively 
straightforward to do, and there are many carbon calculators available to the public 
to assess the carbon trade-offs around household meat consumption, energy use, 
transportation choices, and similar such decisions. 
Unfortunately, lay audiences do not necessarily appreciate that “carbon footprints” 
are not the only way to assess carbon emissions. Carbon footprints focus attention 
on carbon produced by the operation of a particular asset, such as an automobile, 
powerplant, airplane or ship. They do not account for the carbon emitted during 
the construction of said asset, nor do they consider the carbon emitted during the 
decommissioning of the asset, both of which can often be substantial. Life-cycle assessment 
models which consider the carbon embedded in all phases of a product or built asset 
life cycle can lead to different recommendations for green investment (McDowall 
2018). For example, hydropower is widely considered to be attractive because rivers 
are renewable, unlike fossil fuels, and the production of hydropower does not involve 
direct carbon emissions. However, when the construction and decommissioning 
phases of a hydropower project are included in the assessment, the project may be 
appraised differently. The cement used in the construction of hydropower dams is very 
carbon intensive (Mar 2009), as is the construction supply chain. By a similar token, 
decommissioning, when it becomes necessary, of a hydropower plant can involve 
considerable carbon emissions. Equally importantly, forests represent substantial 
natural carbon sinks. Dams that flood natural forests destroy these carbon sinks. Some 
hydropower projects may represent a less attractive alternative than superficially more 
carbon intensive alternatives. Investors need to be aware that embedded carbon is of 
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growing concern to multilaterals, who are actively commissioning research to develop 
tools to assess these issues.
Some investors may question the value of accounting for embedded carbon because 
they worry this will lead to double-counting (a methodological error) as surely the 
carbon emissions produced by cement would be accounted for in that production 
process. While this is true on a global level, accounting merely for the carbon footprint 
of an infrastructure asset distorts the political economy of carbon emissions. The 
IPCC framework anticipates carbon emissions targets and voluntary carbon quotas; 
if the latter are adopted, it is necessary to consider the global value chain, as many 
products which are produced in one country (usually a lesser developed one) are 
consumed in developed countries (Meng et al 2018). Forcing the producer-nation (or 
assembler-nation) to take responsibility for the embedded carbon in, say, the iPhone 
of one of the authors, which was assembled in China (out of components made in the 
US, Mexico and the Philippines) and consumed in the UK would be unjust. Likewise, 
the embedded carbon in the production of large energy or transport mega-projects 
can be substantial. Most scholars agree that responsibility for those embedded carbon 
emissions should be borne by the beneficiaries of the infrastructure mega-project or 
of the goods or services so consumed. Investors, in any event, need to be aware of 
these debates. Ideally, infrastructure desks should have analysts who are adept at 
life-cycle assessment modelling, if not in doing the modelling themselves at least in 
understanding how these models are used in project appraisal as there are now part of 
statutory reporting requirements.
9.2. The Emergence of “ESG” ratings 
Although there are increasingly statutory requirements to report the environmental 
and climate impacts of infrastructure projects, these are developing amidst a 
wider movement to provide a more holistic set of sustainability metrics, taking the 
Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) dimensions together, as a 
tool for helping to internalize the positive or negative externalities of a given project. 
Over the second half 2019 and first quarter of 2020, the European Commission 
moved to procure consultancy services from a wide range of tendering parties on the 
development of ESG ratings. The European Commission is well aware of its leading 
role in green procurement in Europe, and the Commission has begun to develop tools 
for sustainable finance for use by the European Banking Authority. The results of this 
tendering process should be available in April or May 2020.
There is reason to hope that the European Commission commitment to developing 
sound ESG ratings can help avoid some of the criticisms that beset the Juncker 
Plan, while also improving infrastructure planning and promoting a shift towards a 
“circular” economy (Dreschel et al. 2018; Bowman 2017; Mascotto 2020), where waste 
is eliminated and resources continually re-used rather than exhausted (Geissdoerfer 
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2017). Although some critics remain sceptical, there is a growing consensus that 
attention to the ESG dimension of investments heightens financial performance and 
protects firm value (Valente and Atkinson 2019). 
9.3. Mitigation: Decarbonization of Energy and Transport
There is wide agreement that it would be impossible to meet any plausible net zero 
target without decarbonization of energy and transport. Energy decarbonization is 
well underway, with some European countries (including the UK) able to go for weeks 
at a time without relying on coal (Ogden 2019). Taken together, decarbonization of 
the European energy and transport sectors is advancing rapidly and is considered 
achievable at current technological levels and at minimal cost, less than 1% of GDP 
(Capros et al. 2014). 
Decarbonization of transport (also known as “electrification”) is more difficult 
than decarbonization of energy systems, but achievable with aggressive planning 
efforts. Decarbonization of the food supply is also necessary, but with the exception 
of the role of maritime transport in the global food supply chain, largely outside the 
scope of this chapter.
9.3.1. Energy
As noted, decarbonization of energy systems in Europe has been underway for over a 
decade with impressive results (Tagliapietra 2019). Most observers urge policy makers 
to integrate deep decarbonization of energy into broader, cross-sector industrial 
strategies (Avila 2018). One particularly promising area for both policy makers and 
investors is renewal gas.
Renewable gas may become a leading source in the transition to zero-emission energy 
production, especially given its importance in promoting circular economy solutions. 
Its advantages are environmental as well as economic in nature. The environmental 
advantage is double as its production not only entails zero-emission of CO2, but also 
uses inputs deriving from urban, agriculture and industrial waste, contributing to 
decreasing their polluting effect when disposed through traditional methods. The 
economic advantage lies in cost savings deriving from the progressive replacement of 
natural gas imports. It is estimated that in 2015 the EU could produce up to 122 bcm of 
renewable gas per year and replace a substantial part of natural gas imports, leading 
to a cost saving of €138 bn annually (Ecofys 2018). However, the cost saving will not 
only result from the substitution of current import with domestic production, but also 
from the possibility to use existing infrastructure for storage and transport. Relying 
on existing gas grids would also make it possible to alleviate the increasing burden on 
electricity grids, which in the future are likely to face overloads and disruptions due to 
the growing share of renewables among the sources of electricity generation. 
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The European Union has been vigorously promoting the transition to renewable gas 
because of its contribution to achieving the targets of environmental policy, namely to 
reduce GHG emission to 30% and reach 27% of energy consumption from renewables 
by 2030. As a result of the incentives granted by EU policies, production of biogas in 
the EU has reached 18 bcm of methane equivalent in 2015, making Europe the world’s 
greatest producer. 
Despite the aforementioned environmental and economic advantages, some 
questions remain on the long-term economic benefits of full reliance on renewable 
gas. Questions particularly concern the possibility to achieve energy independence. 
In fact, it is estimated that a share of renewable gas, or some inputs for its production 
(e.g. crops), will still need to be imported. 
This issue is important in view of the recent progress in the EU energy policy 
reforms, which envision a full transition to models based on short-term transactions 
in spot markets. In fact, in an energy-deprived area such as Europe, the full reliance 
on models based on short-term transactions is likely to increase the bargaining power 
of non-EU exporters, potentially threatening energy security and price affordability 
for consumers (Cardinale 2019). The fact that the transition to renewable gas will not 
guarantee energy independence suggests the need to carefully monitor the collateral 
changes that accompany the low carbon transition, especially for what concerns 
commercial relations between exporters and importers and their respective bargaining 
power. Moreover, it seems necessary to consider adopting a regulatory framework that 
includes both long- and short-term transaction models.
The relative desirability of various kinds of renewable energy remain an active 
research area, especially when different types of carbon accounting are used 
(McDowall et al. 2018). In life cycle assessment tests, wind power compares favourably 
to solar photovoltaics (PV). Nuclear energy at current technological levels is regarded 
as most desirable as an intermediate solution to wean the global energy system from 
fossil fuels, but nuclear is rarely considered a long-term solution (Prăvălie et al. 2018). 
The ESG approach to deep decarbonization of energy has the additional virtue of 
encouraging co-mitigation of air pollution. While it is possible, as China has done, to 
reduce pollution sharply using ultra-low carbon (ULE) emissions standards (Tang 
et al 2019), decarbonization will also have the positive externality of improving air 
pollution levels (Meng et al. 2019). 
In emerging markets, the calculus of deep decarbonization of energy differs 
somewhat, because energy security is a pressing concern, as is the need to provide 
reliable electricity to households and firms, against a backdrop of more extreme 
weather events, which can cause significant load shedding (Gannon et al. 2018). 
Hydropower is particularly vulnerable to these events (Ahmed et al. 2019). 
In emerging markets, back-up power generation using diesel fuel is widespread, 
especially by export-oriented manufacturing firms (Ahmed et al. 2019). This is an area 
that needs further research, but preliminary studies suggest the effects can be of such a 
9. Ecological Transition  167
significant scale as to have the potential to change recommendations about the optimal 
energy mix for these countries and in any case strengthen the business case for projects 
that promote energy resilience in these markets (Farquharson et al. 2018). Investors, 
including multilaterals like the World Bank, will need to pay more attention to these 
issues going forward.
9.3.2. Transport
Decarbonization of transport is often taken to be synonymous with electrification, 
though that is by no means the entire story. First, to a greater extent than energy 
decarbonization, transport decarbonization will require a socio-technical transition 
away from family-owned autonomous vehicles towards other means of transport. This 
will require, in turn, significant planning challenges, which will coincide with the 
advent of smart cities (Zawieska and Pieriegud 2018).
Significant investment opportunities exist in the electrification space, as many 
European countries have already begun electrification of mass transport systems, 
including busses, trams and trains (Glotz-Richter and Koch 2016). Planners are 
increasingly requiring charging stations for electric cars in parking lots and along city 
streets (Thiel et al. 2010). Most households have probably already purchased their 
last new automobile powered solely by unleaded fuel, and most car manufacturers 
are relying on the growth of electric cars and hybrids to keep them in business. 
Consumer preferences are changing slowly but steadily in this area (Mazur et al. 
2018). Electrification of transport is an active investment area for some specialist firms 
such as Meridiam, through their Transitions fund. 
As with energy, a factor accelerating decarbonization of transport is the positive 
externalities associated with the reduction of automobile induced pollution, which is a 
grave public health threat in most countries. Pollution rates and emission rates tend to 
track each other; although rates of increase have slowed in recent years, tackling both 
will require global cooperation (Meng et al. 2019). The European approach has thus 
far primarily been to manage the co-mitigation of air pollution and carbon emissions in 
the transport sector fuel tax policies in the transport sector (Zimmer and Koch 2017). 
This represents an opportunity for investors, as positive externalities associated with 
curbing pollution can be incorporated into business cases.
The extent to which the sharing economy, notably car sharing and bike sharing, 
contribute to the low carbon transition is also an area of active debate (Mi and Coffman 
2019). Car sharing and bike sharing have the potential to reduce both emissions and 
pollution, but not at all such firms behave in pro-social ways. Both planners and 
investors can play a role in promoting sustainable practices in this sub-sector.
Air travel is another area where decarbonization is essential, but the debate has 
rarely advanced beyond demand reduction, such as that encouraged by the Flight 
Shame movement (Pye et al. 2014). There is political momentum in many European 
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countries (though largely not outside Europe) for taxes on frequent flyers and even 
the abolition of frequent flyer incentive programmes. This is one area where voluntary 
carbon offsetting has become particularly popular. Public attitudes to the use of biofuels 
in commercial aviation appear to be changing, and this could become a significant 
investable space (Filimonau et al. 2018).
Maritime transport remains another area where deep decarbonization is essential to 
meeting net zero targets. One short-term option is in the area of logistics, because fast 
freight is an order of magnitude more carbon-intensive than slower freight (McKinnon 
et al. 2016). Over the medium term, changes in fuel use (towards electrification or at 
least the widespread use of LNG) may be possible, but the use of biofuels is unlikely 
without strong financial incentives by policy makers (Balcomb et al. 2019). Fortunately, 
successful decarbonization of this sector would yield significant gains across the board, 
given the importance of maritime freight to most supply chains (Benamara et al. 2019). 
9.4. Adaptation: Physical and Social Infrastructure
Adaptation to climate change is a less immediately investable space than climate 
mitigation, but there are opportunities to consider. Coastal flooding is the most 
immediate source of concern, as sea level rises are all but inevitable (Vousdoukas et 
al. 2018). Projects on the scale of the Dutch SEAGATE have already been undertaken 
in the Thames Estuary in the UK (Lumbroso and Ramsbottom 2018), and similar 
such projects are underway elsewhere. Not surprisingly, insurance partnerships are 
considered a particularly promising area (Crick et al. 2018). 
Median temperature increases represent another area where adaptation is pressing, 
particularly as it will produce step-change increases in energy demand in vulnerable 
areas (Burillo et al. 2019). Retro-fitting of housing and commercial office buildings 
will be required, especially in countries where building stock turns over infrequently.
Climate change has profound implications for global health, but research in this 
area is only just gaining momentum as the share of health-related adaptation spending 
has risen to approximately 15% of total global adaptation spending (Watts et al. 2018). 
9.5. Remediation: Negative Emissions Technologies  
and Climate Engineering
Remediation represents the third investable space and covers an extraordinary range 
of proposals and techniques. Some of them, such as reforestation and afforestation 
(especially in response to desertification in emerging markets) are neatly aligned 
with other Sustainable Development Goals. In 2014, the World Bank established a 
Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Mitigation to raise finance for methane 
capture projects by marketing tradeable put options that represented the GHG 
reduction potential of such projects. These facilities can be scaled up to raise finance 
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for reforestation and afforestation in developing countries; they can even be envisioned 
as possible sources of finance for technological carbon dioxide removal (Lockley and 
Coffman 2018). 
In the shorter term, carbon capture and storage/carbon capture and utilization 
technologies are proving helpful in the facilitation of carbon neutrality in the European 
iron and steel industry and in the chemical industries (Mandova et al. 2019; Kätelhön 
et al. 2019). Exciting work is already being done on how to optimize European supply 
chains for carbon storage, using a cooperative model (d’Amore 2019) and this is an 
area ripe for policy making (Castillo et al. 2019). At the moment, these industries 
represent the most realistic investable space for institutional money managers.
Also in the short term, reforestation and afforestation projects are likely to receive 
direct financing primarily from third sector organizations. In September 2019, the 
Catholic Church expressed support for climate restoration through both biological 
and technological means, arguing that this is a divine imperative both to protect the 
natural world and to mitigate the inequalities associated with climate degradation 
(Auza 2019). 
Over the longer term, solar radiation management, while controversial, is regarded 
by some to be a cost-effective approach, as it is estimated to cost less than $2 bn 
annually (Carrington, 2018). Venture capitalists likewise see scalable technologies for 
carbon capture as a worthwhile target of speculative investment, especially given the 
involvement of state actors. Many observers, however, are concerned that the most 
active investors in this space are the corporate venture capital arms of oil and gas 
companies, as these firms try to find more sustainable business models (Lu 2019; 
Faran and Olsson 2018). Although most institutional investors will probably wish to 
avoid over-allocation to this space in the immediate future, remediation must be a part 
of horizon scanning.
9.6. Conclusions and Recommendations
The low carbon transition is one of the greatest challenges facing human societies. 
As such, climate mitigation, adaptation and remediation will all be major sources 
of investment opportunities, particularly for institutional investors, in the next few 
decades. For the moment, climate mitigation is the most important area, though 
adaptation and remediation will become more important over time. 
Traditionally, attention has been paid most directly to carbon footprints of energy 
sources and transportation choices, but gradually embedded carbon is becoming an 
important part of the calculus. Life cycle assessment models are widely used, and 
infrastructure investors must be able to make sense of the recommendations they 
generate. More recently, the European Commission has initiated the development of 
ESG ratings for use by procurement authorities, the European Banking Authority, the 
European Investment Bank and other European agencies.
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Opportunities for decarbonization of energy and transport in Europe are well-
established, and appropriate to institutional investors. Emerging markets present 
different challenges in the energy sector than those in established markets, but 
projects that promote energy security and energy resilience are areas where private 
investors and multilaterals can cooperate. Transport decarbonization is often regarded 
as synonymous with electrification, but smart cities will play a role in changing 
consumer demand away from autonomous vehicles. The sharing economy can also 
play a role, subject to close monitoring by regulators. Reductions of carbon emissions 
and of pollution are highly correlated in both the transport and energy sectors, and are 
especially important in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Adaptations to climate change will generally focus on flood control and 
accommodations to median temperature increases. This will pose challenges for both 
physical and social infrastructure. Remediation is comparably an emerging area, but 
one that will eventually be the focus of considerable interest, especially if the net zero 
targets are missed. Finally, this is a rapidly changing area, as the scientific consensus 
on the possibility of limiting Global Warming to 1.5 °C is eroding. Should 2°C or even 
3°C scenarios become more likely, then adaptation and remediation strategies will 
become more urgent areas for investment.
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3
Introduction
Cohesion Policy (known also as Regional Policy) is the European Union’s main 
development policy (Viesti and Prota 2008; Viesti 2019). It has evolved over time: from 
a tool to counterbalance the regional disparities inevitably emerging from the Single 
Market, and, subsequently, from the Monetary Union, to the investment pillar of the 
new economic policy coordination (Berkowitz et al. 2015). In the period 2007–2013, as 
result of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Cohesion Policy has been the major source 
of finance for public investment for many Member States of the European Union, 
representing up to 57% of government capital investment.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an overview of the expenditures 
of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) at 
national and regional levels over the last decades, and second, to discuss the impact 
of the investments co-financed through these two funds mainly in terms of physical 
achievements. We focus on the ERDF and the CF (which represent about 75% of 
Cohesion Policy funding in the 2014–2020 programming period), since the bulk of 
their expenditure provides support to public investment.4
Our analysis covers three programming periods: 1994–1999, 2000–2006, 2007–2013, 
though we focus mainly on 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 in order to take into account the 
Eastern enlargement of the European Union and the effects of 2008 crisis.
1  Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università di Bari “Aldo Moro”.
2  Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Università di Bari “Aldo Moro”.
3  Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università del Salento.
4  Regional Policy is delivered through three main funds: the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. Together with the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 
they make up the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds. The ERDF provides financial 
support for the development and structural adjustment of regional economies: public investments, 
R&D and contributions to private investments; the ESF is the main tool for promoting education, 
employment and social inclusion in Europe; the Cohesion Fund contributes to environmental and 
transport investments.
© Chapter authors, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0222.10
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We use two datasets made available by the European Commission. The first one 
provides, in a single source, historic long-term regionalised annual EU expenditure 
data covering four programming periods, but it does not contain thematic information.5 
The second one shows allocations and expenditures from 2000 to 2013 broken down by 
expenditure categories. Moreover, the study on “Geography of Expenditures”, one of 
the Work Packages of the ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007–2013, 
has produced a consolidated database covering the regional ERDF and CF investments 
from 2000 to year 2014 at NUTS2 level (WIIW and ISMERI Europa 2015).6 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.1. describes the main features of the 
Cohesion Policy and its evolution across time. Section 10.2. focuses on the total levels 
of the European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund expenditure in the 
Member States and looks at the trends observed in the last years. Section 10.3. examines 
the weight of European investments within the total public expenditure and describes 
some of the main “tangible” results generated by the implementation of both the ERDF 
and the CF measures, as far as public physical investments are concerned. Section 
10.4. focuses on the regional level and discusses the economic spillovers produced by 
the Cohesion Policy in favour of the more advanced regions and countries in the EU. 
Section 10.5. summarizes the main messages of our analysis.
10.1. European Cohesion Policy: An Overview7
The evolution of Cohesion Policy has been extensively described in the literature 
(Viesti and Prota 2008; Molle 2015; Piattoni and Polverari 2016; Viesti 2019). One of 
the main drivers of this evolution has been the necessity to face the challenges arising 
from enlargement of the European Union to integrate regions with different levels of 
development; in particular, those of the countries of Southern Europe in 1981 and 1986 
and those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, 2007 and 2013.
The Cohesion Policy emerged in the second half of the 1980s. The Single European 
Act (1986) added the Title V (Economic and Social Cohesion) to the Treaty of Rome, 
with the aim of providing a comprehensive reform of the instruments for regional 
development, namely the Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF). With the Delors 
package of 1987–1988, €63 bn were allocated to this policy for the period 1989–1993, 
accounting for a growing share of the total Community budget: from 18%, in 1987, to 
29%, in 1993. Moreover, the fundamental principles underpinning Cohesion Policy 
were set out as follows:
• Concentration: the greater part of Structural Funds resources are 
concentrated on the poorest regions and countries, namely those having 
5  The dataset is available in the ESIF Open Data platform (https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/
Historic-EU-payments-regionalised-and-modelled/tc55-7ysv).
6  The dataset is available at https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/
data-for-research/
7  This paragraph is largely based on Viesti (2019).
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a GDP per capita lower than 75% of the EU average, at purchasing power 
parity;
• Programming: multi-annual national programmes aligned on EU objectives 
and priorities, with the same time span of the EU overall budget;
• Partnership: each programme is developed through a collective process 
involving authorities at European, regional and local level, social partners 
and organisations from civil society;
• Additionality: financing from the European Structural Funds may not replace 
national spending by a member country.
With the Treaty of Maastricht, Structural Funds assumed an even more important 
role: they became the principal, if not the unique, Community instrument aimed at 
guaranteeing that the processes of economic growth would benefit all the territories 
(and thus all the citizens) of the Union. In 1994, with a controversial decision, a new 
fund, the Cohesion Fund, was set up with the aim of assisting the poorest EU Member 
States whose gross national income per capita totalled less than 90% of the EU average. 
Cohesion Fund resources were allocated to infrastructural measures in the field of 
transport and environment. With the so-called Delors II package, the action of the 
Structural Funds was further reinforced: €167 bn were allocated for the period 1994–
1999 (in the last year, they came to represent 36% of the total Community budget). 
The main beneficiaries were Spain, Italy and Germany (because of the reunification), 
followed by Portugal, Greece, France and the United Kingdom.
In 1997, the Commission published the document Agenda 2000 which reconfirmed 
the centrality of the Cohesion Policy. The European Council of Berlin of 24–25 March 
1999 approved the Commission proposals, but with a smaller amount of financing. 
This was a decision with a very important political meaning in light of the then 
imminent enlargement of the Union, planned for 2004. The era of broad consensus on 
Cohesion Policy ended, and for the first time the resources were to be reduced during 
the programming period: from €32 bn in 2000 to €29 bn in 2006.
In 2004, ten new Member States joined the EU (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary), a major milestone 
in the Union’s development. With the accession of these countries, the regional 
disparities within the Union become considerably more intense. The resources of 
the Cohesion Policy represented about three quarters of the disbursements of the 
Community budget toward the new Member States, and played a fundamental role in 
accompanying the restructuring processes of those economies.
At that time, the political climate made the discussion on the programming period 
2007–2013 particularly long and complex. The budget negotiation was resolved by 
restricting the size of the budget (despite having to accommodate both the “old” and 
the “new” Member States to which Romania and Bulgaria would be added in 2007 
and Croatia in 2013) and by introducing new compensations for the net-contributing 
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States. As in the past, resources were earmarked in substantial measure (€177 bn) to 
the regions with a per capita income lower than 75% of the Community average, now 
included in a Convergence Objective.8 The Cohesion Fund had a budget of almost 
€62 bn. A fundamental aspect of the Cohesion Policy for 2007–2013 was the strong 
reduction of aid in the EU15. More than half of the €308 bn was allocated to the new 
Member States.
The construction of the European Cohesion Policy for 2014–2020 was influenced 
by the publication in 2009 of an authoritative report by an independent Italian 
expert, Fabrizio Barca (Manzella 2011). The Barca report reiterated the importance 
of developing integrated intervention programmes built on the basis of the special 
characteristics of the various regions (“place-based” approach) (Barca 2009). These 
suggestions were partially put into action. The policy for 2014–2020 in many respects 
mimics that of the previous period, but it also presents several innovations. Regional 
allocation criterion changes with respect to the long previous tradition. There is still 
the category of less developed regions, which correspond as in the past to those with 
a per capita income in terms of purchasing power below the 75% of the Community 
average and to which the greatest part of the resources is earmarked. The novelties are 
represented by the category of “transition” regions (per capita income between 75% 
and 90%) and by the category of the most developed regions (per capita income above 
90%). The Cohesion Fund group now includes the new Member States, Portugal and 
Greece. The geography of the beneficiaries shifts ever farther towards the East: the 
new Member States absorb about 55% of the total resources. The significance of these 
figures is obviously much greater if they are expressed as a percentage of GDP or per 
inhabitant. Among the old Member States the biggest beneficiary is Italy, followed 
by Spain; the expenditure diminishes significantly in Germany, while it remains 
substantially unchanged in Portugal and Greece.
10.2. The Geography of ERDF and CF Expenditures 
The first question we aim to answer is: “How much have European countries/regions 
received under the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund?”. 
Table 1 shows the expenditures of the two funds in each Member State from 1994 to 
2013, in constant euros; it shows allocations for the period 2014–2020, in current prices, 
too. It is not possible to add all the periods (current vs. constant euros; expenditures vs. 
allocations) but the overall picture is still important for understanding the “geography” 
of the Cohesion Policy. Obviously, in looking at the three programming periods as a 
whole, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Central and Eastern Europe countries 
8  All the other European regions were included in a new Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
Objective, for which €39 bn were allocated. The decision to go beyond the old logic of “zones” in 
Objective 2 had a very important political significance. Regional Policy was no longer merely a policy 
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have become members only in 2004 and, therefore, have started to benefit from the 
Cohesion Policy later than the old Member States.9 Moreover, initially, the Cohesion 
Fund covered Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Later the group incorporated all the 
new Member States together with Greece and Portugal, while Ireland and Spain — due 
to the growth of their GDP per capita — became no longer eligible (although the latter 
retained the right to receive aids in accordance with the transition rules). 
9  Indeed, the Central and Eastern Europe countries benefited also from the EU’s pre-accession 
structural support.
Looking at the period 1994–2013, the Iberian countries clearly emerge as the 
main beneficiaries: ERDF and CF provided €111 bn to Spain and €51 bn to Portugal. 
However, notwithstanding its later accession, Poland is the second beneficiary country 
with €70 bn (2004–2013), ahead of Italy (€58 bn), Greece (€55 bn) and Germany (€46 
bn). Another group of countries, including both old (France and United Kingdom) 
and new (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania) Member States, received more than 
€20 bn in the whole period. The Cohesion Policy is definitely of minor importance for 
a group of Centre-North European countries such as Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Denmark and Sweden.
It is clear that the expansion of the EU to include the post-socialist CEE countries 
changed the “geography” of the Cohesion Policy, drawing substantial investment away 
from Southern Europe: funds for Ireland drastically declined, and Spain, after peaking 
in 2007–2013 with more than €45 bn, declines subsequently; other Member States, 
especially the larger ones, kept the same amount of funding, with a decline in 2007–
2013 only for the UK. The role of new Member States became crucial: expenditures in 
Slovakia became larger than in France; in Poland they became almost three times those 
in Italy.
The eastward shift is even more clear if one looks at allocations for 2014–2020, with 
the amounts declining in Germany, Greece and Spain, and being confirmed in their 
magnitude (except for Hungary) in the new Member States. In 2020 Poland will be the 
country that has received, overall, the most ERDF and CF expenditures, overcoming 
Spain. In brief, what is evident is that the centre of gravity in Structural Funds allocation 
has shifted from the Southern regions to the Eastern regions of Europe.
However, absolute figures must be matched by per capita amounts. Table 1 shows 
the ERDF and CF expenditures per capita for the period of 2007–2013. The three 
Baltic countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic received more than €2,000 per 
person; the figure is around €1,500 for Greece and Portugal, as well as for Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia; it goes down to €750 for Bulgaria and Romania, and to €550 for 
Spain, €350 for Italy, less than €200 for Germany and Finland, around €100 for France 
and the UK. It is clear how varied the impact of the Cohesion Policy is in the different 
Member States. 
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10.3. The Impact of Cohesion Policy on Public Investment
Cohesion Policy plays a key role in financing public investment in Europe. According 
to the European Commission, its allocations in 2014–2016 are expected to represent 
14% of total public investment in the EU. However, its weight is very different across 
Member States. In some European countries, Cohesion Policy plays a key role; in others, 
it is significant, even if to a lesser extent; in others, it is negligible. This difference is 
due to three factors: (i) the size of cohesion expenditures per country compared to the 
magnitude of the different European economies, (ii) the geography of the crisis that 
hit Europe, (iii) the use of European Structural and Investment (ESI) expenditures in 
different typologies of regions. 
WIIW and ISMERI Europa (2015) show the proportion of actual Cohesion Policy 
expenditures to total government capital expenditures (the sum of fixed investments 
and capital transfers) for the 2007–2013 programming period: this figure is larger than 
50% in some small Central and Eastern European countries (including Hungary), 
larger than 40% in Poland, larger than 30% in most of the other Central and Eastern 
European countries. In Hungary 94% of railways and 54% of road investment have 
been financed by the EU Cohesion Policy. In the EU15, the figure is higher in Portugal 
and Greece, much lower in most Member States (7% for Spain, 4.4 % for Italy and 2.5 
% for Germany). However, WIIW and ISMERI Europa (2015) estimate that Cohesion 
Policy expenditures may have reached 20% of total capital expenditures in Convergence 
regions in Spain, 15% in Italy and 10% in Germany.
Fig. 1 ERDF and Cohesion Fund allocations, 2015–2017 (percentage of general government capital 
expenditure)
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Figure 1 updates and confirms the figures for 2015–2017, using allocations data. The 
role of ERDF and the Cohesion Fund seems even higher in some countries, namely 
Portugal (a country in which the burden of servicing the debt is relevant) and Poland. 
It is reasonable to state that most countries would not have had the financial capacity 
to carry out such investments otherwise.
Indeed, it is well known that in a number of Member States public investments 
are still below the pre-crisis period level (Prota 2016); these persistent low levels of 
public investment (as a share of the GDP) are a cause for concern, because of their 
possible effect on socio-economic disparities between Member States and regions 
in the EU. In many countries, therefore, EU funding played a major counter-cyclical 
role in preventing an even larger reduction in public investment, as confirmed by the 
increase in EU co-financing rates for Cohesion Policy in the period 2007–2013.10 The 
EU co-financing rate was raised to different extents in 16 Member States in which the 
effects of the crisis of 2008 were most severe and the reduction in public investment 
expenditure (part of budget consolidation measures) was substantial: in Greece the 
EU co-financing rate went up to 100%.11 Obviously, the final effect of the increase in EU 
co-financing rates, aimed at reducing the amount of national funding, was to cut the 
overall amount of funding going into Cohesion Policy programmes.
The relative allocation of funding across expenditure items is not identical in all 
countries and regions. The EU funding is particularly crucial in some key investment 
areas (Table 2). For 2007–2013 a detailed breakdown of expenditures in eighty-six items 
is available (WIIW and ISMERI Europa 2015). By aggregating the eight-six intervention 
priorities to twelve broad policy areas, it emerges that the largest policy area (mainly 
capital transfers), with about €52 bn, is R&D, innovation and enterprise support. Roads 
accounts for €39 bn, including €18 bn in motorways in the Trans-European Networks 
(Ten-T); railways for €15.9 bn (including €12 bn in Ten-T corridors); other transport 
(urban, multimodal, airports and ports) for €7.6 bn. Environment investment totalled 
€33.7 bn: main areas of expenditures are water (€16 bn) together with waste, risk 
prevention and promotion of clean urban transport. Other crucial investment priorities 
are ICT, energy, tourism and culture, urban and rural regeneration, education, health 
and social infrastructures.
10  The verification of additionality for the 2007–2013 programming period shows that the average 
annual “structural” spending was on average some 1% lower than initially estimated (European 
Commission 2017). There are however significant differences across Member States. For example, 
the actual structural spending for 2007–2013 was 35% lower than the ex-ante baseline in Greece. The 
variation is over 25% in Italy and between 10 and 20% in Hungary, Lithuania and Portugal.
11  Substantial increases also occurred in Italy (from 48% to 65%), from 50% to 72% in the less developed 
regions, and in Portugal (from 63% to 74%). 
The study “Geography of Expenditures” (WIIW and ISMERI Europa 2015) has 
produced a consolidated database covering the regional ERDF and CF investments 
from 2000 to 2013. Using this database, Table 3 shows the breakdown of the overall 
cumulative expenditure by selected countries in the six policy areas more relevant 
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Table 2 Expenditures of ERDF and CF by priorities, 2007–2013 (constant 2015 euros)
Source of data: European Commission (https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/) 
Priority 2007-2013







Tourism and culture 9.3




for public investment, covering more than half of total ERDF and CF expenditures: 
transport, environment, urban and rural regeneration, social infrastructures, IT 
infrastructures and services, and energy.12 
Table 3 ERDF and Cohesion Fund cumulative 2000–2013 expenditures by selected 
countries and policy area, in billion euros (constant 2015 prices)
Source of data: European Commission (https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/
Historic-EU-payments-regionalised-and-modelled/tc55-7ysv)
Transport infrastructures are clearly the most important policy area, with more than 
€100 bn in 2000–2013. This expenditure category is extremely relevant in Spain and 
12  The different disaggregation in policy areas shown in the Tables 2 and 3 is due to the different 












Spain 24.0 16.3 7.6 2.4 1.5 0.2 52.1
Poland 26.8 8.0 1.3 2.9 2.4 1.7 43.3
Greece 14.9 4.1 2.2 2.5 2.3 1.1 27.1
Portugal 7.0 4.6 2.5 4.8 1.1 0.6 20.6
Italy 7.6 3.3 3.8 1.4 1.8 1.3 19.2
Hungary 7.3 4.4 0.9 2.6 0.6 0.5 16.3
Czech Republic 7.0 3.7 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.0 14.1
Germany 6.4 3.0 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 13.5
France 1.5 2.1 2.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 7.5
Slovakia 2.9 1.5 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.1 6.7
UE-15 65.0 34.0 23.2 12.4 9.0 4.9 148.5
UE-12 49.7 22.0 4.1 9.6 4.8 4.3 94.6
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Poland (around €25 bn) and in general in Central and Eastern European countries. 
This is particularly important since, as shown by Di Comite et al. (2018), investment in 
transport infrastructure financed by the Cohesion Policy is changing the accessibility 
of EU regions. In particular, many regions in Eastern Europe have significantly 
benefitted from improved accessibility as a result of the Cohesion Policy financing 
transport infrastructure investments. This has favoured intra-European trade and the 
organization of manufacturing value chains in Central Europe. As shown by Stöllinger 
(2016), manufacturing activity in the EU is increasingly concentrated in a Central 
European manufacturing core, implying divergent paths of structural change across 
Member States. In the rest of the EU regions accessibility has also increased, though 
less significantly (see Figure 22 in Di Comite et al. 2018). However, in Portugal and 
Spain ERDF and CF investments were crucial for the improvement, since the mid-
1990s, of the road and railway network; the same has happened in Greece (consider 
the motorway from Igoumenitsa to Athens).
Investment for environment and natural resources, the second policy area in order of 
importance, totalled €56 bn, followed by urban and rural regeneration (€27 bn), social 
infrastructures, IT infrastructures and energy. However, priorities for expenditures 
are different among countries. In EU12, transport and environment are extremely 
relevant, also as a consequence of the Cohesion Funds rules. On the contrary, in EU15, 
territorial regeneration and social infrastructures are relatively more important. Some 
national patterns also emerge: in Spain expenditures for the environment and urban 
regeneration are particularly high; in Portugal social infrastructures play a key role. 
Comparing 2000–2006 with 2007–2013 confirms the importance of transport, while 
public investments in the energy sector increase.
What are the results of the Cohesion Policy as far as public physical investments 
are concerned? Table 4 shows the main achievements.13 For 2000–2006, it is useful 
to consider also the Structural Pre-Accession Instrument (ISPA) fund, alongside the 
ERDF and CF.
13  The statistics herein rather underestimate the actual outputs in terms of new or renovated 
infrastructure, due to some features of the reporting mechanism that asked Member States to keep 
track of the progress to the EU Commission. However, this data is the most reliable since it comes 
from official publications and documents of the EU.
In 2000–2006 more than 14,000 km of new roads were built, plus almost 800 
km related to Trans-European Network projects. Additionally, almost 65,000 km of 
reconstructed road were financed. As regards railways, more than 1,500 km of new 
railways were constructed, as well as almost 1,000 km of TEN-related railways, and 
more than 5,800 km of railways were reconstructed. Railway projects were mainly 
concentrated in the areas of Andalusia and Galicia (Spain), Lisbon and Vale do Tejo 
(Portugal), Mazowieckie (Poland), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) and 
Puglia (Italy). These regions all experienced forms of improvements directly resulting 
from the policies at hand, in particular with reference to pre-existing critical aspects 
such as poor quality of road/rail network, congestion, bottlenecks, missing or poor 
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Table 4 Main achievements of the Cohesion Policy co-financed public investments (2000–2006; 
2006–2013)
Source of data: European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/it/policy/evaluations/
ec/2000-2006; https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/it/policy/evaluations/ec/2007-2013)
2000-2006 ERDF, CF and 
ISPA co-financed public 
investments
 2007-2013 ERDF and CF co-
financed public 
investments
Km of new roads (no.) 14,030                                     4,900
Km of new TEN roads (no.) 785                                          2,400
Km of reconstructed roads (no.) 64,897                                     28,600
Km of new railway (no.) 1,522                                       1,050
Km of TEN railway (no.) 980                                          2,600
Km of reconstructed railway (no.) 5,857                                       3,900
Additional population served by water projects (thousand) 14,101                                     5,900
Additional population served by waste water projects (thousand) 20,447                                     6,900
New capacity of solid waste treatment created (m3/day) 231,649                                   -
Annual reduction of energy consumption (GWh) - 1,440
Annual reduction of reenhouse gas emissions (kilo tonnes of CO2) - 830
Additional capacity of renewable energy production (megawatts) - 3,900
intermodal links, ports/airports’ lack of capacity (Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy and Steer Davies Gleave 2010).
The environmental investments mainly referred to the facilities and distribution 
network needed to provide clean drinking water to households, the plant and pipelines 
required for the collection and treatment of wastewater and the facilities needed to 
collect, recycle and manage solid waste (Applica 2012). In these fields the EU invested 
in more than 165,000 projects; they were quite effective, given that more than 14 million 
additional people were served. In addition, more than 6,000 projects on wastewater 
were financed, which resulted in more than 20 million new people being served.14 
Finally, almost 3,000 solid waste treatment projects were also financed, mainly located 
in Germany, Spain, France and Italy, resulting in a considerable improvement of total 
capacity of more than 230,000 m3/day (ADE 2009). Importantly, from 2000 to 2009, the 
shares of landfilled waste dropped from 51% to 32% in the EU15 and from 96% to 85% 
in the EU12. At the same time, the share of recycled waste rose from 31% to 44% in the 
EU15 and from 2% to 12% in the EU12, with peaks in Slovenia (35%), Estonia (25%) 
and Poland (20%). 
In 2007–2013 both the ERDF and the CF, as already mentioned, focused greatly 
on transport expenditures. A considerable share was utilized for the constructions of 
14  The Portuguese region of Norte started with around 40% of population served by wastewater 
treatment plants in 2000, and ended up with more than 55% in 2006. Also in the Italian region of 
Lazio, a considerable improvement occurred, as the percentage of population served by secondary 
and tertiary treatment rose from around 22% in 1999 to around 30% in 2006. On average, the share of 
population connected to wastewater treatment rose in the period 2000–2009 from 85 to 88 in the EU15 
(although with significant lower percentages for countries like Ireland, Greece and Portugal) and 
from 46 to 55 in the EU12.
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new roads or the upgrading of existing ones. For example, in Poland and Romania this 
share is higher than 60%, and in none of the Member States is it less than 40%. In terms 
of actual achievements, this resulted in more than 4,800 km of new roads, of which 
over 70% were built in the EU12, with a substantial amount in Poland. Almost 28,000 
km of existing roads were upgraded (70% in theEU10).15 
More than 1,000 km of new railways were built, almost exclusively in EU15 Member 
States. The upgrade of existing railways covered almost 4,000 km, of which 60% were 
in EU15 countries, and the rest in EU12 countries. Trans-European Networks increased 
by more than 2,400 km of new roads (mainly in the EU12) and by more than 2,600 km 
of railways (mainly in the EU15). Once again, Poland was one of the countries that 
benefitted the most from this policy: the completion of the A1 motorway connecting 
Torun to Strykow, which represented a strategic link between the port of Gdansk, 
central Poland and the Czech border, is a good example.16
Almost 6 million additional people were served by new water projects (more than 
60% in the four countries of Southern Europe). Almost 7 million additional people 
were served by wastewater projects (70% in Southern Europe). It is estimated that an 
annual reduction of energy consumption of almost 1,440 GWh and an annual reduction 
of greenhouse gas emission of around 830 kilotonnes of CO2 in public and residential 
buildings can be directly attributed to energy efficiency investments co-financed by ESI 
funds. Urban development and social infrastructure investments were diffused all over 
Europe. Examples of these projects are: the modernization of schools and colleges in 
Portugal (benefitting over 300 thousand youngsters); upgrading of training facilities 
in Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic and Lithuania; improvements in the healthcare 
system in Hungary; and construction and upgrading of schools in Poland (benefitting 
almost 2 million people).17
As for the programming period 2014–2020, the online European Commission portal 
provides some information on the most important public investments financed via the 
ERDF and CF.18 There are several “major projects” of transport, mainly in CEE countries. 
The largest is the rehabilitation of the railway line HU Border-Brasov, in Romania 
(more than €1.3 bn); while the works on the railway line No. 7 Warszawa Wschodnia 
Osobowa-Dorohusk, in Poland, amount to more than €750 mn. The first non-Eastern 
country to benefit from large EU financial means for transport investment is Greece, 
with the completion of the Metro Thessaloniki Main Line and the acquisition of trains 
for its use. All of these projects have the objective of promoting sustainable transport and 
removing bottlenecks. Major projects are underway also for the environment, such as 
15  One example is the Bulgarian Trakia motorway project, linking the southeastern cities of Stara Zagora 
and Karnobat: finalized in 2013, it completed the route from Sofia to the Black Sea port of Burgas. 
16  See the reports available at https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007- 
2013/#6
17  See the reports available at https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007- 
2013/#10
18  See the dataset available at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2014-2020/ESIF-2014-2020-ERDF- 
CF-Major-Projects/sjs4-8wgj/data 
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Figure 2 shows the European regions receiving most of the expenditure of the 
two funds between 1994 and 2013.20 Andalusia (Spain), Norte (Portugal), Campania 
(Italy), Mazowieckie (Poland) and Sicilia (Italy) are by far the main beneficiaries. 
Looking at the first thirty-five regions with higher expenditures, we find eight regions 
in Spain, seven in Poland, four in Greece, Portugal and Italy, three in Germany and 
two in Hungary. As already stressed, Eastern enlargement was crucial: investment in 
the region of Warsaw (Mazowieckie) in 2004–2013 is as large as investment between 
1994 and 2013 in some large Southern European regions such as Campania and Sicilia 
(Italy), larger than in the region of Athens (Attiki). Several European regions including 
the capital city are large beneficiaries: together with Warsaw, Athens, Dublin, Lisbon, 
Madrid and Berlin in EU15, Budapest, Tallinn, Prague and Bucharest in EU12. In 
some regions, investments financed by ERDF and CF are quite large: twenty Central 
and Eastern European regions received more than €2 bn in 2004–2013. In Andalusia, 
between 2000 and 2013 investment in transport amounted to €5.1 bn and in urban and 
rural regeneration to €3.3 bn. In Portugal €2.1 bn were invested in social infrastructures 
in the Norte region, and €1.2 bn in the Centro. Investments in transport were larger 
than €2 bn in fifteen European regions: €5 bn in Spain and Poland, €2 bn in Greece, and 
€1 bn in Portugal, Italy and Latvia. 
In large European countries with substantial economic internal divides (such 
as Germany, Italy and Spain) territorial concentration is important: in Germany the 
role of the Cohesion Policy increased, after reunification, in Eastern Landers; in Italy 
20  Totals must be read with caution because the figures for the different programming periods are in 
current euros.
the protection and rehabilitation of the coastal zone in Romania (€600 mn). Finally, 
other major projects are in the field of urban transport, such as the construction of the 
second metro line in Warsaw (€450 mn), the extension of the metro in Sofia (€370 mn), 
and the Metropolitan line of the Circumetnea railway in Sicily (€360 mn).
10.4. Regional Convergence and Spillovers
The European Cohesion Policy benefits all European regions in order to improve 
their competitiveness, with a strong focus on less developed areas. The effectiveness 
of the Cohesion Policy and its impact on growth has been widely analyzed in the 
literature (for instance, see the surveys by Fratesi 2016, and Pieńkowski and Berkowitz 
2016). While the results of the papers using regional growth regressions are largely 
inconclusive regarding the impact of the Cohesion Policy on growth, the studies 
adopting a counterfactual impact evaluations technique show a clear positive impact 
of the Cohesion Policy on growth and other economic indicators (Pellegrini et al. 2013; 
Giua 2017; Becker et al. 2018).19
19  Doubts over the conclusions that are frequently inferred from the results obtained from growth 
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internal divides remained as such since the beginning of the Cohesion Policy; in Spain, 
regions in the northeast of the country, together with Madrid, improved their GDP per 
capita substantially compared to the EU average, exiting the rank of less developed 
regions and therefore seeing a strong decline of cohesion expenditures. Territorial 
concentration is also significant in countries such as Portugal, Greece and the United 
Kingdom. As far as Central and Eastern European Member States are concerned, the 
Cohesion Policy started covering the whole country; however, due to both their strong 
growth and the increase of internal divides, some important regions moved, and are 
moving, away from the group of less developed regions to intermediate or developed 
ones, with a decrease of cohesion expenditures: this is the case with all the regions 
containing capital cities.
10.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this final section, we want to briefly summarize the main findings of our analysis. 
• The Cohesion policy is the European Union’s main investment policy, 
covering one third of EU budget. All regions and Member States are affected, 
but its action is substantially stronger in less developed ones.
• Until the big Eastern enlargement, main beneficiaries were in Southern 
Europe. Since 2004, most of the funds have been allocated in Central and 
Eastern European regions and countries that now receive substantially larger 
amounts.
• ERDF and CF expenditures finance around one sixth of European public 
investment. Their role increased in the last decade. In more recent years they 
finance 40% or more of total public capital expenditures in most Central 
and Eastern European countries, but their role is also significant in some 
Southern European countries, namely Greece and Portugal. They were able 
to mitigate the steep decline of public investment in the Member States that 
were hit by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
• ERDF and CF expenditures are particularly important for transport 
infrastructures, both roads and rails, especially in Central and Eastern 
European countries. The investments in transport infrastructure financed 
by the Cohesion Policy are changing the accessibility of EU regions. In 
particular, many regions in Eastern Europe have significantly benefitted 
from improved accessibility as a result of the Cohesion Policy’s financing of 
transport infrastructure investments. Major investments are under way with 
the Cohesion Policy for 2014–2020.
• Environmental investments are important as well, even in Southern Europe; 
ERDF and CF also contribute to social (education, health, social services) 
and economic (IT, energy) infrastructures. 
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• The expenditures for the Cohesion Policy produce significant economic 
spillovers in favour of more advanced regions and countries in the EU.
• Implications of this analysis could be the following. If the low levels of public 
investment persist for a prolonged period, this will lead to a deterioration of 
public capital and negatively affect longer-term output. Many economists 
and research institutions advocate public investment spending to boost both 
internal demand and the potential output of the EU economy. It is, therefore, 
fundamental to pursue policies to encourage the growth-enhancing, long-
term investments. There is little doubt that more public investment in the 
EU’s infrastructure is needed, especially in less developed regions and 
Member States.
• The Cohesion Policy has played and is still playing a major role in this 
framework. Its role within EU policies should be preserved and enhanced. 
In particular, it is important that the Cohesion Policy for 2021–2027 is funded 
with an adequate budget, for both Southern and Eastern less developed 
regions.
• The EU fiscal framework appears unable to foster public investment, even 
as a counter-cyclical fiscal stabilization tool. The issue of the incorporation 
of an appropriate “Golden Rule” in the EU fiscal framework — that is, the 
provision to exclude selected public investment from the budget deficit 
requirements  —  should be at the forefront of discussion about the EU’s 
future. A hypothesis could be to exclude investment co-financed by the 
Cohesion Policy from the Stability and Growth Pact deficit requirement. 
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